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The aftermath of a crisis often brings reflections on the adequacy of regulatory capital 
against financial shocks. Accordingly, succeeding regulatory interventions focus on 
strengthening the resilience of the banking system by improving the quality and quantity of 
capital, and subordinated debt (sub-debt) remains key to these reforms. Whether, however, 
the regulatory motive underpins the decision of banks to issue sub-debt is unclear. Moreover, 
the perceptions of shareholders on the regulatory function of sub-debt are less understood. 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions by first reviewing other roles of sub-debt then 
testing if regulation drives its issuance and finally revealing shareholder incentives that 
weaken its regulatory function.  
Contrasting capital requirement motives with other explanations, and accounting for 
equity issuance, we find that banks issue sub-debt primarily to improve their regulatory 
capital buffer. While a few non-regulatory factors, related to easier entry conditions to debt 
market, influence the issuance decision, their economic impact is smaller than the impact of 
the buffer. By exploring how variations in tail risk and size influence the sub-debt and equity 
issuance decisions by banks with low buffers, we show that issuance choices do not reflect 
risk-shifting incentives. 
Next, we review shareholders’ perceptions of the regulatory value of sub-debt vis-a-vis 
the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation incentives associated with senior debt by 
comparing the reaction of stocks to these security announcements. We find that senior debt 
incentives are more valuable than the regulatory benefit of sub-debt. Contrary to regulatory 
expectations, announcement of sub-debt (capital-improving) offers are valueless even when 
undertaken by risky or less-capitalized banks; rather, senior debt offered by these vulnerable 
banks generate significant shareholder value. Pursuant to these risk-shifting motives, senior 
iv 
debt issuers get riskier post-issuance. These findings suggest that the broader debt priority 
structure harbours perverse incentives that dilute the regulatory effectiveness of sub-debt. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Banking crises often leave a trail of economic damage and unbearable financial 
instabilities that economies and financial systems take a long time to recover from. The 
severity of social costs associated with these crises normally trigger regulatory reforms that 
aim to prevent the next one as bank regulators usually convene to redefine prudent banking 
principles. The latest development in this regard is the implementation of the Basel III capital 
framework, which improves the quality and quantity of regulatory capital. Along these lines, 
regulators are placing greater emphasis on high quality components of regulatory capital, 
such as common equity, as credible and sustainable sources of bank capital. Accordingly, the 
regulatory prominence of sub-debt, and Tier 2 elements in general, is diminished. 
Nonetheless, sub-debt still contributes between 19% and 25% towards the total capital 
adequacy of a bank and as such remains a key component as far as the quantity of regulatory 
capital is concerned.1 
In spite of the overall importance of sub-debt to the capital adequacy of a bank, little is 
known as to whether banks use this type of debt primarily for regulatory reasons related to 
capital requirements. Moreover, there is little evidence on how the shareholders perceive the 
usage of sub-debt as a tool that enhances the financial stability of their institutions as 
intended by the regulators. In other words, we do not know if the views of shareholders on 
the role of sub-debt are compatible with the financial stability objectives that allow banks to 
                                               
1 Basel III recognizes Tier 2 elements that includes sub-debt up to 2% of risk-weighted assets 
(RWA). At this level, these elements would contribute up to 25% to the minimum capital adequacy 
ratio of 8% or 19% in relation to the minimum requirement that includes the capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% (see, BIS, 2010; Federal Reserve System, 2013). 
2 
issue it to meet the regulatory capital requirements. 
The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to bring the regulatory importance of sub-debt to 
the fore by establishing if the ongoing recognition of the instrument in bank regulatory 
capital underlies its issuance. This test is important for a couple of reasons. Primarily, it 
reflects on the practicality of the continuous regulatory efforts that seek to influence the 
recapitalization behavior of banks in order to mitigate threats from financial instability. The 
extant literature is inconclusive in this respect. The early studies conclude that regulation 
effectively drives the capital structure decisions of banks (Cornett et al., 1998; Cornett and 
Tehranian, 1994). However, some recent evidence suggest that regulation is of secondary 
importance in the financial decisions of banks (Dinger and Vallascas, 2016; Krishnan et al., 
2010). In fact, the capital structure of banks is arguably driven by similar factors that apply 
to non-financial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2010; Teixeira et al., 2014). Bearing these 
differences in mind, this thesis uses sub-debt as an alternative regulatory element to fully 
inform debates on the effectiveness of regulation on bank capital structure. Noticeably, the 
prior literature predominantly addresses this topic by focusing on the use of equity or overall 
bank leverage, which ignores the regulatory aspect of sub-debt.  
Secondly, it is critical to ensure that sub-debt serves the regulatory purposes intended. 
That is, it is insufficient to merely explore the effects of regulation on the sub-debt issuance 
decision of banks but necessary to ensure that the instrument does not harbour undesirable 
intentions that threaten financial stability, which it seeks to uphold in the first place. There 
are concerns that sub-debt exacerbates moral hazard in banking, especially since the removal 
of credit covenants that would otherwise disqualify the instrument from regulatory capital 
or when it is used by standalone banks or BHCs (Ashcraft, 2008; Belkhir, 2013). On these 
grounds, this thesis proceeds to determine who issues sub-debt, and if the risk-shifting 
motivation, rather than the regulatory motive, underscores the utilization of the instrument 
3 
as suggested by the literature.  
While the foregoing tests have an important bearing on the use of sub-debt for regulatory 
purposes, it is also essential to ensure that these functions are not impeded in any way. In 
the interest of financial stability, shareholders should view the issuance of sub-debt in the 
same light as regulators, otherwise the regulatory importance of the instrument would be 
weakened. On this basis, the thesis finally examines the potential distractions to the 
regulatory effectiveness of sub-debt by evaluating the valuation perceptions of shareholders 
towards the instrument, especially in the presence of senior debt. This analysis is based on 
the existing evidence that shareholders use senior debt to shift risk and expropriate the wealth 
of junior debt holders (Masulis, 1980). In this respect, debt seniority could present valuable 
opportunities for bank shareholders to shift risk and expropriate subordinated claims, 
thereby acting against the objectives of capital frameworks that allow sub-debt in regulatory 
capital. In line with this possibility, the thesis evaluates whether there are any cross-sectional 
differences in the reaction of shareholders to the announcement of senior debt or sub-debt, 
particularly for banks that have a legacy of being risky or under-capitalized. The empirical 
analysis in this regard concludes by examining how these security choice decisions affect the 
long-term risk behavior of the issuers and if these choices reflect risk-shifting intentions of 
shareholders mainly relating to the use of senior debt. 
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
The implications of financial instability are enormous as evidenced by the recent global 
financial crisis. An array of regulatory tools are available to soften the disruptions from these 
episodes, among them the regulatory capital frameworks. However, what remains is that 
these measures would only be worthwhile if they are effective in influencing banks to 
recapitalize and remain sound. Importantly, the application of regulatory capital frameworks 
should not bear unintended consequences that further exacerbate financial instability nor be 
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interrupted in a way that could undermine the effectiveness of the capital elements in regards 
to financial stability. By using sub-debt as a component of these frameworks, this thesis 
offers an insight into these themes.  
The thesis comprises two in-depth empirical chapters that expand the understanding of 
sub-debt within the regulatory context, thereby complementing the extant literature that is 
predominantly preoccupied with the disciplinary and the tax implications of the instrument. 
As an extension, the chapters contribute to the wider literature on the effectiveness of 
regulation on the behavior of banks and their capital structure decisions. The thesis is also 
relevant to discussions on the effective role of sub-debt within regulatory capital frameworks. 
The summary and contributions of the two empirical chapters are discussed in the following 
sub-sections.  
1.2.1 Does Regulation Drive Banks to Issue Subordinated Debt? 
Chapter 3 tests the underlying motives behind the issuance of sub-debt. By comparing 
the regulatory factor (regulatory capital buffer) to the theoretical capital structure factors 
(collectively, non-regulatory factors) that drive the issuance of junior debt in non-financial 
firms, the study isolates the effectiveness (or otherwise) of regulation in the sub-debt issuance 
decision of banks. The underlying argument of this chapter is that the regulatory acceptance 
of sub-debt should make it appealing to banks with low regulatory capital buffers. The 
chapter, therefore, builds upon the existing studies on the relevance of regulation in the 
financial decisions of banks.  
Using sub-debt in this debate is critical in some respects. Firstly, it offers a fresh 
perspective to the current discussions by using another regulatory capital element other than 
equity. Secondly, it expands the scope of discussions on the use of sub-debt in banking that 
have so far excluded the default regulatory functions of the instrument. Some notable studies 
by Covitz et al. (2004) and Hancock and Birchler (2004) offer some thoughts on the effect 
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of regulation on sub-debt issuance. However, these studies are concerned with the issuance 
of sub-debt across deposit legislative regimes, which are of little relevance to the recognition 
of the instrument in regulatory capital. The present study, therefore, offers a comprehensive 
picture of the regulatory motives behind the use of sub-debt by referring to the capital 
frameworks that directly regulate its application in banking.  
For this analysis, the study uses securities of publicly listed and delisted US banks for the 
period ranging from 1983 to 2015. The start of the sample period coincides with the 
implementation and application of the regulatory capital requirement to all banks in the US, 
while the length of the sample period ensures that the analysis cuts across all regulatory 
capital regimes, such that, intertemporal variations in the regulatory treatment of sub-debt 
are fully captured. In addition, the present study is deliberately targeted at the US given the 
active discussion of sub-debt in this market, let alone the historic tendency, dating as far back 
as the 1960s, of banks to use sub-debt as part of their capital (Ehlen, 1983). 
The results of this chapter suggest that banks use sub-debt for regulatory purposes. 
Specifically, banks that are close to the regulatory minimum requirement (low regulatory 
capital buffer) are more likely to issue sub-debt to improve their overall capital adequacy 
levels. The importance of non-regulatory factors in the sub-debt issuance decision is usually 
smaller than this regulatory motive. These results also take into account the available 
opportunity of banks to use equity for the same purposes.  
Crucially, the study establishes that the regulatory motives of using sub-debt do not 
harbour issues of moral hazard. In this case, risky banks are less likely to issue sub-debt. The 
findings rather point to some ability of the market to ration risky issuers, thereby exerting 
some degree of market discipline in debt quantities (Park and Peristiani, 1998). Notably, this 
rationing also applies to large banks in contrary to arguments that the conjectural 
government guarantees associated with these banks weakens the market discipline upon 
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them (Acharya et al., 2016; Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2011; 2014). 
1.2.2 The Effect of Debt Priority on the Regulatory Role of Subordinated 
Debt 
The second empirical investigation, reported in chapter 4, evaluates how the seniority of 
securities within the wider capital structure leads to shareholder incentives that interfere with 
the effective functioning of sub-debt as a regulatory capital element. This chapter is informed 
by the existing evidence that shareholders constantly seek opportunities to improve their 
wealth, and such actions are detrimental to the value of other security classes. Debt in general 
is susceptible to value expropriation by shareholders (Chen and Stock, 2018; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) but junior debt, in particular, is largely devalued when shareholders issue 
senior debt or debt of equivalent status (Black and Cox, 1976; Masulis, 1980). The analysis 
in this chapter, therefore, seeks to assess the extent to which shareholders value the risk-
shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities associated with the use of senior debt at the 
expense of the regulatory capital efforts that allow banks to use junior debt (sub-debt in this 
case) as a source of financial strength.  
Through an understanding of the shareholder motives in this respect, the thesis 
contributes to existing studies that consider the current capital frameworks inadequate to 
control the risk-taking behavior of banks (Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Hellwig, 2010). 
Specifically, the analysis adds to the outstanding debate that mainly view the inclusion of 
sub-debt in regulatory capital as unwarranted and detrimental to financial stability (Davies, 
2015; Schoenmaker, 2015).  
The results from this chapter suggest that the priority of debt within the wider bank capital 
structure bears moral hazard that weaken the regulatory effectiveness of sub-debt. By 
reviewing the wealth effects of shareholders when they announce senior or sub-debt, we 
show that sub-debt does not generate any shareholder value, even for risky or less-capitalized 
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banks that are supposed to benefit greatly from a regulatory capital element. Instead, senior 
debt adds significant shareholder value for these risky, less-capitalized or large banks. The 
tests from a multivariate setting further indicate that the level of risk positively explains the 
share valuations for banks announcing senior debt but this is not the case for sub-debt offers. 
These findings are, therefore, in line with suggestions that senior debt provides shareholders 
with valuable opportunities for shifting risk and expropriating the wealth of other 
stakeholders (Tang and Singer, 1993).  
Bearing in mind these opportunities for risk-shifting, the study proceeds to test how the 
security issuances profiles the long-term risk behavior of banks. For this test, the analysis 
compares the 2-year post issuance risk of banks that use senior or sub-debt. We conduct the 
study over the sample period covering 1984 to 2013 to ensure that security issuers have the 
minimum required information for the post-issuance analysis. The study shows that the 
issuance of senior debt aggravates the risk-taking behavior of banks, especially when these 
banks have a legacy of being risky. However, these effects are not evident in banks that issue 
sub-debt. 
Overall, the findings indicate that shareholders systematically place greater value on the 
issuance of senior instruments that promote their risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation 
motives at the detriment of the regulatory value of sub-debt as enshrined in the capital 
frameworks. As such, the regulatory deficiencies of sub-debt that are identified by the 
literature are not a result of its design, but are driven by the conflicting shareholder incentives 
within the broader priority structure of bank capital. In so doing, these findings underscore 
the widening divergence of the market and regulatory expectations with regards to the use 
of regulatory capital elements (Lubberink and Willett, 2016). Moreover, it extends studies 
such as Hancock and Birchler (2004) that evaluates the complementary nature of sub-debt 
and senior debt within the bank capital structure without regard to the implications of the 
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underlying tensions from their coexistence. 
1.2.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the roles of sub-
debt within the wider bank capital structure. These functions range from the regulatory role 
to the disciplinary, informational and tax benefits offered by the instrument. Chapter 3 
investigates the effect of regulation on bank’s decision to issue sub-debt. The chapter further 
evaluates whether these regulatory motives conceal the risk-shifting motives of banks. 
Chapter 4 reviews the implications of debt seniority on the regulatory effectiveness of sub-
debt, where the study scrutinizes the motives of shareholders that use senior debt in the 
presence of sub-debt. The chapter basically explores the shareholder perspectives with regard 
to the value of moral hazard opportunities provided by senior debt vis-a-vis the regulatory 
value of sub-debt. Additionally, the chapter assesses the impact of security choice decisions 
on the long-term risk behavior of banks with a view to determining whether the choice to 
issue senior debt underpins shareholders’ risk-shifting intentions. Finally, Chapter 5 
concludes the thesis, offers some policy implications and identifies areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2:  The Role of Subordinated Debt in Banking 
2.1 Introduction 
The significant role of banks in the financial sector indicates that major disruptions to 
their functions would cause severe consequences for economic growth (Dell'Ariccia et al., 
2008; Fernández et al., 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). For this reason, strengthening the 
financial stability of banks continues to be a key mandate of bank regulators (BIS, 1988; 
2010).  
Among the financial stability tools at their disposal, regulators are armed with regulatory 
capital frameworks that define unencumbered instruments that would unconditionally 
support institutions during distress to avert any disruptions to the smooth functioning of the 
banking system. This active determination of the components of regulatory capital and the 
setting of minimum capital requirements, thereof, act as an element of assurance on the 
safety and soundness of banks (Berger et al., 1995). In this manner, bank capital requirements 
are viewed as an incentive tool that aligns regulatory concerns about the social costs of 
financial instability to the private interests of bank shareholders (Miles et al., 2013; Santomero 
and Watson, 1977; Tarullo, 2008).  
However, the enormous task of financial stability cannot be sorely entrusted to 
shareholders. Hence regulators have expanded the scope of capital elements beyond the 
traditional forms of capital i.e., common or preference shares as is the case in non-financial 
firms. In this respect, regulators have enlisted unconventional means of capital, among them 
sub-debt, to strengthen the financial capacity of banks. The inclusion of sub-debt as a 
regulatory capital element is, however, subject to stringent regulatory qualification that 
specifically requires the instrument to be long-term, unsecured, uninsured or subordinate to 
depositors and general creditors, among others (Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989; 2013). 
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Regulators are convinced that these conditions provide sufficient compromise for sub-debt 
to act as a cushion for depositors and general creditors despite its transience and incapacity 
to absorb losses on an ongoing basis.2 Effectively, the residual loss position of sub-debt 
holders is akin to that of the deposit insurer, prompting views that its holders bear similar 
interests as regulators in so far as the safety and soundness of banks is concerned (Berger et 
al., 1995; Tarullo, 2008).  
In spite of these obvious regulatory benefits, little is known on whether banks use sub-
debt for the primary purpose of satisfying the capital requirements, neither is there evidence 
on the deterrents to the regulatory function of sub-debt. The instrument has rather received 
a lot of attention in other aspects of the capital structure than its default regulatory role. A 
more prominent and widely researched role of sub-debt is its ability to deter moral hazard in 
banking due to the risk-sensitivity of sub-debt investors (see among others, Chen and Hasan, 
2011; Evanoff et al., 2011; Nguyen, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). Other, auxiliary roles of sub-
debt are with regard to its information content (Covitz and Harrison, 2004; Hancock and 
Birchler, 2004) and its existence as an alternative security that banks can apply in their 
financial decisions, more especially for tax purposes (De Mooij and Keen, 2016; 
Schandlbauer, 2014; 2017).  
This chapter further elaborates on these functions in the following sub-sections. After 
introducing the importance of regulatory capital in financial stability, sub-section 2.2 explains 
the regulatory role of sub-debt by first considering the history of the regulatory capital 
                                               
2 The recognition of these deficiencies forms the basis for relegating the regulatory role of a sub-
debt to a supplementary one, and justifies its historically restricted contribution in regulatory capital 
to 50% of Tier 1 elements (BIS, 1988; Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989). At the same time, this 
restriction could be underpinning the scarce utilization of the instrument in banks (Bennett et al., 
2015; Conlon and Cotter, 2014) and its concentration among a few large banks (Belkhir, 2013; BIS, 
2003; Kwast et al., 1999). 
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standards in the US. The sub-section then offers some insights on the conditions that have 
overtime allowed sub-debt to be used as a form of bank regulatory capital. Sub-section 2.3 
summarizes the debates on the market discipline from sub-debt, starting off with the 
monitoring roles then proceeding with the influencing effects of the instrument. This sub-
section further deliberates on the mandatory sub-debt proposals that attempt to complement 
the supervisory processes by requiring banks to issue sub-debt. The informational, tax and 
capital structure roles of sub-debt are elaborated in sub-section 2.4. Lastly, sub-section 2.5 
concludes the debates on the roles of sub-debt by identifying some outstanding gaps that 
this thesis attempts to fill.  
2.2 The Role of Sub-Debt in Regulatory Capital 
In the US, the International Lending and Supervision Act of 1983 pushed regulators to 
formally require banks to maintain a mandatory capital adequacy ratio following concerns of 
systemic instability from the debt crisis that engulfed developing countries (FDIC, 1997). 
Prior to this development, regulators did not have an explicit framework for assessing bank 
capital adequacy but relied on peer-review assessments to gauge the safety and soundness of 
individual banks. Notably, the discussions on the form and definition of bank capital far 
preceded this legislation as regulatory intentions towards a more formal and explicit capital 
adequacy framework were established by the Interagency Supervisory Committee (ISC) in 
early 1978 (FFIEC, 1979).3 In fact, FFIEC (1979) indicates that deliberations on the overall 
capital adequacy of banks were an afterthought of a process that started in August 3, 1978 
to specifically review the purpose of sub-debt in bank capital. Nonetheless, subsequent 
                                               
3 The ISC was formed in 1977 under Interagency Coordination Committee (ICC), a body created 
by the three core banking regulators in the US viz., Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of Currency to improve the supervisory process of 
financial institutions under their purview (FFIEC, 1979). The mandate of the ISC was subsequently 
assumed by the Task Force on Supervision following the establishment of the FFIEC in 1979. 
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proposals by the FFIEC to include sub-debt as part of the definitions of regulatory capital 
brought some grave divisions among the regulatory agencies (Battey, 1981).  
The capital rules proposed by FFIEC (1981) categorized bank capital into two tiers, 
primary and secondary, of which sub-debt would constitute the latter on condition that it 
meets a minimum original (weighted-average) maturity of 10 years (7 years) and restricted to 
50% of primary capital. While the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and the 
Federal Reserve Board (Fed) agreed that sub-debt offers some protection to depositors and 
general creditors, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) strongly held equity as 
the only critical determinant of bank capital (FDIC, 1981; 1997). In more precise terms, the 
FDIC capital adequacy ratio was exclusively equity divided by total assets, both adjusted for 
loss and doubtful assets, while sub-debt and limited-life preferred stock were explicitly 
disregarded as sustainable sources of bank capital given their lack of permanence, inability 
to absorb losses on an on-going basis, and mandatory debt servicing requirement that 
aggravated an institution’s financial condition (FDIC, 1981). The disparity of views on this 
matter are the cause of the subsequent parallel and disjointed application of capital rules in 
the early 80s.4 However, the rules were ultimately harmonized in 1985 as the agencies found 
common ground on the definition of capital and the capital adequacy ratio (Federal Reserve 
System, 1985a). Thereafter, sub-debt became a key component of regulatory capital across 
all regulatory capital regimes. Save for the reduction of the minimum maturity from 7 years 
(pre-Basel I) to 5 years post-Basel I, the conditions for recognizing the instrument in 
                                               
4 From 1981 the 3 agencies set their own capital adequacy ratios although the Fed and OCC rules 
were largely consistent and determined on the basis of bank-size. The Fed and OCC required a total 
capital adequacy ratio of 6% for banks with assets below $1billion (Community Banks); 5.5% for 
those with assets below $15billion (Regional Banks), while the 17 multinational banks with assets 
greater than $15 billion were initially excluded from the requirements (Federal Reserve System, 1982). 
The FDIC on the other hand set an across the board minimum requirement of 6% for state non-
member banks (FDIC, 1981).  
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regulatory capital are relatively similar (Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989; 2007; 2013). 
Table 2-1 summarizes the regulatory criteria for recognizing sub-debt within bank capital 
across the regulatory capital frameworks in the US.  
[Insert Table 2-1] 
In spite of the strict conditions that ensures that sub-debt is sufficiently stabilized to 
support a bank’s financial condition, commentators still argue that the capital frameworks 
that continue to recognize the instrument in regulatory capital are inadequate and flawed 
(see, Barrell et al., 2011). These concerns extend far beyond the usual transiency and going-
concern limitations of the instrument as the present discussions by Davies (2015) and 
Schoenmaker (2015), for example, rule out chances of the instrument ever being exposed to 
liquidation losses due to rescue packages that often protect banks from failure. On these 
grounds, the instrument is deemed irrelevant in regulatory capital and as such the capital 
frameworks that continue to recognize it are misguided and ineffective (Fullenkamp and 
Rochon, 2017).  
Notwithstanding that, a key omission in the debates on the inefficacy of sub-debt in 
regulatory capital is the potential conflict of shareholder incentives brought about by the 
priority of debt within the broader bank capital structure, which could incite banks to use 
senior instruments to expropriate junior debt (Black and Cox, 1976; Smith and Warner, 
1979). In essence, the continuous regulatory emphasis of sub-debt as an important element 
in the financial stability of banks could merely be frustrated by risk-shifting and wealth-
expropriation incentives that cause banks to use senior, but non-regulatory elements, even 
when the regulatory benefits of using sub-debt would be superior. This thesis further 
elaborates on this possibility in the fourth chapter.  
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2.3 The Role of Sub-Debt in Market Discipline 
The most acknowledged role of sub-debt outside the regulatory capital sphere is its 
presumptive ability to constrain risk-taking in banks. The residual nature of sub-debt usually 
leads to holders being alert and motivated to evaluate the risk positions of a bank in an effort 
to avert prospective losses upon bankruptcy. Interestingly, this secondary role of sub-debt 
was promoted by the regulators during discussions that built up to the Basel I reforms, as 
the FDIC made proposals for a capital adequacy ratio of 9%, of which one third would be 
contributed by sub-debt (Federal Reserve System, 1985b). Although these proposals were 
never adopted, the FDIC was being unusually receptive to the inclusion of sub-debt in 
regulatory capital in order to supplement supervisory efforts with enhanced market discipline 
from the instrument. The regulators were adamant that sophisticated sub-debt investors are 
able to gather information about the financial health of an institution and appropriately 
incorporate these assessments in the pricing of their subordinated funds. The resultantly high 
borrowing costs for risky institutions would increase the cost of meeting the capital 
requirements with sub-debt, and this threat could act as an effective deterrent to excessive 
risk-taking (Federal Reserve System, 1985b). This regulatory position opened an active 
debate on whether the market is able to discipline banks through liabilities such as sub-debt. 
To start with, an effective market discipline regime would be sustained when investors 
continually gather and process publicly available information about institutions and timely 
reflect these evaluations in the prices of the securities they hold (Bliss and Flannery, 2002). 
Crucially, this exercise should not be burdensome on investors and the managers should be 
acting in the best interests of security holders, otherwise the information signal extracted 
from the security prices would be distorted. Bliss and Flannery (2002) also makes an 
important distinction with respect to the phases of market discipline. Firstly, the generation 
of the information signal through constant changes in security prices is just an indication of 
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market monitoring, while the ability of this signal to alter the actions of 
managers/institutions exhibits some elements of market influence (also see, Bliss, 2001; 
Flannery, 2001). Notably, the discussions that reacted to the FDIC’s proposals i.e., Hannan 
and Hanweck (1988), Avery et al. (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990), and the majority 
of the literature in general, are concerned with the monitoring phase of market discipline.  
2.3.1 The Monitoring Role of Sub-Debt 
In some of the earliest work in this area, Hannan and Hanweck (1988) examines the 
association between interest rates on uninsured certificates of deposit (CD) and bank 
solvency risk. Using a sample of 300 US banks over the first quarter of 1985, their study 
finds that CD investors accordingly demand a yield that appropriately compensates their 
perceived default risk. While the study demonstrates the applicability of market discipline in 
banking, using CDs, however, misses the specific discussion on the effectiveness of sub-debt 
as a dual-purpose instrument with regulatory and disciplinary roles. In fact, Avery et al. (1988) 
argues that market discipline through uninsured depositors is less appealing given their ability 
to quickly readjust their exposure positions in response to bank problems or be bailed out 
under a purchase and assumption (P&A) arrangement. Sub-debt is constrained in these two 
aspects due to its relatively long-term nature and the lack of protection under a P&A 
transaction.  In this regard, Avery et al. (1988) tests the relationship between sub-debt spreads 
and bank risk to establish the compatibility of market and regulatory interests in as far as the 
use of sub-debt is concerned. Over the 1-year period (1983-1984), the study finds that bank 
risk is not reflected in the credit spreads of sub-debt issues made by the largest US Bank 
Holding Companies (BHCs), hence the instrument would not offer supplementary benefits 
envisioned by the regulators.  
Effectively, earlier views on the applicability of market discipline in banking are divergent 
and Gorton and Santomero (1990) attributes the disparity to model deficiencies that are 
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unable to precisely explain the relationship between bank risk and the price of debt. In their 
case, the default risk premium of junior debt should take into account the assumed risk 
positions of the instrument as firm value changes. In the presence of senior debt, junior debt 
holders behave like equity when firm value is critically low (see, Black and Cox, 1976). As 
the residual value accrues to senior debt under these circumstances, junior debt will be 
relegated to a similar residual position as equity, thereby benefiting from increased risk. 
However, excessive risk is detrimental to junior debt when firms are valuable. Effectively, 
the value of sub-debt is not a linear function of risk as assumed by the prior studies on market 
discipline, and Gorton and Santomero (1990) addresses this problem by calculating the 
volatility implied by sub-debt prices. With their supposedly accurate measure of debt value, 
Gorton and Santomero (1990) finds that bank risk is not reflected in the pricing of sub-debt 
as previously found by Avery et al. (1988).5  
2.3.1.1 The Effect of Government Guarantees on Market Monitoring - The US 
Perspective 
A common factor among the earlier studies, however, is their concentration around a 
period that experienced market turmoil that prompted the government to assemble rescue 
packages in order to allay fears of contagion and systemic risk. A significant rescue policy 
around the early 80’s is the explicit guarantee on systemically large banks that were deemed 
“Too-Big-To-Fail” (TBTF). The greatest beneficiary of the TBTF policy was Continental 
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (CINB), the 7th largest bank then, where all its 
depositors and general creditors were guaranteed upon its failure in May 1984 (see, FDIC, 
1997). Controversially, the regulators offered an unprecedented level of capital and liquidity 
support in a bid to save CINB, a development that created a general impression that no 
                                               
5 The test is applied to the same sample and study period as in Avery et al. (1988). 
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investor funds would be lost through a bank failure (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). Essentially, 
the specific timing of the earlier studies that do not find any reaction of sub-debt spreads to 
bank risk would be tainted by the presumptive protection of creditors, including sub-debt 
investors. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), therefore, argues that it is imperative that the tests 
for market discipline should reflect the time-varying risk perceptions of investors associated 
with policy changes. These perceptions were certainly attenuated by the TBTF policy, but 
were subsequently revamped by the late 80s P&A policy that sought to impose losses on 
uninsured creditors and the bank holding companies of failed bank subsidiaries. Beyond the 
P&A period (post 1988), investors would have fully absorbed the reality of potential losses 
to their positions, especially with the discussion and implementation of stricter regulatory 
measures under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA).  
Using a larger sample size that covers the significant policy changes of the 80s (1983 to 
1991), Flannery and Sorescu (1996) finds that sub-debt spreads around the early periods 
associated with TBTF presumptions are less reactive to bank risk, while the spreads seem to 
account for the risk profiles of banks over the whole study period, more specifically in the 
latter 3 years of the study (1989-1991). In this regard, state guarantees that insulate creditors 
against failure encourages them to be passive to the risk-taking behavior of banks. Basically, 
the results of the prior studies are driven by the implied protection from the TBTF policy 
that weaken the sensitivity of sub-debt investors to bank risk. These views are generally 
shared by the studies of Covitz et al. (2004) and Hancock and Birchler (2004) that track the 
risk-perceptions of sub-debt investors across deposit insurance regimes. Using a sample of 
sub-debt issues made by the largest US BHCs over the period 1985 to 2002, the twin studies 
find that the instrument is an effective discipliner and more interestingly, sub-debt spreads 
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have always been sensitive to bank risk but the monitoring signals are suppressed under 
econometric analysis that do not control for sample selection bias.  
More recent evidence by Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) also shows that the state bail-
out of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) impaired market discipline from sub-
debt. The study establishes that yields of the 300 sub-debt issues made by 70 US BHCs 
between 1994 and 1999 did not capture the fundamental risk of banks after LTCM. From 
another perspective, the recent implementation of the legislation that seeks to remove 
government rescues, in terms of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, drove sub-debt investors to 
appropriately price their exposures in large US BHCs (Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2014). In 
effect, a legislation that limits the chances of bail-outs increases the yield spreads and as a 
result reduces the funding advantage of large banks that issue sub-debt, thereby enhancing 
market discipline in banks that would otherwise be deemed TBTF. Generally, the extant 
literature is adamant that the market for sub-debt offers disciplinary properties that can 
supplement supervisory efforts provided there are no state interventions (also see, Ashcraft, 
2008; Belkhir, 2013; Chen and Hasan, 2011; Flannery, 1998).  
2.3.1.2 The Effect of Government Guarantees on Market Monitoring - The 
International Perspective 
Evidence shows that the diluting effect of government guarantees on the market 
monitoring abilities of sub-debt is not driven by geopolitical issues specific to the US market. 
Using an international sample, Nier and Baumann (2006) finds that, with limited government 
support, banks that hold a larger fraction of sub-debt have higher levels of capital in line with 
suggestions that market discipline drives banks to be safer. Another cross-country study by 
Nguyen (2013) also finds that higher levels of sub-debt in bank capital structure mitigate risk-
taking, except for large banks deemed TBTF or in government controlled institutions. 
Similar effects are noted by Sironi (2003) in a European context, where sub-debt investors 
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can effectively reflect the risk profile of banks within their valuations on condition that the 
banks are not subject to government subsidies through guarantees or public ownership. The 
study further emphasizes that the waning perceptions of governments bailing out large 
institutions due to tighter public sector budgets and the cession of national bank’s monetary 
policy decisions to a single central authority are also instrumental to the noticeable 
participation of European sub-debt investors in monitoring bank risk. Similarly, the 
deliberate act by the Japanese government to let Hokkaido Takushoku Bank fail removed 
the bail-out perceptions associated with large Japanese banks, and decisively drove investors 
to fully reflect the eminent probability of default on their sub-debt valuations (Imai, 2007).  
However, the monitoring effects of sub-debt are not only disturbed by these state 
guarantees, but contradictory regulatory efforts that allow more junior securities in bank 
capital also hinders these market forces. For instance, Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) 
shows that sub-debt yields are not sensitive to bank risk following the introduction of Trust 
Preferred Shares (TPS), a more junior regulatory capital element. Basically, the capital priority 
restructuring that came along with TPS elevated sub-debt to a “senior” status, hence 
investors became passive to bank risk.6 
2.3.2 The Influencing Role of Sub-Debt 
Another stream of literature in this respect considers the less developed phase of market 
discipline in regards to the ability of sub-debt to influence the behavior of banks. As Bliss 
(2001) indicates, the adjustment of security prices only tells the story from a market 
monitoring perspective, but a complete effect of market discipline would be attained where 
the actions of managers are altered by this security repricing.  
                                               
6 Boyson et al. (2016) offers a detailed discussion of the regulatory importance of TPS. The 
securities were ultimately derecognised in regulatory capital in September 2010. 
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By examining security returns of 107 BHCs over the period 1986 to 1997, Bliss and 
Flannery (2002) demonstrate that sub-debt returns, and equity returns alike, are not 
consistently associated with subsequent managerial actions. Similar evidence is provided by 
Krishnan et al. (2005) as they show that the issuance of sub-debt does not result in changes 
in the risk-behavior of banks. Based on a matched sample of 28 banks for the period 1994 
to 1999, the study concludes that sub-debt lacks some preventative influence as the risk 
variables are not sensitive to its first issuance. While the findings by Krishnan et al. (2005) 
could be swayed by the limited sample size, Niu (2008b) also suggests that markets could 
have already adjusted their valuations in the period leading to the issuance, given the 
tendency of banks to lower their pre-issuance risk in an attempt to attract favorable funding 
rates in future. The study further argues that, in the aftermath of sub-debt issuance, banks 
would have little chance to alter their risk profiles as the disciplining effect of sub-debt sets 
in. Therefore, the dynamics underlying the pre-issuance risk behavior would be important 
into the post-issuance era, resulting in no changes in risk across the two periods (Niu, 2008b, 
p.1116). 
Apart from the lack of market influence, there is some emerging evidence that sub-debt, 
and junior debt in general, is ineffective as a source of market discipline. Blum (2002) argues 
that risky debt pushes banks to seek higher yields to maintain sufficient margins above their 
cost of borrowing. In this case, banks will always be chasing risky and high-yielding assets in 
a bid to offset the high cost of funding with sub-debt. In effect, any pre-issuance efforts by 
investors to accurately factor in the risk profile of a bank in their sub-debt valuations are 
counteracted by excessive risk-taking after issuance. Therefore, capital structures that include 
sub-debt would be ineffective in curbing risk if banks cannot commit to a predetermined 
risk level. Niu (2008a), however, demonstrates that such commitment can be achieved 
through deposit rates. Under sufficiently competitive markets, banks that attract an above 
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average deposit rate imply that they are more likely to invest in high-yielding and risky assets 
to offset their deposit contracting costs. That is, the gambling incentives of these banks are 
high, and sub-debt investors that are able to set anticipatory prices in tandem with this 
probable behavior can effectively reduce the funds available for future gambling. In essence, 
the level of deposit serves as the necessary commitment device required by Blum (2002) and 
banks that offer a prudent deposit rate would be more likely to invest in a safe asset. Niu 
(2008a), therefore, concludes that the disciplinary effect of sub-debt can be fully achieved 
under these terms but on condition that the levels of sub-debt in bank capital is maintained 
in limited quantities. They argue that high levels of debt would make default more valuable, 
thus countering the effects of market discipline.  
Other studies find a conditional effect of sub-debt on the risk behavior of banks. For 
example, Ashcraft (2008) and Belkhir (2013) find that sub-debt has a risk-mitigating effect 
on subsidiaries of BHCs. The studies argue that the disciplinary effect of sub-debt is aided 
by the equity holding of BHCs that provide sufficient control to direct the actions of 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, sub-debt exacerbates moral hazards and worsens the 
financial condition of standalone banks or BHCs. Similarly, the introduction of Basel I 
requirements that removed tighter credit covenants weakened the ability of sub-debt 
investors to constrain risk-taking in banks (Ashcraft, 2008; Goyal, 2005).7 Effectively, the 
regulatory criteria that recognize sub-debt in regulatory capital stand against the market 
forces that are intended to complement the supervisory processes.  
In the midst of the conflicting evidence on the disciplinary role of sub-debt, Park (2000) 
contends that the monitoring roles cannot be delegated to a junior debt holder in the first 
                                               
7 Following the introduction of Basel I, regulatory sub-debt ceased to have credit-acceleration and 
credit-enhancement features to prevent creditors from “running” on financially distressed banks 
(Federal Reserve System, 1989). 
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place. In their view, senior debt provides effective discipline since risky bets impair their face 
value, which would otherwise be paid in full upon liquidation. In this case, senior lenders are 
highly sensitive to adverse information and would always opt for liquidation while the 
residual nature of junior debt means that they would derive little value from liquidation, but, 
would rather choose to continue the operations regardless of the risks faced. Notably, this 
monitoring regime would be effective if the impaired position of the senior lender is 
maintained at marginal amounts, otherwise the incentives to liquidate would be lost. More 
importantly, the debt structure of firms should ensure that only a single security holder is 
prioritized and appropriately rewarded for their monitoring role or else the free-rider 
problems would create a monitoring gap that firms could exploit to advance their risk-taking 
activities.  
2.3.3 Mandatory Sub-Debt Proposals 
The foregoing evidence points to a disparity of views with regard to the oversight function 
of sub-debt and junior debt in general. Notwithstanding that, the risk monitoring role of 
sub-debt still gained greater prominence such that these disciplinary properties are 
considered potential complements to the supervisory processes (Tarullo, 2008). However, 
these disciplinary effects would only accrue to banks that choose to issue the instrument. 
That is, the prospect of higher sub-debt costs resulting from greater risk and the subsequent 
regulatory inference of distress from the inability of banks to raise additional funding can 
only be determined for banks that choose to issue sub-debt. Due to this discretionary 
issuance, a large volume of the literature emphasizes that the desirable elements of sub-debt 
can properly be harnessed if regulators impose a minimum mandatory sub-debt (MSD) 
requirement (see for example, Evanoff et al., 2011; Hamalainen et al., 2010; Niu, 2008b; 
Tarullo, 2008). In this instance, banks will be required to always hold some proportion of 
sub-debt within their regulatory capital. The early discussions on the design of an effective 
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MSD policy are summarized in Lang and Robertson (2002) and BIS (2003) and the proposals 
generally anchor on the magnitude and frequency of sub-debt issuance. In terms of 
magnitude, a popular suggestion is that an optimal MSD policy should require banks to hold 
about 2% of risk-weighted assets in sub-debt (Calomiris, 1997; 1999; Evanoff and Wall, 2001; 
Herring, 2004; U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000). This level would ensure 
that the requirement is not burdensome on banks (Lang and Robertson, 2002) and 
constraining sub-debt to a small upper bound would, in general, reduce the gambling 
incentives of banks (Niu, 2008a). Otherwise, a larger repayment commitment associated with 
higher levels of debt would contravene the disciplinary effect of sub-debt as banks would 
rather value expected payoff of going bankrupt (Niu, 2008a, p.46). In general, larger debt 
holdings entrench investors, thereby offering similar potential upside gains from increased 
risk-taking as an equity stake (Park, 2000). 
With regard to frequency, there is some consensus that regular issuance would greatly 
enhance the quality of the signal from sub-debt. This will arise from the constant adjustment 
of debt valuations that reflect new information about the condition of the bank (Hamalainen 
et al., 2010; Kwast et al., 1999; Litan and Rauch, 1997). Effectively, the debt markets would 
offer a timely assessment of the bank risk profiles if sub-debt is issued at high periodic 
intervals, preferably every year (Evanoff et al., 2011; Evanoff and Wall, 2001). Moreover, 
Evanoff et al. (2011) argue that the frequent roll-over of sub-debt would further develop the 
liquidity and depth of the debt markets with an ultimate reduction in the issuance costs.  
To that effect, the US Congress directed regulators through the Graham-Leach and Bliley 
Act (GLB) also known as the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (Section 108), to assess 
the viability of requiring large banks to hold some level of sub-debt in their capital. The 
report in this regard points to similar views that the market for sub-debt provides useful 
signals, especially for large banks whose issues appear in line with most aspects of the MSD 
24 
proposals (see, Federal Reserve System and Treasury, 2000). However, there are some 
significant considerations that still need to be made prior to mandating sub-debt issuance. 
Specifically, the Federal Reserve System and Treasury (2000) is of the view that the current 
evidence does not rigorously demonstrate that sub-debt spreads exclusively and accurately 
capture the risk perceptions of investors. This skepticism is supported by evidence that 
sophisticated and informed investors are willing to assume positions in sub-debt, so long as 
they are enticed by a reasonable premium over an otherwise safer position i.e. senior debt 
(see, Hancock and Birchler, 2004). Moreover, Levonian (2000) and Gropp et al. (2006) argue 
that the signals from sub-debt spreads about the health of a bank are not superior to equity, 
if anything, the indicators from both securities would be effective as complementarities. 
Based on these observations, and the overarching need to fully reflect on the cost-benefit 
of a MSD, the Federal Reserve System and Treasury (2000) is convinced that the regulatory 
evidence for sub-debt is still at infancy and further research is needed to inform a mandatory 
sub-debt policy. Crucially, the report argues that the introduction of a MSD might 
prematurely crowd out several other interventions with similar regulatory intentions viz., 
FDICIA and the Pillar 3 requirements under Basel II whose effectiveness is yet to be tested. 
Moreover, enhancing the disciplinary effect of sub-debt through shorter maturities needs to 
be balanced with the long-term traits of capital-like securities that have to absorb bank losses 
(Tarullo, 2008). The greatest challenge, therefore, lies in effectively managing the regulatory 
expectations with the disciplinary prospects of sub-debt, lest the instrument loses its 
relevance as a capital-cushion in favor of its role as a mere signaling device.  
2.4 Sub-Debt and Bank Financial Decisions 
Banks also use sub-debt in other aspects of their operations, but the most common ways 
are to disclose private information (Covitz and Harrison, 2004; Hancock and Birchler, 2004) 
and to benefit from the tax shield associated with debt (Schandlbauer, 2017). With regard to 
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its information content, Covitz and Harrison (2004) finds that banks use sub-debt to release 
positive private information to the market. In their arguments, the quality of information 
disclosed through the issuance exercise is fundamental to the funding costs of an institution. 
Accordingly, the only banks that would undergo the debt issuance process are those with 
favorable information and credit-sensitive securities like sub-debt are used as conduits for 
divulging this positive private information to the debt markets. By examining the credit rating 
migrations (ratings downgrades and upgrades) of 136 BHCs between 1990 and 1998, Covitz 
and Harrison (2004) show sub-debt issuers are more likely to receive a rating upgrade in line 
with this positive information hypothesis.  
Apart from releasing information, sub-debt is also used to serve the differing investors’ 
unobservable risk-preferences that are based on the level of their knowledge. Hancock and 
Birchler (2004) indicate that sub-debt is willingly held by investors that are well informed 
about a bank’s default risk probability and are accordingly incentivized for bearing the 
additional risk associated with the instrument. On this basis, sub-debt is always priced in 
relation to the safer securities like senior debt, hence the premium on sub-debt also reflects 
the compensation for holding it (the incentive premium). Precisely, “… the incentive 
premium can be thought of as information rent earned by investors who have favorable 
information about the issuer” (Hancock and Birchler, 2004, p.3). On this premise, sub-debt 
is mainly used when economic conditions are favorable and the market generally have good 
information about issuers, otherwise senior debt would be offered. 
Banks also use sub-debt to earn the tax benefit that comes with the tax-deductibility of 
interests repayments on debt. While bank leverage generally rises with tax increases (De 
Mooij and Keen, 2016), the ability to extract the tax benefit through sub-debt, however, 
depends on the state of bank-capitalization. Schandlbauer (2017) finds that poorly capitalized 
banks gain the dual tax and regulatory advantage by shifting their liabilities away from non-
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tax-deductible mezzanine debt to sub-debt. Nonetheless, the implications of these 
adjustments are negligible when compared to the overall leverage adjustments made by well-
capitalized banks.  
Other than the fore mentioned functions, Schandlbauer (2014) depicts sub-debt as an 
alternative security that banks can apply in their capital structure decisions. In the setting 
where banks are supposed to adjust towards their target leverage and Tier 1 ratios, 
Schandlbauer (2014) finds that banks further deviate from their targets by issuing sub-debt. 
Accordingly, the extent of Tier 1 or leverage ratios are irrelevant to the decision of banks to 
issue sub-debt, rather, banks appear to use the instrument for other purposes that could 
range from tax benefits, signalling of financial strength or for its contribution to total 
regulatory capital. Essentially, Schandlbauer (2014) is limited in explaining the precise forces 
underlying the issuance of sub-debt by banks. Moreover, sub-debt does not contribute to 
either of the primary capital ratios used in the analysis, therefore the study greatly undermines 
the regulatory relevance of the instrument. Furthermore, combining banks, mutuals and 
thrifts in the same analysis complicates this discussion as these institutions are differently 
affected by regulation. In addition, the limited study period of 2000 to 2007 inadequately 
captures the intertemporal variations on the treatment of sub-debt in regulatory capital.  
2.5 Conclusions 
The existence of sub-debt within bank capital structure is traceable to many factors. 
However, the common purpose of the instrument is largely explained by its ability to provide 
market discipline that reduces excessive risk taking in banking. In some other ways, albeit 
less common, sub-debt appears to be used as an information signal, where its issuance acts 
as a channel to release positive private information to the market. Also, the instrument 
appears to offer some tax advantages over and above its existence as an alternative capital 
element. Effectively, the functions of sub-debt in bank capital are not limited to a single 
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dominant effect. Notwithstanding that, the extant literature on the role of sub-debt 
completely side-lines the possible regulatory functions of the instrument in spite of its 
continued recognition as an element of regulatory capital. That is, banks could be using sub-
debt as a means of improving their overall regulatory capital position.  
In recognition of this gap, and the general debate on the irrelevance of regulation on the 
capital structure of banks, this thesis attempts to explain the role of regulation on the decision 
of banks to issue sub-debt. The thesis considers the impact of the deviation from the total 
capital adequacy ratio (with sub-debt as a constituent) on the sub-debt issuance decision of 
banks across all regulatory capital frameworks in the history of the US banking sector. In 
further tests, the thesis examines the effect of shareholder incentives arising from the priority 
of debt within the broader capital structure of a bank on the ability of sub-debt to effectively 
discharge its regulatory role. These tests are mainly concerned with the manner in which 
shareholders perceive the announcement of a regulatory capital element (sub-debt) and 
senior debt - a security that is renowned for supporting shareholder motives that seek to 
shift risk and expropriate the wealth of junior debt securities.  
In this regard, the empirical chapters follow up with chapter 3 studying the effect of 
regulation in the sub-debt issuance decision of banks, while chapter 4 draws conclusions on 
how the seniority of debt within the wider bank capital structure weakens the effective 
functioning of sub-debt in regulatory capital. 
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Tables - Chapter 2 
Table 2-1: Conditions for the Recognition of Sub-Debt in Bank Regulatory Capital 
This table summarizes the criteria for the inclusion of sub-debt in bank regulatory capital across the capital 
frameworks in the US. Pre-Basel I Regime is the regulatory period before 1990 while Basel I Regime is the period 
from 1990 to 2007. Basel II is the period from 2008 to 2013 while the Basel III is the period after 2014.8 
Condition Pre-Basel I Regime Basel I Regime Basel II Regime Basel III Regime 
Regulatory quota 
50% of Tier 1 Capital 
or up to 0.5% of Total 
Assets with other Tier 
2 elements 
50% of Tier 1 Capital or 
up to 4% of RWA with 
other Tier 2 elements 
50% of Tier 1 Capital or 
up to 4% of RWA with 
other Tier 2 elements 
Up to 2% of RWA 




7 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 
Level of subordination Depositors 
Depositors and general 
creditors 






and not a deposit 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Have credit-sensitive or 
payment-acceleration 
features 
Not applicable* No No No 
Seek prior regulatory 
approval before 
redemption 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* The capital framework is not explicit in terms of these features, which could be viewed as a non-restriction for 
investors that wish to apply credit-linked covenants.  
  
                                               
8 The regulatory periods are defined in line with the effective implementation dates (including 
transition periods) of the capital frameworks in the US (see, Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989; 
2007; 2013). 
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Chapter 3:  Does Regulation Drive Banks to Issue 
Subordinated Debt?9 
3.1 Introduction 
The reform of bank capital requirements triggered by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and 
embedded in the Basel III Accord, increases the quantity and quality of the regulatory capital 
required to strengthen the resilience of banks to shocks (BIS, 2010).  Despite these regulatory 
changes, subordinated debt (sub-debt) remains a key component of regulatory capital and 
the issuance of this type of debt can still help banks comply with capital requirements.10  
Nevertheless, by giving banks the opportunity to improve their capital requirements via 
debt, regulators might exacerbate risk-shifting incentives in the banking industry (Admati et 
al., 2018; Ashcraft, 2008). This is especially the case if market discipline in the sub-debt 
market is ineffective in penalizing riskier banking firms when they raise funds (Acharya et al., 
2016; Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Krishnan et al., 2005). 
Whether banks issue sub-debt primarily because of capital regulation and whether the 
regulatory treatment of sub-debt especially appeals to banks with more risk-shifting 
incentives lacks empirical evidence. In contrast, recent banking studies indirectly raise 
questions as to the role of capital regulation on sub-debt issuance by highlighting that this 
regulation is of secondary importance for the general debt-equity choice by banks as 
                                               
9 A special thank you to Larry Wall, Maria Nieto, Christian Eufinger, Harald Benink and seminar 
participants at the 2018 Financial Management Association Conference, 2018 World Finance 
Conference and 2018 Essex Finance Centre Conference on Banking and Finance for the valuable 
comments and suggestions on this chapter. 
10 The capital requirements have always allowed a fraction of regulatory capital to be met by sub-
debt. For instance, Basel III recognizes the instrument within the aggregate Tier 2 quota of 2% of 
risk-weighted assets, while Basel I and Basel II allowed up to 2% of the total capital adequacy ratio 
to be satisfied by sub-debt (Federal Reserve System, 1989; 2007; 2013). Before Basel I, sub-debt 
counted towards the 0.5% quota for Tier 2 components (Federal Reserve System, 1982; 1985a). 
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compared to market discipline and non-bank specific factors (Brewer III et al., 2008; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010). Along these lines, several corporate 
finance studies highlight that junior (sub-) debt is present in the capital structure of non-
financial firms (Badoer et al., 2017; Colla et al., 2013; Linn and Stock, 2005) and propose 
explanations as to why firms rely on sub-debt that are unrelated to capital regulation (for 
example, Attaoui and Poncet, 2013; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). 
In this study, we present the first empirical analysis that contrasts the importance of the 
regulatory capital motive for the issuance of sub-debt with other potential motivations and 
assess to what extent bank risk-shifting incentives lie behind the regulatory motive. In doing 
so we account for the fact that the issuance of sub-debt is not the only, and most effective, 
choice in terms of security issuance available to banks to significantly boost their regulatory 
capital ratio. We accordingly estimate a multinomial logit model where we jointly account for 
the determinants of the issuance of sub-debt and equity. Our empirical setting, therefore, 
allows us to compare the determinants of sub-debt and equity issuance and to understand 
when banks are induced to privilege the issuance of sub-debt over equity, as required by a 
risk-shifting strategy. We employ a sample of US listed and delisted banks for the period 
1983 to 2015, with the start of our sample period coinciding with the application of the 
capital requirements to all banks, including multinational banks (Cornett and Tehranian, 
1994). The US banking industry is an ideal setting for our analysis because of its long-dated 
series of sub-debt, and equity, issues that cut across all regulatory capital regimes and thereby 
fully capturing the intertemporal variations in the regulatory treatment of sub-debt. 
To capture the importance of the regulatory capital motive on the issuance decision, we 
use as a key variable, the regulatory capital buffer; namely, a measure of the proximity of a 
bank’s regulatory capital adequacy ratio to the minimum required. Banks with a lower buffer 
gain potentially more regulatory benefit from raising sub-debt. The importance of capital 
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requirements is then contrasted with a set of other determinants. These are based on theory 
arguments proposed for non-financial firms, and refer to tax benefits, growth opportunities, 
credit quality, volatility and financial constraints (see, Attaoui and Poncet, 2015; Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Colla et al., 2013), and to motivations related to the 
presence of market discipline in bank debt quantity (Bennett et al., 2015; Billett et al., 1998). 
In a set of preliminary univariate tests we show that banks issuing sub-debt are 
characterized by a lower regulatory capital buffer than the other sampled banks. A significant 
difference in the capital buffer is, however, also present between issuers of equity and non-
issuing banks. Furthermore, this preliminary analysis suggests that banks issuing sub-debt 
differ in other non-regulatory aspects from non-issuers, being for instance larger and less 
risky, having more growth opportunities and better credit quality. These latter differences 
are, nevertheless, not supportive of the theoretical predictions proposed for non-financial 
firms but simply signal easier entry conditions to the debt market.   
To further understand the role played by capital regulation, we next conduct an additional 
and simple regulatory compliance test that isolates sub-debt issues that would not count 
towards regulatory capital.11 We find that the majority of sub-debt issues (two-thirds) are 
eligible in regulatory capital and these issuances account for a significant portion of the value 
of the total sub-debt raised over the sample period. Taken together, these initial results show 
some preliminary support for the importance of the regulatory motive on the issuance 
decision but they also highlight that issuing banks are systematically different from non-
issuers in several non-regulatory characteristics.  
                                               
11 Among others, sub-debt should not be secured, guaranteed, insured or have credit enhancing 
or repayment acceleration features; but, should be subordinate to depositors and have a minimum 
original maturity of 5 years (7 years before Basel I). The instrument is also restricted in regulatory 
capital, alongside other Tier 2 elements (see, Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989; 2007; 2013).  
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To compare the relative importance of regulatory and non-regulatory variables, we then 
proceed by estimating a multinomial logit model, where the decision to issue sub-debt or 
equity is portrayed as depending on the regulatory capital buffer, bank-specific characteristics 
and macroeconomic controls. Under this multivariate setting, we find further evidence of a 
strong negative relationship between the regulatory buffer and the likelihood to issue both 
sub-debt and equity. In contrast, we find that most of the other possible determinants of the 
issuance decision of sub-debt are not significant in our sample of banks. In particular, we 
only find an increase in the likelihood to issue sub-debt when banks are larger and less risky 
or during periods of high term premiums. In general, the non-regulatory drivers of the 
issuance decisions reflect explanations based on the entry conditions to the debt market. 
Further, with the exception of the impact of tail risk, signaling a role for market discipline in 
debt quantity, the impact of the non-regulatory variables on the sub-debt issue decision is 
smaller than the impact of the buffer variable.  
A possible interpretation of the buffer result is based on the likelihood that banks with 
low regulatory buffers may also be characterized by a higher probability of distress, which 
could induce low-buffer banks to shift risk towards creditors by leveraging up with debt 
instead of issuing equity (Admati, 2014; Admati et al., 2018). Therefore, our results may 
capture the risk-shifting incentives of distressed banks that might emerge via capital 
regulation. However, against this argument our initial analysis shows that the regulatory 
buffer plays a similar role on the issuance of sub-debt and equity; namely, banks with a low 
buffer are also more likely to increase the high quality component of the regulatory capital. 
Thus there does not seem to be a substitution effect between sub-debt and equity when 
banks possess low regulatory buffers. Also, these arguments would contradict the evidence 
that poorly capitalized banks are more likely to issue equity than other banks because of 
market pressure (Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). Moreover, the position is at odds with market 
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discipline theories (see, for instance, Niu, 2008a; 2008b) that suggest that riskier or distressed 
institutions might find difficulties in raising sub-debt. 
Nevertheless, we proceed with further tests to document that the issuance decision of 
banks with a low regulatory buffer is significantly influenced by the presence of market 
discipline in debt quantities and this discipline constrains risk-shifting opportunities. To put 
it differently, we show that banks more exposed to tail risks and reporting a low regulatory 
buffer are significantly less (more) likely to issue sub-debt (equity) than less-risky ones. 
Intuitively, it appears that issues by low buffer banks with a high tail risk exposure are 
penalized by investors (Imai, 2007; Niu, 2008b) and are rationed out of the sub-debt-market 
(Covitz and Harrison, 2004) - these banks being then induced to issue equity. 
Our baseline analysis, where size appears a strong predictor of the issuance decision, raises 
the possibility that the use of sub-debt to improve regulatory capital ratios is primarily, or 
even entirely, an option for larger banks. Given that larger banks may not be subject to any 
market discipline because of too-big-to-fail arguments (Bhagat et al., 2015; Hagendorff et al., 
2018) - as also suggested by recent studies on market discipline in debt prices (see, for 
instance, Acharya et al., 2016) - then they might be inclined to increase their leverage via sub-
debt issuance (even when they become riskier). When we extend the initial specification with 
an interaction term between the regulatory buffer and bank size, we indeed find that the 
issuance likelihood increases significantly for large banks, but especially so when they have a 
low regulatory capital buffer. Small banks show, instead, a very low likelihood to issue sub-
debt at any level of capital buffer, though the issuance is more likely when their capital buffers 
are low.  
Nevertheless, further tests indicate that the size effect is unlikely to be driven by a too-
big-to-fail argument that undermines market discipline and facilitates risk-shifting by large 
banks. In fact, we document that larger banks are penalized in the sub-debt market when 
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they are more exposed to tail risk with the consequence of being more likely to issue equity 
when they are riskier. Furthermore, we find that the use of sub-debt as a tool to improve the 
regulatory capital buffer is primarily driven by the issuance decision of larger banks with low 
tail risk exposure. Small banks with low buffers show low probabilities to issue sub-debt 
independently of their tail risk exposure.  
All in all, our findings show the key importance of the regulatory explanation of sub-debt 
issuance ahead of non-regulatory arguments and highlight how the regulatory motive is 
influenced by the presence of market discipline in debt quantities. More broadly, our analysis 
documents that general entry conditions to the debt market, as highlighted by studies on 
non-financial firms (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988), and not risk-
shifting opportunities, primarily shape the security issuance decision and the related choice 
between sub-debt and equity, when banks have low regulatory buffers. Furthermore, by 
highlighting systematic differences between issuers and non-issuers of sub-debt, our study 
shows the importance of accounting for selection bias in any investigation of market 
discipline in debt prices. 
Our analysis is related to the limited number of studies that investigate the drivers of sub-
debt issuance by banks (Covitz et al., 2004; Covitz and Harrison, 2004; Hancock and Birchler, 
2004; Schandlbauer, 2014; 2017). In particular, the studies of Covitz et al. (2004) and 
Hancock and Birchler (2004) are closely related to this review. Their analyses, however, focus 
on the influence of deposit insurance regimes on sub-debt issuance, while this work focuses 
on the role of capital requirements and non-regulatory explanations. In addition, these 
studies do not compare the determinants of the sub-debt issuance decision with the 
determinants of equity issuance and do not investigate the potential influence of risk-shifting 
opportunities. 
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The study of Schandlbauer (2014) directly compares to ours by estimating the probability 
of issuing sub-debt alongside other capital elements. However, the study depicts sub-debt as 
just another liability element that banks can use. It is therefore, not surprising that in the 
setting where banks are supposed to adjust towards the primary capital ratios, they (banks) 
rather apply sub-debt to deviate from these targets. Accordingly, the regulatory role of sub-
debt in this context is not precisely explained, as banks appear to use the instrument for 
purposes that could range from tax benefits, signalling of financial strength or contribution 
to total capital. Basically, our study overcomes the limitations of Schandlbauer (2014) by 
determining the specific factor underlying the issuance of sub-debt, thus regulation. 
More generally, our study is related to the literature on the role of sub-debt in the banking 
industry. This literature emphasizes sub-debt as a potential source of market discipline via 
the higher cost of funding imposed by risk-sensitive sub-debt holders (Flannery and Sorescu, 
1996; Niu, 2008b). However, this disciplinary ability via debt prices has been shown to be 
effective only when sub-debtors do not expect to be bailed out (Balasubramnian and Cyree, 
2011; 2014; Baron, 2017; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Furthermore, in the case of commercial 
banks, the disciplinary effect of sub-debt only materializes when the debt is held by the parent 
holding company (Belkhir, 2013) or the sub-debt contracts have strict covenants (Ashcraft, 
2008; Goyal, 2005). Differently from these studies, our analysis places emphasis on market 
discipline via debt quantity and on its interplay with the regulatory motive of the issuance 
decision.  
Finally, we contribute to the studies on how regulation influences the funding choices of 
banks (Brewer III et al., 2008; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016; Gropp and Heider, 2010; 
Krishnan et al., 2010). The extant studies focus on the choice between debt and equity in the 
capital structure, and not specifically on the decision to issue sub-debt or on how this 
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decision differs from the decision to issue equity. Our analysis relies on the fact that sub-
debt in banking has a regulatory aspect that may affect the issue behavior of banks.  
The remainder of this analysis is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature, 
while Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4, discusses the econometric model and 
variables, while Section 3.5 presents the empirical results of how regulation influences the 
issuance activity of banks. Section 3.6 concludes the study. 
3.2 Related Research 
There is a long debate in the banking literature on the relative importance of regulation 
and other factors in driving the capital structure and the equity issuance decision of banks 
(see for instance, Cornett et al., 1998; Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Gropp and Heider, 2010; 
Polonchek et al., 1989). The most recent studies argue that the capital structure and the equity 
issuance of banks are affected by factors similar to those affecting non-financial firms and 
regulation is not binding (Brewer III et al., 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010). Although this 
literature has focused on the equity ratio and equity issuance, a comparative analysis of 
regulatory and non-regulatory motives can be also applied to sub-debt issuance. In particular, 
a regulatory explanation, largely ignored by previous studies on sub-debt issuance by banks 
(see, Covitz et al., 2004; Hancock and Birchler, 2004), sees the inclusion of sub-debt in the 
regulatory capital as a potential key determinant of issuance. The regulatory motive of the 
issuance decision might especially appeal to banks with high risk-shifting incentives (such as 
less capitalized, riskier or even larger banks) because of the opportunity to improve the 
regulatory capital ratio via debt. However, this is less likely to occur in the presence of market 
discipline in debt quantities that sufficiently penalize weaker institutions and makes it difficult 
and expensive to raise risk-sensitive securities that suffer losses in the case of bank default 
(Berger, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998). 
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Explanations for the issuance decision of sub-debt unrelated to regulation are instead 
proposed by studies on the use of junior (sub-) debt by non-financial firms. For instance, the 
issuance of sub-debt might be intended to modify the debt priority structure of a firm 
because of the growth opportunities of the corporation - firms with high growth 
opportunities, and consequently larger creditor-shareholder conflicts, normally opt for a 
greater use of senior claims (Barclay and Smith, 1995).  
Other explanations are normally built around conventional determinants of capital 
structure decisions. For instance, companies that are keen to obtain tax benefits should rely 
more on riskier debt such as sub-debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Along these lines, 
Sundaresan and Wang (2016) argue that the use of sub-debt in capital regulation is not for 
the good of depositors, but is a source of tax benefits for value maximizing banks. Likewise, 
De Mooij and Keen (2016) and Schandlbauer (2017) find that an increase in tax causes banks 
to hold more debt because of the resultant tax shield while Schandlbauer (2014) presumes 
that banks could be using sub-debt for signalling, capital or tax purposes. In a related analysis, 
Attaoui and Poncet (2013) frame the optimal priority structure of debt in the context of the 
tradeoff between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. In their model, and against the risk-
shifting argument, low leverage firms use more junior debt, while high leverage firms increase 
their proportion of long-term senior debt when their assets are riskier. 
More recently, Badoer et al. (2017) show that an increase in firm volatility leads to an 
increase in the issuance of secured debt and sub-debt. This is explained by an increase in the 
cost of senior debt induced by volatility as compared to secured and sub-debt. Hackbarth 
and Mauer (2012) model how capital structure and debt priority structure interact with 
investment policy when i) there is a stockholder-bondholder conflict over investment, and 
ii) corporations account for how future investment is financed. They show that firms with 
high external financing costs (e.g., small and financially constrained firms), and especially 
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riskier firms with high financial distress costs rely more on junior debt. This is consistent 
with Rauh and Sufi (2010) and Colla et al. (2013), who build on the theoretical research on 
the importance of credit quality for the optimal debt structure (see among others, Bolton 
and Freixas, 2000; Diamond, 1991a; 1991b) and show that sub-debt is primarily used by 
firms with lower credit quality. All these studies refer to the concept of priority spreading 
indicating that firms increase the use of secured and subordinated debt and reduce the use 
of senior debt as their credit quality deteriorates. 
The predictions of the models described above, however, do not conform to the 
explanation of the issuance by riskier institutions, or by institutions with a low credit quality, 
related to market discipline arguments that apply to debt quantities (Berger, 1995; Park and 
Peristiani, 1998). For instance, it has been shown that banks move from risk-sensitive 
securities to insured deposits when they become riskier (Bennett et al., 2015; Billett et al., 
1998).12 In some cases, banks have to recapitalize and reduce their risk levels before they can 
enjoy favorable entry conditions in the uninsured debt market (Berger, 1995). 
We, therefore, employ the different theories discussed in this section to examine the role 
of regulatory and non-regulatory arguments proposed for non-financial firms (see mainly, 
Attaoui and Poncet, 2013; 2015; Colla et al., 2013; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) on the 
decision to issue sub-debt by banks. Accordingly, our study complements analyses on bank 
security issuance, that to date have primarily focused on the equity market (for example, 
Cornett et al., 1998; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016; Krishnan et al., 2010).  
 
                                               
12 This liability rebalancing, however, thwarts market discipline efforts as protected depositors are 
generally insensitive to risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Karas et al., 2013). 
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3.3 Data 
The sample of banks used in our analysis is drawn from the population of 2145 publicly 
traded and delisted US banks available in Compustat-Capital IQ for the period ranging from 
January 1, 1983 to December 31, 2015. More precisely, we retain from Compustat firms with 
SIC codes from 6020 to 6036.  
To identify banks issuing sub-debt over the sample period, we extract a list of 4,604 sub-
debt issues made by 1,725 financial institutions from Bloomberg and Thomson One Banker. 
The issues are then merged (using the Cusip identifier) to the bank population dataset to 
filter out non-bank issuers. This process results in a sample of 512 sub-debt issues by 174 
unique banks after eliminating issuers that have also issued equity in the same quarter, those 
without accounting data, and consolidating duplicate time issues (more than one issue in a 
quarter).13 
We next extract from Thomson One Banker data on equity issuance via Seasoned Equity 
Offers (SEOs) over the same period. This allows us to consider the fact that banks can 
primarily use equity issuance to rapidly improve their regulatory capital ratios and to compare 
the determinants of sub-debt and equity issuance. We remove offers without a Cusip 
identifier, or the amount issued, as well as those that have no impact on the capital structure; 
namely, withdrawn or pure secondary offers. In particular, proceeds from secondary offers 
just flow between investors and do not accrue to the bank. Furthermore, we drop issuers 
                                               
13 We identify only 14 cases where a bank issues both sub-debt and equity in the same quarter. 
While given our econometric setting, explained in section 3.4 and the very low number of cases, we 
cannot consider these cases as being part of a different category of events, their exclusion is unlikely 
to affect our findings. For instance, we achieve similar conclusions if we classify the 14 cases either 
as only sub-debt issuance or as only equity issuance. Furthermore, our results do not vary if we classify 
each of the 14 cases to the issuance category referring to the first type of security issued by banks in 
each of the quarters during which these issues occurred. 
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that have also issued sub-debt in the same quarter and remove duplicate time issues to arrive 
at a final sample of 585 SEOs by 371 unique banks. Lastly, we obtain stock prices and 
macroeconomic data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
[Insert Table 3-1] 
Table 3-1 shows the distribution of sub-debt issuance and SEOs over the sample period. 
Both types of issuance are not very frequent in our sample, an observation consistent with 
studies on the liability or capital structure of banks (see, Ashcraft, 2008; Belkhir, 2013; 
Bennett et al., 2015; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). On average, only 2% (3%) of total bank-
quarter observations in our study issued sub-debt (equity) between 1983 and 2015. Both 
security issues account for an average of 3% per bank over the same period.  
However, the importance of the two types of issuance evolves differently over time. Sub-
debt issuances are more frequent in the early part of the sample period, while SEOs become 
more common in the latest part of the sample. The early period was characterized by the 
rescue of Continental Illinois liabilities, which failed in 1984, and the subsequent explicit 
guarantee for other large banks (Covitz et al., 2004; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). These 
actions potentially drove sub-debt issues as the uninsured creditors presumed some state 
protection. The equity issues in the most recent years are possibly an aftermath of the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP). Khan and Vyas (2015) points out that CPP recipients were more 
likely to issue equity to repay their CPP debt.  
Figure 3-1 presents the distributions of the two types of security issuance in terms of 
amount raised. Sub-debt raised the most proceeds despite being relatively less frequent as 
compared to SEOs. The value distribution suggests that banks, like non-financial firms, limit 
wealth losses arising from adverse selection by issuing lower amounts of SEOs (Choe et al., 
1993). 
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[Insert Figure 3-1] 
3.4 Econometric Model and Variables 
We apply a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of issuing sub-debt or 
equity in a given quarter. Our dependent variable (ISSUE) is a tripartite outcome taking a 
value of 0 for "no issuance", 1 for "sub-debt issuance" and 2 for "equity issuance". 
Furthermore, we control for unobserved time-variant factors, and potentially omitted 
macroeconomic variables, by including year dummies.14 We cluster standard errors at the 
bank-level to control for across time error correlation within banks. More formally, the 
baseline model assumes the following specification:  
mlogit{𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 0,1,2 |𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)} =  α + 𝛾𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + β𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
Where BUFFER measures the difference between a bank’s regulatory capital adequacy 
ratio and the minimum regulatory requirement. Banks with low buffers are expected to access 
the capital markets in an attempt to improve their regulatory capital ratios and mitigate 
regulatory pressure. Sub-debt then stands as one of the recapitalization options for these 
banks given its recognition as a form of regulatory capital.  
 We construct the buffer variable by taking into account the variations in the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement over our sample period.15 X and TIME are a vector of 
                                               
14 In additional tests, reported as additional tables, we show that our main results remain 
unchanged when year dummies are replaced with quarterly dummies (see, Table A.3-2). 
15 There are no regulatory capital ratios on Compustat-Capital IQ before 1993. We overcome this 
hurdle by computing the missing ratios guided by the Federal Reserve Bulletins of the Federal 
Reserve System and Krishnan et al. (2010). However, the unavailability of key regulatory data such 
as risk-weighted assets still present challenges in the calibration of the ratios across the Basel I 
transition period (1990 to 1992). The capital ratios from 1985 to 1992 are, therefore, based on similar 
regulatory criteria, in spite of the Basel I transition requirements (see, Federal Reserve System, 1989); 
notably, observations in the transition period account for just 4 percent of the total observations. At 
this magnitude, we deem the likely error in the capital calculation to pose a low risk to our inferences. 
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controls and time dummies, respectively, while 𝜺𝒊𝒕 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎) is the error term. We winsorize 
the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% level to limit the effects of outliers, and we 
measure the covariates at a quarterly lag to reduce endogeneity and simultaneity biases.  
We next include bank-specific and macroeconomic variables that are deemed to drive the 
issuance of sub-debt (and equity) by institutions independently of the regulatory context. We 
control for bank size (Size) via the logarithm of total assets. Large institutions should be 
more likely to issue sub-debt and equity given the economies of scale they gain when issuing 
public securities and the related lower flotation costs (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Covitz et al., 
2004). Furthermore, large banks are more likely to receive a bailout in the case of distress 
(Acharya et al., 2016; Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2011; Berger and Bouwman, 2013) and 
while this is supposed to ease access to the sub-debt market (Balasubramnian and Cyree, 
2014; Beyhaghi et al., 2014), it could also discourage banks from raising equity via SEOs 
(Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). Nevertheless, against these arguments, the model proposed by 
Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) highlights that financially constrained firms (as it should be the 
case of smaller banks) should favor junior (sub-) debt. 
Next, we control for the log of the number of years (Bank Age) a bank appears in 
Compustat (years since IPO). Younger banks, with a less established reputation in the 
banking market, should experience higher external financing costs. Similar to non-financial 
firms, this could prompt them to specialize in one form of debt, thus limiting their access to 
alternative funding securities such as sub-debt (Colla et al., 2013). In contrast with this 
argument, Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) argue that younger institutions are financially 
constrained, hence they would prefer sub-debt and defer senior securities for their future 
                                               
Table A.3-1 of the additional tables summarizes developments on regulatory capital requirements in 
the US. 
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funding needs. Younger banks are also expected to rely on equity issues to support growing 
investment opportunities, whereas more mature firms opt for internally generated financial 
resources (DeAngelo et al., 2010). 
We also control for the effect of taxation (Tax), measured as the ratio of taxes to pre-tax 
earnings. The tax-deductibility of interest payments enables institutions to maximize their 
tax shield by issuing more junior debt (Attaoui and Poncet, 2013; 2015). Higher tax rates 
should then lead banks to issue sub-debt in preference to equity (Schandlbauer, 2017). We 
then account for the “contracting costs” arguments that institutions with high growth 
opportunities are less likely to issue sub-debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995). For these 
institutions, high priority claims provide an essential threat of liquidation upon inappropriate 
or risky investments, thus abating the asset-substitution and under-investment problems 
associated with them (growth firms). Similarly, and according to the market timing 
perspective, firms should issue equity when their shares are overvalued (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Krishnan et al., 2010). We capture a bank’s growth 
opportunities as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity (Tobin’s Q). 
Firm risk and the credit quality of the issuer may also affect the issuance decision via their 
effects on the debt structure (Badoer et al., 2017; Colla et al., 2013; Rauh and Sufi, 2010) and 
on the overall capital structure (Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Kisgen, 2006; 2009). We measure 
bank risk by means of Tail Risk, defined as the (minus) average equity loss when a bank’s 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns 
(Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). This measure indicates large wealth losses not only for 
shareholders but potentially also for debtholders (Hagendorff et al., 2018). In particular, 
debtholders, by holding fixed claims on a bank’s cash flows, are likely to lose some of their 
principal in the presence of extreme large losses in bank value as indicated by high values of 
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tail risk. We measure the credit quality of the issuer via a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks 
with a S&P rating of BBB- or better (investment grade), or 0 otherwise (Credit Quality).  
Other controls are related to capital structure decisions. The Return on Assets (ROA), 
measured as pre-tax earnings divided by total assets, controls for the performance of the 
bank. Profitable institutions are able to service their payment commitments, hence they are 
more likely to issue debt securities (Gropp and Heider, 2010). Nonetheless, earnings 
accumulated by profitable institutions might create little need for external equity capital, thus 
reducing the probability of an SEO (Frank and Goyal, 2009). The ratio of total deposits to 
total assets (Deposits) controls for the possibility that banks might resort to external 
financing when they have exhausted cheaper sources of funding, in terms of deposits 
(Belkhir, 2013; BIS, 2003). Khan and Vyas (2015) show that US banks that received public 
support through the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) have a higher likelihood 
of issuing equity in the following quarters. We, therefore, add a dummy (TARP) equal to 1 
for the period a bank took part in the TARP program, or 0 otherwise.16  
We also control for the rate of change in the consumer price index (Inflation) as previous 
studies have shown a positive association between leverage and inflation (Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Oeztekin, 2015). High inflation reduces the real cost of funding, however, investors 
may also withhold capital if their nominal returns are diluted by higher inflation (Fan et al., 
2012). Finally, the model also accounts for economic growth opportunities as captured by 
the difference between the yield on the 10-year and 1-year treasury bonds (Term Premium). 
The spread between long and short-term rates signals strong future economic performance 
(Erel et al., 2012). Previous studies on non-financial firms, focusing on the demand-side 
                                               
16 We extract the list of banks that received state assistance from www.propublica.org. 
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drivers of the issuance decision, show that equity issuances are common during favorable 
economic times due to lower adverse selection costs associated with equity announcements 
during these times (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Choe et al., 1993). For banks, however, 
equity issuances are counter-cyclical (Baron, 2017), and the related decline of equity issuance 
in booming conditions might favor an increase in investor demand for high-risk securities 
such as sub-debt. 
3.5 The Determinants of Sub-debt Issuance  
3.5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Table 3-2 reports summary statistics for the variables described in the previous section, 
separately for three groups of banks: 1) non-issuers, 2) issuers of sub-debt and 3) issuers of 
equity.  
[Insert Table 3-2] 
The summary statistics highlight important differences across the three groups. For 
instance, issuers of sub-debt have significantly lower regulatory capital buffers as compared 
to non-issuers and issuers of equity. Furthermore, they are significantly larger, older and have 
a higher Tobin’s Q, ROA and Credit Quality compared to other groups. Noticeably, sub-debt 
issuers also have a lower Tail Risk than others. All in all, it seems that the issuance of sub-
debt is more likely in banks that have plausibly easier access to the bond market because of 
lower flotation costs and the ability to attract a larger supply of capital by investors (Blackwell 
and Kidwell, 1988; Colla et al., 2013). The highlighted differences in terms of size, risk and 
credit quality, and the lack of importance of the tax variable, do not conform to theoretical 
predictions based on demand-side factors (Attaoui and Poncet, 2013; 2015; Dong et al., 2012; 
Elliott et al., 2008; Gomes and Phillips, 2012). In terms of macro-controls, the comparative 
analysis of the three groups of banks shows that, differently from the other groups, sub-debt 
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issuers tend to time their activity to inflationary periods, which are associated with a lower 
real cost of funding. Furthermore, as in Khan and Vyas (2015), TARP banks are primarily in 
the group of equity issuers. 
As a further examination of the potential role played by capital regulation, we next classify 
the security issues into the four quartiles of the Buffer distribution and compute the ratio 
between the number of issues and the number of banks in each quartile. Our analysis, 
reported in Panel B of Table 3-2, shows that the issuance frequency for both sub-debt and 
equity declines as the buffer increases. Notably, the fact that the frequency of sub-debt in 
the lowest quartiles is larger than the frequency of issuing equity confirms earlier indications 
that sub-debt issuers have significantly lower buffers than equity issuers.  
Our data also allow us to distinguish sub-debt by a number of regulatory characteristics, 
including maturity and if the debt is insured, guaranteed or has step-ups/credit enhancement 
features. Although non-exhaustive, these characteristics reasonably cover important aspects 
that are required for sub-debt to be included as part of Tier 2 capital (see, Federal Reserve 
System, 1985a; 1989; 2007).17 We are also able to assess the regulatory capacity of a bank by 
establishing if the sub-debt issued will count towards the regulatory quota allocated to Tier 
2 elements. For this purpose, we observe the extent to which a bank has utilized its Tier 2 
quota a quarter prior to the issuance of sub-debt. The measurement is simply the actual Tier 
2 ratio before issuance less the required regulatory Tier 2 ratio, and takes into account the 
changes in capital requirements over our sample period. For example, Tier 2 elements were  
allowed up to 0.5% of total assets before Basel I, improving to 4% of RWA under Basel I 
and II, and can currently contribute 2% of RWA under Basel III (see, Federal Reserve 
                                               
17 Another key condition is that banks should seek prior regulatory approval for the early 
redemption of sub-debt. We could not establish this feature on issues that have a call and put options 
but are comforted by their relatively low representation (16%) in our sample.  
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System, 1985a; 1989; 2007; 2013). This information allows us to further understand the role 
of the regulatory standards on the issuance of sub-debt by identifying sub-debt issues that 
are expected to count towards regulatory capital and those that are not.  
We report the result from this analysis in Panel C of Table 3-2. We find that 307 issues 
(equivalent to 60% of the total number of issues) are eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital 
based on the minimum qualifying criteria and a bank’s regulatory capacity.18 The amount 
raised through these eligible securities make a significant portion, 70%, of the total proceeds 
from sub-debt. Overall, the issuance of sub-debt seems to be generally designed in such a 
way to allow the issuing banks to employ the raised funds for regulatory purposes. 
3.5.2 Baseline Multinomial Logit Model 
Table 3-3 shows the regression results of the multinomial logit model employed to 
examine the determinants of the probability to issue sub-debt and equity. Columns (1) and 
(3) report the estimated coefficients for the sub-debt and equity equations, respectively. 
Columns (2) and (4) show the related marginal effects. We employ the non-issuance decision 
as a reference outcome. Therefore, the results refer to the probability to issue one type of 
security as compared to not issuing any. Furthermore, to facilitate the comparison between 
the two types of securities, in column (5) we present an estimation that compares the 
likelihood to issue sub-debt versus equity. 
[Insert Table 3-3] 
The results show that an increase in the regulatory capital buffer significantly reduces the 
probability to issue sub-debt and equity. That is, banks with lower buffers see the use of sub-
                                               
18 Conversely, we identify 205 ineligible sub-debt issues, of which 72 do not meet the minimum 
maturity criteria of 5 years (7 years prior to Basel I), 112 are issued by banks that have already 
exhausted their Tier 2 quota, and 21 are jointly disqualified and over the Tier 2 threshold.  
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debt as an important tool when they need to improve regulatory capital ratios. The variable 
has similar impact on the issuance of sub-debt and equity (column 5), thereby indicating that 
sub-debt remains relevant to banks with low regulatory capital even with the presence of 
equity as an alternative recapitalization option. In an attempt to further understand the 
regulatory importance of sub-debt, we proceed by comparing the likelihood to issue sub-
debt and equity by banks at various levels of the Buffer distribution. We plot the annualized 
probability to issue either security at different percentiles of the regulatory capital buffer in 
Figure 3-2. 
[Insert Figure 3-2] 
Figure 3-2 shows that banks appear more likely to issue equity than sub-debt at any level 
of the buffer. However, the difference between the likelihood to issue sub-debt or equity is 
not significant at the tails of the buffer distribution. This suggests that banks opt for any 
security that could boost their regulatory capital levels when they are on the edge of the 
minimum capital requirements, while those at the opposite end seem to have little regulatory 
incentive or pressure to issue.  
More intriguing, however, is the high probability of issuing either security when banks are 
extremely less-capitalized, i.e. with a buffer at the 1st percentile of the buffer distribution. To 
put this into perspective, the annual likelihood to issue sub-debt or equity by banks with 
buffers at the 1st percentile is twice as high as that for banks with a buffer at the 10th 
percentile. In comparison to banks with a buffer at the 90th percentile of the distribution, the 
extremely less-capitalized banks are 10 and 6 times more likely to issue sub-debt and equity, 
respectively. It, therefore, appears that the high issuance likelihood by banks that are on the 
lower tail of the buffer distribution conceals the overall difference between the impact of the 
Buffer variable on sub-debt and equity issuance that is observed in Column (5) of Table 3-3.  
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While the regulatory motives seem to be an important driver of the issuance decision, we 
find little evidence on the influence of other explanatory variables. We particularly find that 
the only common bank-specific determinant between sub-debt and equity issuance is Size: 
the probability to issue both types of securities is higher in bigger banks. Overall, the role of 
Size on sub-debt tends to be consistent with the view that firms are more likely to rely on 
debt securities when they have better access to the debt market (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; 
Colla et al., 2013; Gropp and Heider, 2010). Furthermore, the likelihood to issue sub-debt is 
also larger when banks are characterized by a lower tail risk exposure. This is, therefore, 
against the evidence offered by models proposed for non-financial firms focusing on the 
demand for capital (for example, Dong et al., 2012; Elliott et al., 2008; Goyal and Wang, 
2013; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) and is more consistent with the related presence of 
market discipline in debt quantities, where informed risk-sensitive investors avoid being 
exposed to risky institutions (Erel et al., 2012; Hancock and Birchler, 2004; Park and 
Peristiani, 1998).  
Other bank characteristics influence the likelihood to issue equity but not the issuance of 
sub-debt. The likelihood to issue equity decreases with Bank Age, in line with the argument 
that younger firms issue equity to support growing investment opportunities, while more 
mature firms prefer to opt for internally generated financial resources (DeAngelo et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the likelihood to issue equity increases with the availability of growth 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q), confirming that banks tend to issue equity when their shares are 
overvalued (Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Krishnan et al., 2010). In addition, banks rescued 
by the TARP are more likely to issue equity as suggested by Khan and Vyas (2015). 
As for macroeconomic controls, we find that a larger Term Premium increases the 
likelihood to issue sub-debt while it decreases the likelihood to issue equity. These 
50 
observations suggest that banks meet their funding needs with sub-debt as economic 
opportunities enlarge, while equity is mainly countercyclical as suggested by Baron (2017).  
To elaborate on the economic importance of the regulatory variable against other 
variables for the issuance decision, Panel B of Table 3-3 compares the marginal effects of 
Buffer with the marginal effects of the other significant variables in the sub-debt equation 
(namely, Size, Tail Risk and Term Premium). With the exception of Tail Risk, the impact of 
these variables is significantly lower than the impact of Buffer.  
The above findings are further highlighted in Table 3-4, where we report the quarterly 
probability to issue sub-debt by banks at the 25th or 75th percentile of the sample distribution 
for the variables that enter with a significant coefficient in the sub-debt equation. Specifically, 
we show the probability to issue when banks are at the 25th or 75th percentile of the Buffer, 
Size and Tail Risk, or when the Term Premium is at the same percentiles. To improve our 
understanding of the specificities of sub-debt issuance, and of the more general funding 
choices implemented via security issuance, we also report similar information for equity 
issuance.  
[Insert Table 3-4] 
We find that when the regulatory capital buffer declines from the 75th to the 25th 
percentile, the quarterly probability to issue sub-debt increases from 0.47% to 1.14%, and 
the increase is larger (in absolute terms) as compared to what we observe for a similar change 
in the non-regulatory variables. Coupled with the marginal effects reported for each variable 
in Table 3-3, these results point to the importance of the regulatory variable (Buffer) in the 
sub-debt issuance decision.19  
                                               
19 As an alternative test, we account for short-term variations by including quarterly time dummies 
in our model. Except for the Term Premium, other factors remain quantitatively similar, while Inflation 
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The findings discussed in this section offer indications in favor of a significant influence 
of capital regulation on the issuance decision of sub-debt while offering limited support to 
non-regulatory explanations. In particular, our analysis does not support theoretical 
predictions proposed for non-financial firms related to the importance of tax benefits, 
growth opportunities or credit quality in the issuance of junior (sub-) debt. If there is any 
role for non-regulatory motives on the issuance decision, this role is associated with factors 
that ease entry conditions to financial markets, such as a larger size and a lower tail risk 
exposure.  
3.5.2.1 Sub-Sample Analysis and Alternative Specifications 
It could be argued that our results do not fully capture the demand and supply dynamics 
that have a potential bearing on the issuance of sub-debt. Apart from the time and 
macroeconomic conditions (which we control for), these market interactions could be 
influenced by changes in the conditions that qualify sub-debt in the regulatory capital, with 
the most prominent being the implementation of Basel I in 1990 (Federal Reserve System, 
1989). The adoption of Basel I increased the proportion of sub-debt in capital but also ceded 
investor-control to the regulators by eliminating covenants on regulatory sub-debt (Ashcraft, 
2008). The interaction between these demand and supply effects would then be different 
pre- and post-Basel I implementation, making it difficult to capture these dynamics with a 
reduced form specification.  
To account for the change highlighted above, we follow Ashcraft (2008) and split the 
sample between the pre-Basel I and Basel I regime, where the former is the period before 
the implementation of Basel I in 1990, otherwise all other periods fall under the Basel I 
                                               
enters the sub-debt model as significantly negative (see, Table A.3-2). Nevertheless, the Buffer variable 
still has the greatest impact on the issuance of sub-debt when compared to Size, Tail Risk and Inflation.  
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regime. We, however, omit the post Basel II proposal period (after 2002) to avoid 
contamination effects related to the announcement of further changes in capital regulation 
(see, Federal Reserve System, 2003 for the proposed Basel II rules). We report the regression 
results and the associated marginal effects for the buffer variable under Table A.3-3a where 
columns 1 to 3 are the estimates for the pre-Basel I regime (1983-1989) while columns 4 to 
6 are with respect to the post-Basel I regime (1990-2002). We find that the Buffer is important 
to the decision to issue sub-debt regardless of the regulatory capital regime (Panel A). Panel 
B further shows that the decision to issue sub-debt is still significantly important for banks 
with low regulatory buffers. Moreover, the importance of the buffer does not vary across the 
regulatory regimes as shown in Panel C (column 4). Similar results are confirmed even when 
the Basel I regime extends to 2005; namely, a year prior to the international announcement 
of Basel II as reported in Table A.3-3b.  
Equally, the tendency of banks to remain undercapitalized during adverse periods (see, 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016) could impact on the likelihood of 
banks issuing sub-debt during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. To eliminate these 
potential effects, we run our tests up to 2006 and find that the impact of the Buffer on sub-
debt issuance remains consistent with the main findings (See, Table A.3-4).  
Another caveat is that our dataset is characterized by the lack of direct information on 
regulatory capital ratios before 1993 (that we have overcome by following Krishnan et al. 
(2010)). Bearing this in mind, we repeat the analysis focusing only on the sub-period 1993-
2015. This exercise excludes 184 issues by 74 banks. We still find the likelihood to issue sub-
debt (or equity) is larger when banks are characterized by a lower regulatory capital buffer 
(Table A.3-5, Panels A and B). We conclude, therefore, that our pro-regulatory motive 
finding is robust to changes in the period of the analysis. 
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More importantly, security issuance is not the only means through which banks can 
improve their capital adequacy ratios hence we account for the possibility that banks could 
adopt internal measures for this purpose. Specifically, banks could build their capital base by 
reducing dividends or deleveraging through asset reduction. To examine this issue, we assign 
an additional category to the dependent variable that is equals to 3 if a bank cuts dividends 
and/or reduce assets in a particular quarter, collectively defined as “Internal”. Other 
categories remain as previously, thus 1 for sub-debt, 2 for equity and 0 for no-issuance (base 
outcome). We report these results in Table A.3-6 and Panel A shows that the Buffer still plays 
a prominent role in the recapitalization decision of banks. Nevertheless, banks with low 
buffers are more likely to improve their capital ratios through security issuance viz., sub-debt 
or equity, while those with higher buffers are most likely to build capital through internal 
means (as further confirmed by Panel B). These findings suggest that banks with sufficient 
capital can “leisurely” build their capital base, but those pressed for capital adopt an instant 
recapitalization strategy, thus security issuance (also see, Dinger and Vallascas, 2016).  
We next add further controls to our baseline specifications to exclude the possibility that 
our findings are driven by the effect of omitted variables that are captured by the regulatory 
capital buffer. Specifically, we control for the loan to asset ratio as loans are normally 
characterized by higher risk-weights and, as such, influence the regulatory capital ratio. We 
also jointly control for the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, and the ratio of 
other real estate loans to total assets to account for the riskiness of the credit portfolio. Our 
results remain similar (TablesA.3-7a and A.3-7b). 
Finally, we eliminate the possibility that our results could be driven by econometric bias 
by re-estimating our baseline specification using the multinomial probit model as an 
alternative econometric setting, and the ordered probit model as a way of accounting for 
potential pecking order in the security issuance decisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
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multinomial probit model results shown in Table A.3-8 still find a negative relationship 
between Buffer and sub-debt issuance. In addition, the results of the ordered probit model in 
Table A.3-9 suggest that there are no ordering preferences in the issuance of sub-debt or 
equity since low-buffer banks are equally likely to issue either security. The difference 
between these security choices is insignificant (column 5). Perhaps, the relatively cheaper 
issuance costs of sub-debt (see, Boyson et al., 2016) offset the faster recapitalization benefits 
associated with equity, resulting in this indifference.  
3.5.3 Regulatory Versus Risk-Shifting Motives 
A possible interpretation of our results is related to the likelihood that banks with a lower 
regulatory capital buffer could also have a higher probability of distress. In turn, this could 
induce low-buffer banks to shift risk towards creditors by privileging debt issuance over 
equity issuance (Admati, 2014; Admati et al., 2018). Our result, therefore, could be a 
consequence of sub-debt being used as a tool to further increase bank leverage by poorly 
capitalized banks taking advantage of the regulatory motive. 
The interpretation above, however, would contradict the evidence that poorly capitalized 
banks are more likely to issue equity than other banks because of market pressure (Dinger 
and Vallascas, 2016). In addition, the position is at odds with market discipline theories (see, 
for instance, Niu, 2008a; 2008b) which suggest that riskier or distressed institutions might 
find difficulties in raising sub-debt. Furthermore, and more importantly, our analysis shows 
that banks with lower buffers are also more likely to issue equity. That is, we do not find 
evidence of a substitution between equity and sub-debt when banks have lower regulatory 
capital.20  
                                               
20 In contrast, untabulated tests show that the estimated probability to issue equity and sub-debt 
are positively and significantly correlated in our sample (r=0.22; p-value=0.000). 
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Nonetheless, we further exclude the possibility that our results are capturing a risk-
shifting motive of poorly capitalized banks in the following sub-sections, where we observe 
the sub-debt issuance behavior of risky banks, and more especially when they are large. These 
motives would be most pronounced in banks that are risky as they may attempt to offload 
their vulnerable positions to other stakeholders, and large banks - since expectations for a 
bailout usually incite them to be riskier (Afonso et al., 2014; Hagendorff et al., 2018; Taleb 
and Tapiero, 2010).  
3.5.3.1 Regulatory Capital Buffer and Tail Risk 
In this analysis, we offer further evidence against a risk-shifting strategy being behind the 
regulatory motive of the issuance decisions. To this end, we focus on the interplay between 
Buffer and Tail Risk. The observed negative impact of Tail Risk on the likelihood that banks 
issue sub-debt indicates the presence of market discipline in debt quantities. This market 
discipline mechanism might then reduce opportunities for banks with a low regulatory buffer 
to rely on debt to improve their regulatory ratios when they are more exposed to extreme 
losses; namely, when they have more incentives to shift risk towards creditors and the 
financial safety net. To verify the validity of this argument, in Table 3-5, we extend the 
baseline specification reported in Table 3-3 with an interaction term between Tail Risk and 
Buffer.  
However, the sign and significance level of the coefficient associated with the interaction 
term is not informative as to the direction and magnitude of the interaction effect in non-
linear models (Hoetker, 2007). More specifically, the interaction effects can be significant for 
some observations although the interaction coefficient is not significant, while some 
observations may not be significant in spite of a significant interaction coefficient (Hoetker, 
2007, p.336). It is in this respect that Hoetker (2007) advocates for the interaction effects to 
be calculated at given values, and hence, like other recent literature in this field (i.e. Berger 
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and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016) we rely on the computation of predicted 
probabilities for banks at different regulatory buffers and different exposures to tail risk. 
That is, we calculate the interaction effects when a bank’s buffer and tail risk are at the lower 
quartile (25th percentile) and upper quartile (75th percentile) of the Buffer and Tail Risk 
distributions. In this regard, Panel A of Table 3-5 reports the results of the regression model 
while Panel B shows the predicted probabilities, and their differences, to issue sub-debt and 
equity for low- and high-buffer banks when these banks have low (a value equal to the 25th 
percentile of the sample distribution) or high (a value equal to the 75th percentile of the 
sample distribution) exposure to Tail Risk. Panel C reports the associated marginal effects of 
low-buffer and high-buffer banks when they have low and high tail risk. 
[Insert Table 3-5] 
We find that banks with a lower regulatory capital buffer are more likely to issue sub-debt 
when they are less exposed to tail risk. Risky banks instead issue significantly more equity at 
all levels of regulatory capital than less-risky ones, but more especially when they have a low 
regulatory capital buffer. To put our analysis into perspective, it is worth noting that the 
annual probability that a low buffer bank with low tail risk issues sub-debt is 4.83% against 
a probability of 3.74% when a bank is riskier. In contrast, the annual probability that a low 
buffer bank with low tail risk issues equity is around 4.47% against a probability of 5% when 
a bank is riskier.  
Essentially, our analysis suggests that risky banks with a lower regulatory capital buffer 
are pushed by concerns over default risk to recapitalize with equity and not sub-debt. 
Furthermore, the exposure to tail risk does not matter for the issuance of sub-debt only when 
issuing banks report high regulatory capital buffers. Nevertheless, in this group of banks the 
issuance likelihood remains small at any level of tail risk. 
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In short, our tests offer further evidence of market discipline in debt quantities (Billett et 
al., 1998; Park and Peristiani, 1998), with risk-sensitive investors leading to a lower supply of 
funds to riskier banking firms, especially when they have low capital buffer. These findings 
are, therefore, against the view that the inclusion of sub-debt in the regulatory capital might 
especially appeal to banks with more risk-shifting incentives because of a lack of market 
discipline. 
3.5.3.2 Regulatory Capital Buffer and Bank Size 
Our baseline analysis, where Size is a strong predictor of the issuance decision, raises the 
possibility that the use of sub-debt to improve regulatory capital ratios is primarily, or even 
entirely, an option for the largest banks in our sample. If these banks are then not subject to 
any market discipline because of the too-big-to-fail arguments suggested by recent studies 
on market discipline in debt prices (see for instance, Acharya et al., 2016), they might then 
be inclined to build up their leverage risk via sub-debt issuance (even when they become 
riskier). The inclusion of sub-debt in the regulatory capital might then facilitate risk-shifting 
by larger banks. 
[Insert Table 3-6] 
To assess whether the above argument is valid, we initially extend the baseline 
specification with an interaction term between Buffer and Size in Table 3-6. We report the 
regression results in Panel A, whereas in Panel B we report the probability of issuing sub-
debt and equity for small (total assets equal to the 25th percentile of the sample distribution) 
and large banks (total assets equal to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution) and for 
similar percentiles of the capital buffer. We then compare, in Panel C, whether these 
probabilities significantly differ between small and large banks. 
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We find that the issuance likelihood increases significantly in the group of large banks 
especially when they are characterized by a low buffer. In contrast, for small banks the 
likelihood to issue sub-debt is extremely low at any level of capital buffer, though it is 
significantly higher for banks with a lower regulatory capital buffer. In both groups, banks 
are more likely to opt for the issuance of equity than sub-debt at any level of the buffer 
(column 3). For instance, for a large bank with a low buffer, we observe an annual issuance 
probability equal to about 2.09% and 5.28% for sub-debt and equity, respectively. In 
contrast, the probability that a small bank with a low buffer issues sub-debt is only about 
0.38% versus an annual probability to issue equity of 3.73%. In short, we find strong support 
for sub-debt being primarily used to boost regulatory capital when banks are large. However, 
the fact that large banks with low regulatory buffer are also significantly more likely to issue 
equity than other banks casts doubt on the fact that these banks design the issuance strategies 
around risk-shifting opportunities.  
In Table 3-7 we further elaborate on the possibility that the size effect in sub-debt issuance 
is a consequence of large banks being perceived by investors as too-big-to-fail and as such 
are not penalized for their risk-taking behavior (see discussions by, Afonso et al., 2014; 
Bhagat et al., 2015; Hagendorff et al., 2018). In this table, we extend our baseline model with 
an interaction term between Tail Risk and Size to assess if large banks are not penalized by 
investors when they are more exposed to tail risk because of a lack of market discipline in 
debt quantities.  
[Insert Table 3-7] 
We report the regression results in Panel A and the predicted probability to issue sub-
debt and equity for different values of bank size and for different tail risk exposures in Panel 
B. We find that large banks with a high tail risk exposure (namely, banks with tail risk equal 
to the 75th percentile of the sample distribution) are significantly less likely to issue sub-debt, 
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whereas they are more likely to issue equity. In contrast, we do not find that the risk-exposure 
matters for the issuance decisions of smaller banks. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that larger banks are subject to a disciplinary mechanism via debt quantity and are forced to 
recapitalize through equity issuance when they become highly exposed to tail risk. In 
contrast, the irrelevance of tail risk for small banks suggests the presence of broader 
difficulties in accessing the sub-debt market, and the security markets in general, for these 
banks (as compared to larger banks).  
We next review if the observed market discipline in debt quantities is especially strong 
when issuing large banks are characterized by a low regulatory buffer; namely, for those large 
banks where a higher tail risk exposure is likely to be more detrimental for debtholders 
because of the lower equity protection against losses. To this end we estimate a model with 
a triple interaction term between Size, Tail Risk and Buffer (and with interaction terms between 
each pair of constituent components). Therefore, this model allows us to understand how 
the issuing behavior of large (and small) banks with different regulatory buffers is influenced 
by their tail risk exposure. We report the results of this interaction in Panel A of Table 3-8 
while Panel B shows the predicted probabilities, and their differences, of issuing sub-debt 
and equity by large and small banks with low buffers across tail risk levels. Panel C reports 
the same statistics for large and small banks with high buffers across their tail risk (as defined 
earlier).  
[Insert Table 3-8] 
Panel A of Table 3-8 indicates that larger banks with low buffers are less likely to issue 
sub-debt when they are riskier, while the issuance probability of smaller banks with low 
buffers remains relatively low and independent of the tail risk exposure. Furthermore, the 
probability that larger banks issue equity is still significantly higher than the probability of 
issuing sub-debt at any value of tail risk. Yet, and in line with the findings reported in Table 
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3-5, Panel B confirms that the only setting where tail risk does not matter for the issuance 
decision of sub-debt is when the issuing banks are characterized by a high regulatory capital 
buffer. However, the lack of risk-sensitivity equally applies to small banks and large banks 
(with both banks showing low issuance likelihood).  
All in all, our findings indicate that the issuance choices of large banks to improve 
regulatory capital ratios are heavily affected by market mechanisms that penalize the issuance 
of debt securities by riskier institutions. In particular, the fact that larger banks with a low 
regulatory buffer are significantly more likely to issue sub-debt when they are less risky, and 
the evidence of a greater likelihood to issue equity than sub-debt by these banks, go against 
the argument that these banks are not subject to market discipline in debt quantity which 
aids their risk-shifting via the issuance choices. More generally, our analysis is supportive of 
the presence of size benefits unrelated to government guarantees and related to the 
economies of scale in the issuance process of any type of security (including sub-debt and 
equity) when the issuer is a large corporation (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
3.6 Conclusions  
The eligibility of sub-debt as a component of bank regulatory capital implies that the 
issuance of sub-debt is a viable option to improve a bank’s regulatory capital ratio. In this 
study, we contrast this regulatory motive for the issuance of sub-debt with other potential 
explanations of the issuance decision proposed for non-financial firms. In conducting our 
analysis, we account for the fact that the issuance of sub-debt contributes with equity 
issuance to improve the capital ratio and employ a multinomial logit model to identify and 
compare the determinants of the two issuance decisions. 
Our analysis finds that the issuance likelihood of sub-debt is primarily driven by the 
purpose of improving the regulatory capital ratio, with a limited additional number of 
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significant explanatory factors that seem to reflect easier entry conditions into the sub-debt 
segment of the bond market. The economic impact of these factors is, however, generally 
more limited as compared to the economic impact of the capital buffer. 
In a set of additional tests that exploit how variation in tail risk and size influences the 
issuance decisions of banks with low buffers, we do not find support for the importance of 
risk-shifting incentives. In particular, we show that sub-debt issuance is an important tool to 
improve regulatory capital ratios especially for banks with low tail risk exposure, while riskier 
institutions are more likely to rely on equity issuance to boost their buffer. While these results 
are supportive of the presence of market discipline in debt quantities, we document that this 
discipline mechanism materializes especially for large banks, against the view that investors 
do not penalize these banks because of too-big-to-fail guarantees. Small banks show instead 
broader difficulties in accessing the sub-debt market unrelated to their tail risk exposure. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that regulation is a key motivation for the decision of banks 
to enter the sub-debt market and shows that the inclusion of this type of debt in the 
regulatory capital primarily benefits safer and larger institutions because of market discipline 
in debt quantities and because of easier entry conditions to the security markets. Notably, by 
identifying systematic differences between issuers and non-issuers of sub-debt, our analysis 
shows the importance of accounting for selection bias in any analysis focusing on market 
discipline in debt prices.
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Tables and Figures - Chapter 3  
Table 3-1: Distribution of Sub-Debt and Seasoned Equity Offers (Equity) from 1983 to 2015 
This table summarizes our sample of banks that have issued sub-debt and equity on an annual basis, the relative 
frequencies of the securities and average proceeds raised from both securities.  
Subordinated Debt Seasoned Equity Offers - Equity 


























1983 210 3 1.4 3 1.4 256.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1984 215 13 6.0 15 7.0 192.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1985 226 21 9.3 27 11.9 138.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1986 230 11 4.8 11 4.8 83.7 20 8.7 21 9.1 59.4 
1987 238 24 10.1 31 13.0 244.2 3 1.3 3 1.3 117.2 
1988 226 9 4.0 9 4.0 235.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1989 227 17 7.5 17 7.5 156.8 3 1.3 3 1.3 296.7 
1990 222 8 3.6 10 4.5 137.7 2 0.9 2 0.9 102.7 
1991 230 14 6.1 24 10.4 135.6 14 6.1 14 6.1 84.6 
1992 217 27 12.4 37 17.1 200.1 16 7.4 16 7.4 59.8 
1993 773 19 2.5 29 3.8 192.7 22 2.8 23 3.0 48.0 
1994 901 18 2.0 24 2.7 179.5 9 1.0 9 1.0 9.7 
1995 892 20 2.2 26 2.9 164.9 10 1.1 10 1.1 24.6 
1996 841 13 1.5 19 2.3 248.8 8 1.0 8 1.0 15.6 
1997 795 11 1.4 16 2.0 251.4 5 0.6 5 0.6 25.7 
1998 803 11 1.4 12 1.5 176.5 15 1.9 15 1.9 102.8 
1999 902 10 1.1 11 1.2 380.0 9 1.0 10 1.1 187.5 
2000 858 7 0.8 8 0.9 456.3 2 0.2 2 0.2 744.1 
2001 834 9 1.1 10 1.2 858.6 9 1.1 10 1.2 24.8 
2002 762 9 1.2 11 1.4 691.5 14 1.8 14 1.8 46.0 
2003 732 17 2.3 24 3.3 374.3 15 2.0 16 2.2 154.0 
2004 673 8 1.2 16 2.4 612.1 17 2.5 18 2.7 61.3 
2005 705 8 1.1 13 1.8 1136.9 16 2.3 16 2.3 34.3 
2006 751 5 0.7 9 1.2 2051.2 18 2.4 18 2.4 46.6 
2007 708 11 1.6 13 1.8 1006.5 5 0.7 5 0.7 89.3 
2008 676 7 1.0 8 1.2 1088.8 28 4.1 30 4.4 1511.1 
2009 668 3 0.4 3 0.4 87.5 86 12.9 97 14.5 656.2 
2010 673 2 0.3 2 0.3 22.8 73 10.8 78 11.6 198.8 
2011 655 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 27 4.1 28 4.3 179.2 
2012 675 2 0.3 1 0.1 75.0 27 4.0 28 4.1 61.6 
2013 652 10 1.5 14 2.1 1124.0 29 4.4 34 5.2 33.8 
2014 649 18 2.8 22 3.4 607.9 26 4.0 28 4.3 83.9 
2015 623 30 4.8 37 5.9 328.2 21 3.4 24 3.9 83.3 
Total 19442 395 2.0 512 2.6 385.2 549 2.8 585 3.0 264.0 
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Table 3-2: Analysis of Issuers and Non-Issuers  
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of non-security issuers, sub-debt issuers and equity issuers and their associated mean difference in Panel A. Buffer is the actual regulatory 
capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the 
ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss 
when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. 
Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel B classifies banks and security issues into the four quartiles of the Buffer distribution, while Panel C summarizes sub-debt issues that are 
eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital because they meet the minimum qualifying criteria and/or the issuer still has regulatory capacity to include the instruments within the quota 
for Tier 2 elements. The frequency and amount raised from these eligible securities in relation to all sub-debt issues are also reported.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of 
Non-security Issuers and Issuers 
Non-Issuers Sub-Debt Issuers Equity Issuers Mean Difference 







Buffer 62557 0.067 0.054 512 0.037 0.037 585 0.065 0.063 0.030*** 0.001 -0.029*** 
Size 62557 7.218 9.946 512 10.21 10.36 585 7.962 7.689 -2.997*** -0.744*** 2.253*** 
Bank Age 60696 1.755 1.909 512 2.928 3.194 575 2.190 2.375 -1.173*** -0.435*** 0.738*** 
ROA 61897 0.003 0.003 508 0.003 0.003 583 0.001 0.002 -0.0003** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
Tax 62557 0.302 0.316 512 0.308 0.317 585 0.301 0.308 -0.006 0.001 0.007 
Tobin’s Q 52903 1.353 1.231 490 1.428 1.304 550 1.071 0.974 -0.075** 0.282*** 0.357*** 
Tail Risk 52970 0.046 0.037 492 0.031 0.027 550 0.058 0.047 0.014*** -0.012*** -0.027*** 
Deposits 62017 0.766 0.785 508 0.684 0.702 583 0.764 0.778 0.083*** 0.002 -0.080*** 
Credit Quality 62557 0.111 0.000 512 0.691 1.000 585 0.188 0.000 -0.581*** -0.077*** 0.503*** 
TARP 62557 0.042 0.000 512 0.006 0.000 585 0.202 0.000 0.036*** -0.160*** -0.196*** 
Inflation 62557 0.006 0.006 512 0.007 0.007 585 0.005 0.005 -0.001* 0.001*** 0.002*** 
Term Premium 62557 0.006 0.001 512 0.005 0.001 585 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Panel B: Distribution of Sub-Debt and Equity Issues by Buffer Size          
Buffer-Size Quartile Number of Banks 
Sub-Debt Equity 
Number of Issues Issues to Banks (%) Number of Issues Issues to Banks (%) 
1st Quartile 1060  248   23.4   194  18.3  
2nd Quartile 1173  178   15.2   158  13.5  
3rd Quartile 1251  72   5.8   141  11.3  
4th Quartile 1121  14   1.2   92  8.24  
Panel C: Eligible Sub-Debt Issues 
Total Issues Eligible Issues 
Eligible Issues to  
Total Issues (%) 
Total Amount ($mil) Eligible Amount ($mil) 
Eligible Amount to Total 
Amount (%) 
512 307  60.0   197 242   137 581  69.8  
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Table 3-3: Modelling the Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Multinomial Logit Model 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B reports the Chi2 (p-value in parentheses) of difference in the marginal effects of the Buffer and 
other factors that are significant in the sub-debt issuance model. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
at the bank level, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -19.23*** -16.76*** -14.89*** -14.52*** -4.338 
 (3.404)  (2.595)  (4.284) 
Size 0.853*** 0.748*** 0.320*** 0.306*** 0.533*** 
 (0.102)  (0.0531)  (0.113) 
Bank Age -0.0392 -0.031 -0.231*** -0.229*** 0.192 
 (0.124)  (0.0809)  (0.142) 
ROA 26.24 22.99 12.10 11.66 14.14 
 (22.56)  (15.00)  (26.84) 
Tax 0.184 0.151 0.798 0.790 -0.615 
 (0.942)  (0.616)  (1.124) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0596 -0.055 0.184* 0.183* -0.243 
 (0.155)  (0.105)  (0.189) 
Tail Risk -12.20*** -10.76*** 0.0180 0.186 -12.21*** 
 (3.444)  (2.074)  (4.087) 
Deposits -1.425 -1.271 1.017 1.030 -2.442* 
 (1.135)  (0.717)  (1.374) 
Credit Quality 0.246 0.212 -0.0176 -0.021 0.263 
 (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.233) 
TARP 0.164 0.134 0.797*** 0.789*** -0.633 
 (0.762)  (0.164)  (0.774) 
Inflation -3.364 -3.042 5.346 5.355 -8.710 
 (6.857)  (6.892)  (9.547) 
Term Premium 3.742** 3.351*** -3.558** -3.585** 7.300*** 
 (1.471)  (1.448)  (2.172) 
Constant -9.697***  -8.304***  -1.393 
 (1.523)  (0.845)  (1.785) 
      
Observations 49058  49058  49058 
R-squared 0.212     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Test for Difference between the Marginal Effects of Buffer and Size, Tail Risk and Term Premium - Chi2 (p-value in 
parentheses) 
Buffer = Size 31.60 (0.00) 30.93 (0.00)  
Buffer = Tail Risk 1.900 (0.17) 25.85 (0.00)  
Buffer = Term Premium 32.79 (0.00) 11.68 (0.00)  
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Table 3-4: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panels B to E show the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile and those 
at the upper quartile of the Buffer, Size, Tail Risk and Term Premium distributions, respectively. The standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -19.23*** -16.76*** -14.89*** -14.52*** -4.338 
 (3.404)  (2.595)  (4.284) 
Size 0.853*** 0.748*** 0.320*** 0.306*** 0.533*** 
 (0.102)  (0.0531)  (0.113) 
Bank Age -0.0392 -0.031 -0.231*** -0.229*** 0.192 
 (0.124)  (0.0809)  (0.142) 
ROA 26.24 22.99 12.10 11.66 14.14 
 (22.56)  (15.00)  (26.84) 
Tax 0.184 0.151 0.798 0.790 -0.615 
 (0.942)  (0.616)  (1.124) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0596 -0.055 0.184* 0.183* -0.243 
 (0.155)  (0.105)  (0.189) 
Tail Risk -12.20*** -10.76*** 0.0180 0.186 -12.21*** 
 (3.444)  (2.074)  (4.087) 
Deposits -1.425 -1.271 1.017 1.030 -2.442* 
 (1.135)  (0.717)  (1.374) 
Credit Quality 0.246 0.212 -0.0176 -0.021 0.263 
 (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.233) 
TARP 0.164 0.134 0.797*** 0.789*** -0.633 
 (0.762)  (0.164)  (0.774) 
Inflation -3.364 -3.042 5.346 5.355 -8.710 
 (6.857)  (6.892)  (9.547) 
Term Premium 3.742** 3.351*** -3.558** -3.585** 7.300*** 
 (1.471)  (1.448)  (2.172) 
Constant -9.697***  -8.304***  -1.393 
 (1.523)  (0.845)  (1.785) 
      
Observations 49058  49058  49058 
R-squared 0.212     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer (at lower quartile) and High-Buffer Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.139***  1.472***  -0.333** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.474***  0.724***  -0.250** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.665***  -0.748***   
Panel C: Probability (%) of Small Banks (at lower quartile) and Large Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Small Banks  0.067***  0.593***  -0.526*** 
B) Large Banks 0.362***  1.104***  -0.742*** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) 0.296***  0.511***   
Panel D: Probability (%) of Low Tail Risk Banks (at lower quartile) and High Tail Risk Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or 
equity 
A) Low Tail Risk Banks  1.023***  1.025***  -0.002 
B) High Tail Risk Banks 0.819***  1.029***  -0.210* 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.204***  0.004   
Panel E: Probability (%) of issuing sub-debt or equity during Low-Premium (at lower quartile) and High-Premium Periods (at upper 
quartile) 
A) Low-Premium Period  0.895***  1.138***  -0.243** 
B) High-Premium Period 1.062***  0.956***  0.106 
Difference in probability (B vs A) 0.167***  -0.182**   
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Table 3-5: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity and Tail Risk 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B shows the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low Tail Risk) 
and those at the upper quartile (High Tail Risk) of the Tail Risk distribution when their buffers are at the lower 
quartile (Low-Buffer) and upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. Panel C reports the associated 
marginal effects of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer banks when they have low and high Tail Risk. The standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
    
Buffer -21.56*** -14.28*** -7.278 
 (5.294) (2.536) (5.776) 
Tail Risk -15.70*** 2.535 -18.24*** 
 (3.802) (2.120) (4.252) 
Buffer # Tail Risk 53.28 95.77*** -42.50 
 (104.0) (25.71) (106.2) 
Size 0.863*** 0.278*** 0.585*** 
 (0.102) (0.0510) (0.113) 
Bank Age -0.0350 -0.0984 0.0633 
 (0.125) (0.0780) (0.141) 
ROA 27.60 -4.604 32.20 
 (22.33) (14.88) (26.56) 
Tax 0.0412 1.423** -1.382 
 (0.954) (0.581) (1.113) 
Tobin’s Q -0.142 0.184** -0.326** 
 (0.136) (0.0932) (0.166) 
Deposits -1.193 1.041 -2.234 
 (1.121) (0.702) (1.360) 
Credit Quality 0.213 -0.00350 0.216 
 (0.178) (0.168) (0.225) 
TARP -0.362 1.126*** -1.488** 
 (0.619) (0.189) (0.643) 
Inflation -3.457 2.467 -5.924 
 (6.856) (6.782) (9.421) 
Term Premium 3.501** -4.650*** 8.151*** 
 (1.443) (1.414) (2.125) 
Constant -9.806*** -7.464*** -2.342 
 (1.511) (0.790) (1.758) 
    
Observations 49058 49058 49058 
R-squared 0.201   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low Tail Risk and High Tail Risk Banks issuing sub-debt or equity at different levels of the Buffer 
Low Tail Risk Banks    
A) Low-Buffer Banks 1.208*** 1.118*** -0.090 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.483*** 0.647*** -0.164** 
Difference in probabilities (B vs A) -0.725*** -0.471***  
High Tail Risk Banks    
C) Low-Buffer Banks 0.934*** 1.248*** -0.314 
D) High-Buffer Banks 0.387*** 0.792*** -0.405*** 
Difference in probabilities (D vs C) -0.547*** -0.456***  
Panel C: High vs Low Tail Risk Banks (difference in probabilities) 
A) Low-Buffer Banks -0.274*** 0.130*** -0.144*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks -0.096 0.145*** -0.049*** 
Marginal Effects (B vs A) 0.178*** 0.015  
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Table 3-6: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity and Bank Size 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B shows the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Small) and those 
at the upper quartile (Large) of the Size distribution when their buffers are at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) and 
upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. Panel C reports the associated marginal effects of Small and 
Large banks when they have low and high Buffers. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level 
while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
    
Buffer -20.14 -40.24*** 20.10 
 (15.75) (8.182) (17.83) 
Size 0.858*** 0.0607 0.798*** 
 (0.123) (0.0727) (0.139) 
Buffer # Size 0.0566 3.979*** -3.923** 
 (1.764) (0.892) (1.990) 
Bank Age -0.0326 -0.0744 0.0418 
 (0.125) (0.0792) (0.143) 
ROA 28.35 3.514 24.84 
 (22.52) (15.01) (26.76) 
Tax 0.0161 1.298** -1.282 
 (0.952) (0.580) (1.113) 
Tobin’s Q -0.142 0.135 -0.277* 
 (0.136) (0.0941) (0.165) 
Tail Risk -14.19*** 5.700*** -19.89*** 
 (3.561) (1.595) (3.962) 
Deposits -1.214 0.752 -1.967 
 (1.119) (0.673) (1.333) 
Credit Quality 0.214 -0.00724 0.221 
 (0.177) (0.170) (0.227) 
TARP -0.254 1.182*** -1.436** 
 (0.590) (0.189) (0.611) 
Inflation -3.389 3.420 -6.809 
 (6.879) (6.738) (9.395) 
Term Premium 3.553** -4.417*** 7.970*** 
 (1.447) (1.428) (2.139) 
Constant -9.803*** -5.664*** -4.138** 
 (1.742) (0.886) (1.956) 
  
Observations 49058 49058 49058 
R-squared 0.202 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Small and Large Banks issuing sub-debt or equity at different levels of the Buffer 
Small Banks    
A) Low-Buffer Banks 0.095*** 0.933*** -0.838*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.035*** 0.417*** -0.382*** 
Difference in probabilities (B vs A) -0.060*** -0.516***  
Large Banks    
C) Low-Buffer Banks 0.523*** 1.321*** -0.798*** 
D) High-Buffer Banks 0.197*** 0.879*** -0.682*** 
Difference in probabilities (D vs C) -0.326*** -0.442***  
Panel C: Large vs Small Banks (difference in probabilities)   
A) Low-Buffer Banks 0.429*** 0.388*** 0.041 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.162*** 0.462*** -0.300*** 
Marginal Effects (B vs A) -0.267*** 0.074  
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Table 3-7: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity based on Size and Tail Risk 
This table reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks based on their Size and Tail Risk. The 
regression results in panel A are estimated with a Multinomial Logit model for the sample period 1983 to 2015 with 
the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity 
was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum 
required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat 
(years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of 
total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or 
better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the 
difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms 
while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B shows the probability of issuing 
sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Small) or those at the upper quartile (Large) of the Size distribution 
when their Tail Risk is at the lower quartile (Low Tail Risk) and upper quartile (High Tail Risk) of the Tail Risk 
distribution. Panel C reports the associated marginal effects of Small and Large banks when they have low and high 
Tail Risk. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
    
Buffer -19.73*** -10.52*** -9.207** 
 (3.509) (1.957) (3.977) 
Size 0.891*** -0.00518 0.896*** 
 (0.124) (0.0683) (0.138) 
Tail Risk -5.146 -26.95*** 21.81 
 (17.31) (5.734) (18.20) 
Size # Tail Risk  -0.910 4.094*** -5.004** 
 (1.879) (0.623) (1.990) 
Bank Age -0.0311 -0.0613 0.0303 
 (0.125) (0.0807) (0.143) 
ROA 28.35 1.737 26.61 
 (22.31) (15.19) (26.61) 
Tax 0.00584 1.337** -1.331 
 (0.953) (0.583) (1.108) 
Tobin’s Q -0.138 0.227** -0.365** 
 (0.136) (0.0946) (0.167) 
Deposits -1.209 0.850 -2.059 
 (1.116) (0.710) (1.359) 
Credit Quality 0.214 0.0653 0.149 
 (0.178) (0.173) (0.229) 
TARP -0.196 1.112*** -1.308** 
 (0.576) (0.195) (0.597) 
Inflation -3.294 2.562 -5.856 
 (6.841) (6.846) (9.464) 
Term Premium 3.586** -4.876*** 8.462*** 
 (1.441) (1.438) (2.139) 
Constant -10.13*** -5.279*** -4.854*** 
 (1.650) (0.819) (1.871) 
    
Observations 49058 49058 49058 
R-squared 0.204   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Small and Large Banks issuing sub-debt or equity at different levels of Tail Risk 
Small Banks    
A) Low Tail Risk 0.075*** 0.752*** -0.677*** 
B) High Tail Risk 0.060*** 0.718*** -0.658*** 
Difference in probabilities (B vs A) -0.015 -0.034  
Large Banks    
C) Low Tail Risk 0.415*** 0.944*** -0.529*** 
D) High Tail Risk 0.324*** 1.058*** -0.734*** 
Difference in probabilities (D vs C) -0.091*** 0.114***  
Panel C: Large vs Small Banks (difference in probabilities)   
A) Low Tail Risk 0.341*** 0.192** 0.149 
B) High Tail Risk 0.264*** 0.341*** -0.077 
Marginal Effects (B vs A) -0.077*** 0.149***  
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Table 3-8: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity based on Buffer, Size and Tail Risk 
This table reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks based on their Size, Tail Risk and Buffer. 
The regression results in panel A are estimated with a Multinomial Logit model for the sample period 1983 to 2015 
with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if 
equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the 
minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on 
Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax 
earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when 
a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the 
ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of 
BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium 
is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B shows the issuance 
probability of Large (at the upper quartile of Size distribution) or Small banks (at the lower quartile of Size 
distribution) with low buffers (at the lower quartile of Buffer distribution) according to their risk levels, while Panel 
C reports similar probabilities when the banks have higher buffers (at the upper quartile of Buffer distribution). The 
standard errors are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
    
Buffer -24.22 -47.61*** 23.39 
 (17.44) (8.839) (19.52) 
Size 0.899*** -0.175* 1.074*** 
 (0.138) (0.0960) (0.161) 
Tail Risk -1.938 -32.85*** 30.92* 
 (17.26) (6.252) (18.44) 
Buffer # Size 0.335 4.097*** -3.762* 
 (1.807) (1.054) (2.089) 
Buffer # Tail Risk 76.28 50.97 25.31 
 (103.5) (47.95) (112.5) 
Size # Tail Risk -1.502 3.726*** -5.229*** 
 (1.804) (0.685) (1.952) 
Buffer # Size # Tail Risk 0.00252 0.00612*** -0.00360*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00155) (0.00107) 
Bank Age -0.0261 -0.0496 0.0236 
 (0.124) (0.0837) (0.145) 
ROA 22.83 2.791 20.03 
 (22.57) (15.63) (27.30) 
Tax 0.0500 1.077* -1.027 
 (0.949) (0.602) (1.127) 
Tobin’s Q -0.142 0.146 -0.288 
 (0.146) (0.103) (0.178) 
Deposits -1.138 1.430** -2.568* 
 (1.116) (0.726) (1.353) 
Credit Quality 0.217 -0.0439 0.261 
 (0.176) (0.176) (0.231) 
TARP 0.187 0.588*** -0.401 
 (0.729) (0.184) (0.746) 
Inflation -4.857 -1.411 -3.446 
 (6.906) (7.020) (9.655) 
Term Premium 3.963*** -4.757*** 8.720*** 
 (1.454) (1.450) (2.159) 
Constant -10.17*** -4.150*** -6.021*** 
 (1.841) (0.977) (2.065) 
    
Observations 49058 49058 49058 
R-squared 0.211   




Table 3-8 (Continued): Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity based on Buffer, Size and Tail 
Risk 
This table reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks based on their Size, Tail Risk and Buffer. 
The regression results in panel A are estimated with a Multinomial Logit model for the sample period 1983 to 2015 
with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if 
equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the 
minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on 
Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax 
earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when 
a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the 
ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of 
BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium 
is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B shows the issuance 
probability of Large (at the upper quartile of Size distribution) or Small banks (at the lower quartile of Size 
distribution) with low buffers (at the lower quartile of Buffer distribution) according to their risk levels, while Panel 
C reports similar probabilities when the banks have higher buffers (at the upper quartile of Buffer distribution). The 
standard errors are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Small/Low-Buffer Banks and Large/High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity at different levels of 
Tail Risk  
Large Banks with Low Buffers    
A) Low Tail Risk 0.571*** 1.520*** -0.949*** 
B) High Tail Risk  0.453*** 1.479*** -1.026*** 
Difference in probabilities (B vs A) -0.118*** -0.041  
Small Banks with Low Buffers 
C) Low Tail Risk 0.102*** 1.359*** -1.257*** 
D) High Tail Risk 0.086*** 1.143*** -1.393*** 
Difference in probabilities (D vs C) -0.016 -0.216***  
Small vs Large Low-Buffer Banks  
E) Low Tail Risk -0.469*** -0.161  
F) High Tail Risk -0.367*** -0.336**  
Panel C: Probability (%) of Small/High-Buffer Banks and Large/High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity at different levels of 
Tail Risk 
Large Banks with High Buffers    
A) Low Tail Risk 0.220*** 0.798*** -0.578*** 
B) High Tail Risk  0.188*** 0.815*** -0.627*** 
Difference in probabilities (B vs A) -0.032 0.017  
Small Banks with High Buffers 
C) Low Tail Risk 0.038*** 0.474*** -0.436*** 
D) High Tail Risk 0.035*** 0.418*** -0.383*** 
Difference in probabilities (D vs C) -0.003 -0.056*  
Small vs Large High-Buffer Banks (difference in probabilities) 
E) Low Tail Risk -0.182*** -0.324***  




Figure 3-1: Average Proceeds from Sub-Debt and Equity 





























































































































Figure 3-2: Probability (annualized) of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity 
This graph displays the annualized probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at different percentiles of the 
Buffer, for the period 1983 to 2015. Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required. 



































Additional Tables - Chapter 3  
Table A.3-1: Components of Capital and Capital Adequacy Ratios 
This table summarizes the developments in regulatory capital requirements in the US. Panel A shows the composition 
of regulatory capital while Panel B reports the levels of bank capitalization. 
 Jan 1982 Jun 1985 Mar 1989ᵃ 
Panel A: Composition of Regulatory Capital 
Primary Capital (Tier 1) 
Common stock  √ √ √ 
Perpetual preferred stock (Noncumulative) √ √ √ᵇ 
Capital surplus (Stock premium) √ √ √ 
Retained earnings √ √ √ 
Mandatory convertibles  √ √ 
n/a Reserves for contingencies √ √ 
Other capital reserves √ √ 
Minority interest n/a √ √ 
Allowance for loan losses  √ √ n/a 
Goodwill n/a Deduct Deduct 
Secondary Capital (Tier 2) 
Limited life preference stock √ √  
Qualifying subordinated debt √ √ √ 
Intermediate-term preferred stock 
n/a 
√ᶜ 
Allowance for loan losses  √ᵈ 
Undisclosed after-tax profits √ 
Mandatory convertibles and hybrids √ 
Perpetual preferred stock (Cumulative) √ 
Deductions from Total Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) 
Reciprocal holdings of capital  
n/a Deduct 
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries 











Well Capitalized n/a >= 10.0 >=5.0 
Adequately Capitalized > 6.5 > 7.0 > 7.0 >= 8.0 >=4.0 
Marginally Capitalized  >= 5.5 >= 6.5 >=6.0 n/a 
Minimum Requirement 5.5 6.0 6.0 8.0 4.0 
Under Capitalized < 5.5 < 6.0 < 6.0 < 8.0 < 4.0 
Significantly Undercapitalized 
n/a 
< 6.0 < 3.0 
Critically Under-Capitalized < 2ᵉ < 2ᵉ 
Relative to: Total Assets (TA) 




ᵃ The rules were fully implemented in January 1993, with some transition arrangements between 1990 and 1992. 
ᵇ Limited to 25% of Tier 1 capital.  
ᶜ Are aggregated with sub-debt and limited to 50% of Tier 1 capital. 
ᵈ Limited to 1.25% of RWA. 
ᵉ The threshold is relative to tangible capital, which includes regulatory capital plus cumulative preference shares. 
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Table A.3-2: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Quarterly Time Dummies 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B to E show and compare the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile 
and those at the upper quartile of the Buffer, Size, Tail Risk, and Inflation distributions, respectively. The standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -21.79*** -19.03*** -8.023*** -7.640*** -13.77*** 
 (3.057)  (1.933)  (3.519) 
Size 0.874*** 0.764*** 0.299*** 0.284*** 0.575*** 
 (0.100)  (0.0517)  (0.112) 
Bank Age -0.0390 -0.034 -0.0211 0.020 -0.0180 
 (0.126)  (0.0799)  (0.142) 
ROA 25.39 22.30 1.124 0.733 24.27 
 (22.76)  (15.06)  (27.17) 
Tax 0.0154 -0.001 0.951 0.944 -0.936 
 (0.932)  (0.584)  (1.099) 
Tobin’s Q -0.206 -0.181 0.0290 0.032 -0.235 
 (0.141)  (0.0990)  (0.174) 
Tail Risk -16.20*** -14.34*** 6.638*** 6.838*** -22.84*** 
 (3.365)  (1.789)  (3.894) 
Deposits -0.921 -0.829 1.265* 1.270* -2.186 
 (1.149)  (0.712)  (1.398) 
Credit Quality 0.190 0.167 -0.150 -0.146 0.340 
 (0.178)  (0.170)  (0.228) 
TARP -0.760 -0.688 1.321*** 1.324*** -2.081*** 
 (0.615)  (0.197)  (0.640) 
Inflation -16.00* -13.49* -37.96*** -37.47*** 21.96 
 (8.908)  (10.24)  (13.65) 
Term Premium 3.973 3.599 -7.119*** -7.132*** 11.09*** 
 (2.700)  (2.242)  (3.536) 
Constant -9.970***  -8.147***  -1.823 
 (1.509)  (0.814)  (1.772) 
      
Observations 49058  49058  49058 
R-squared 0.203     
Quarter Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer (at low quartile) and High-Buffer Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.182***  1.220***  -0.038 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.434***  0.837***  -0.403*** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.747***  -0.383***   
Panel C: Probability (%) of Small Banks (at low quartile) and Large Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Small Banks  0.065***  0.616***  -0.551*** 
B) Large Banks 0.370***  1.101***  -0.731*** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) 0.305***  0.485***   
Panel D: Probability (%) of Low-Risk Banks (at low quartile) and High-Risk Banks (at upper quartile) issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low Tail Risk Banks  1.049***  0.878***  0.171* 
B) High Tail Risk Banks 0.779***  1.004***  -0.225** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.269***  0.127***   
Panel E: Probability (%) of issuing sub-debt or equity during Low-Inflation (at low quartile) and High-Inflation Period (at upper quartile)  
A) Low-Inflation Period  1.056***  1.242***  -0.186 
B) High-Inflation Period 0.946***  0.929***  0.017 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.110***  -0.313***   
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Table A.3-3a: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity Across Regulatory Capital Regimes 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the pre-Basel I and the Basel I regimes. The Basel 
regimes are categorized as Pre-Basel I in the years 1983-1989, while Basel I regime is from 1990 to 2002. Panel A 
shows the Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a 
bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the 
actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is 
the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) 
and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution, while Panel C compares the effect of the 
Buffer on security issuance across the regulatory capital regimes. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at 
the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis  
Pre-Basel I Regime (1983-1989) Basel I Regime (1990-2002) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
       
Buffer -24.11** -40.39* 16.29 -17.25*** -25.71*** 8.458 
 (9.363) (21.18) (20.73) (5.689) (7.777) (9.531) 
Size 0.969*** 0.453 0.516* 0.848*** 0.0608 0.787*** 
 (0.133) (0.289) (0.283) (0.188) (0.0989) (0.199) 
Bank Age -0.0263 0.0133 -0.0396 -0.0685 -0.139 0.0702 
 (0.206) (0.247) (0.263) (0.165) (0.127) (0.203) 
ROA 5.972 -280.7*** 286.7*** 32.70 -20.03 52.73 
 (31.78) (80.39) (77.05) (31.13) (34.99) (48.89) 
Tax -1.415 3.073 -4.489* 0.217 -0.178 0.395 
 (1.288) (2.142) (2.601) (1.763) (1.140) (2.068) 
Tobin’s Q 0.362 0.561 -0.199 -0.0644 0.328* -0.393 
 (0.295) (0.392) (0.462) (0.216) (0.172) (0.269) 
Tail Risk -18.08** -57.99** 39.91 -7.436 0.193 -7.629 
 (9.081) (25.53) (27.25) (5.196) (4.941) (7.178) 
Deposits 1.033 1.352 -0.319 -1.778 1.915 -3.693* 
 (1.515) (2.654) (3.061) (1.537) (1.165) (1.903) 
Credit Quality -0.193 -0.604 0.411 0.624** 0.334 0.290 
 (0.223) (0.646) (0.651) (0.314) (0.392) (0.457) 
Inflation -18.21 -26.46 8.253 1.735 -13.85 15.59 
 (24.98) (56.42) (62.04) (19.34) (24.83) (31.49) 
Term Premium -1.782 17.32*** -19.10*** 5.408** -3.320 8.728* 
 (2.314) (6.532) (7.229) (2.706) (3.828) (4.718) 
Constant -12.19*** -10.57*** -1.618 -10.79*** -6.383*** -4.405 
 (1.886) (3.479) (3.710) (2.543) (1.346) (2.818) 
       
Observations 4422 4422 4422 21931 21931 21931 
R-squared 0.165   0.262   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  2.765*** 0.578*** 2.187*** 1.017*** 0.548*** 0.469*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 1.972*** 0.328*** 1.644*** 0.466*** 0.154** 0.312** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.793** -0.250**  -0.551*** -0.395***  
Panel C: Comparison of the Buffer Across Regulatory Regimes    
Sub-Debt (Pre- vs Post-Basel I)  -6.860 
Equity (Pre- vs Post-Basel I)  -14.68  
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Table A.3-3b: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity Across Regulatory Capital Regimes 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the pre-Basel I and the Basel I regimes. The Basel 
regimes are categorized as Pre-Basel I in the years 1983-1989, while Basel I regime is from 1990 to 2005. Panel A 
shows the Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a 
bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the 
actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is 
the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) 
and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution, while Panel C compares the effect of the 
Buffer on security issuance across the regulatory capital regimes. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at 
the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis  
Pre-Basel I Regime (1983-1989) Basel I Regime (1990-2005) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity Sub-Debt Equity Sub-Debt vs Equity 
       
Buffer -24.11** -40.39* 16.29 -19.20*** -20.57*** 1.365 
 (9.363) (21.18) (20.73) (5.338) (6.528) (8.488) 
Size 0.969*** 0.453 0.516* 0.866*** 0.114 0.752*** 
 (0.133) (0.289) (0.283) (0.162) (0.0907) (0.175) 
Bank Age -0.0263 0.0133 -0.0396 -0.143 -0.299** 0.157 
 (0.206) (0.247) (0.263) (0.158) (0.117) (0.193) 
ROA 5.972 -280.7*** 286.7*** 24.31 -45.48 69.79 
 (31.78) (80.39) (77.05) (32.72) (31.06) (47.08) 
Tax -1.415 3.073 -4.489* 0.163 0.371 -0.208 
 (1.288) (2.142) (2.601) (1.641) (1.258) (2.052) 
Tobin’s Q 0.362 0.561 -0.199 -0.129 0.354** -0.483** 
 (0.295) (0.392) (0.462) (0.194) (0.145) (0.237) 
Tail Risk -18.08** -57.99** 39.91 -7.520 0.819 -8.339 
 (9.081) (25.53) (27.25) (5.059) (4.707) (6.965) 
Deposits 1.033 1.352 -0.319 -1.451 0.603 -2.054 
 (1.515) (2.654) (3.061) (1.471) (1.092) (1.855) 
Credit Quality -0.193 -0.604 0.411 0.837** 0.209 0.628 
 (0.223) (0.646) (0.651) (0.330) (0.344) (0.441) 
Inflation -18.21 -26.46 8.253 12.21 2.162 10.05 
 (24.98) (56.42) (62.04) (11.27) (12.58) (16.89) 
Term Premium -1.782 17.32*** -19.10*** 5.050** -1.499 6.549* 
 (2.314) (6.532) (7.229) (2.348) (2.891) (3.745) 
Constant -12.19*** -10.57*** -1.618 -11.14*** -7.399*** -3.738 
 (1.886) (3.479) (3.710) (2.276) (1.311) (2.592) 
       
Observations 4422 4422 4422 26838 26838 26838 
R-squared 0.165   0.251   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  2.765*** 0.578*** 2.187*** 1.046*** 0.661*** 0.385*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 1.972*** 0.328*** 1.644*** 0.523*** 0.294*** 0.229 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.793** -0.250**  -0.523*** -0.367***  
Panel C: Comparison of the Buffer Across Regulatory Regimes    
Sub-Debt (Pre- vs Post-Basel I)  -4.910 
Equity (Pre- vs Post-Basel I)  -19.82  
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Table A.3-4: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity before the Global Financial Crisis - 1983 to 2006 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2006 (before the Global 
Financial Crisis). Panel A shows the Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite 
outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base 
outcome). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of 
total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio 
of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity 
divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of 
the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of 
change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 
year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in 
ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower 
quartile (Low-Buffer) and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. The standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -16.70*** -17.47*** -19.93*** -11.06*** 3.226 
 (4.400)  (5.878)  (7.444) 
Size 0.952*** 1.006*** 0.095 0.045 0.857*** 
 (0.124)  (0.087)  (0.141) 
Bank Age -0.074 -0.076 -0.224** -0.125** 0.150 
 (0.135)  (0.101)  (0.160) 
ROA 22.44 24.32 -64.80** -36.68** 87.25** 
 (23.52)  (29.76)  (37.23) 
Tax -0.517 -0.553 0.800 0.455 -1.316 
 (1.016)  (1.051)  (1.457) 
Tobin’s Q -0.035 -0.041 0.371*** 0.209 -0.406* 
 (0.169)  (0.132)  (0.213) 
Tail Risk -11.33*** -11.98*** -0.350 -0.094 -10.98* 
 (3.915)  (4.152)  (5.705) 
Deposits -0.674 -0.720 0.872 0.497 -1.546 
 (1.270)  (1.023)  (1.681) 
Credit Quality 0.311* 0.327 0.195 0.107 0.116 
 (0.186)  (0.289)  (0.338) 
Inflation -0.0884 0.000 -10.32 -5.806 10.23 
 (8.250)  (11.33)  (14.15) 
Term Premium 2.731* 2.824* 6.970*** 3.898*** -4.238 
 (1.448)  (2.565)  (3.017) 
Constant -11.14***  -6.061***  -5.082** 
 (1.768)  (1.093)  (2.083) 
      
Observations 33197  33197  33197 
R-squared 0.218     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.234***  0.751***  0.483*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.576***  0.281***  0.295* 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.658***  -0.469***   
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Table A.3-5: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - 1993 to 2015 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1993 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) 
and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -30.99*** -19.58*** -18.27*** -18.29*** -12.72** 
 (4.873)  (2.843)  (5.658) 
Size 0.767*** 0.485*** 0.365*** 0.364*** 0.402*** 
 (0.119)  (0.0565)  (0.132) 
Bank Age -0.085 -0.050 -0.375*** -0.382*** 0.289 
 (0.153)  (0.0964)  (0.180) 
ROA 20.47 12.79 24.35 24.62 -3.876 
 (34.18)  (15.13)  (37.13) 
Tax 0.915 0.580 0.382 0.380 0.533 
 (1.369)  (0.698)  (1.520) 
Tobin’s Q -0.149 -0.097 0.149 0.154 -0.298 
 (0.175)  (0.119)  (0.213) 
Tail Risk -9.366* -5.998* 1.228 1.364 -10.59* 
 (5.032)  (2.140)  (5.558) 
Deposits -2.281* -1.463* 0.465 0.501 -2.746* 
 (1.290)  (0.783)  (1.529) 
Credit Quality 0.460 0.295 -0.0490 -0.055 0.509 
 (0.310)  (0.206)  (0.344) 
TARP 0.235 0.141 0.799*** 0.813*** -0.564 
 (0.748)  (0.168)  (0.761) 
Inflation 10.13 6.328 12.12* 12.25* -1.987 
 (6.944)  (6.733)  (9.395) 
Term Premium 4.989** 3.238** -4.301*** -4.451*** 9.290*** 
 (2.269)  (1.572)  (2.834) 
Constant -7.042***  -5.978***  -1.064 
 (1.785)  (0.954)  (2.086) 
      
Observations 42509  42509  42509 
R-squared 0.218     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  0.949***  1.491***  -0.542*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.227***  0.623***  -0.396*** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.722***  -0.867***   
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Table A.3-6: Modelling the Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt, Equity or Internally Generating Capital 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a multiple outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, 3 if a bank internally generated its capital by cutting 
dividends and/or reducing assets - Internal, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital 
adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years 
a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio 
of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average 
equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; 
Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a 
S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part 
in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; 
and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age 
are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B reports 
the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) and those at the upper 
quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level, 
while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression 
Analysis 















         
Buffer -20.49*** -19.33*** -10.65*** -11.90*** 3.021*** 87.43*** -9.833** -23.51*** 
 (3.195)  (2.292)  (0.314)  (3.935) (3.189) 
Size 0.876*** 0.753*** 0.320*** 0.287*** 0.0349** 0.262 0.555*** -0.841*** 
 (0.102)  (0.0518)  (0.0157)  (0.112) (0.102) 
Bank Age 0.0676 -0.047 -0.0761 -0.202** 0.235*** 5.630*** 0.144 0.167 
 (0.128)  (0.0770)  (0.0216)  (0.143) (0.128) 
ROA -12.12 20.36 -37.42** -1.635 -66.32*** -1562*** 25.30 -54.20** 
 (23.46)  (15.32)  (5.184)  (27.11) (23.31) 
Tax -0.0160 0.072 0.966 1.076* -0.218 -5.715 -0.982 -0.202 
 (0.953)  (0.619)  (0.165)  (1.123) (0.945) 
Tobin’s Q -0.155 -0.046 0.120 0.229** -0.201*** -4.798*** -0.275 -0.0455 
 (0.158)  (0.101)  (0.0369)  (0.190) (0.160) 
Tail Risk -11.66*** -11.50*** 2.694 1.501 2.518*** 64.20*** -14.36*** 14.18*** 
 (3.484)  (2.080)  (0.508)  (4.138) (3.518) 
Deposits -1.591 -1.251 0.930 1.140 -0.362* -8.433* -2.521* 1.229 
 (1.138)  (0.720)  (0.202)  (1.384) (1.144) 
Credit Quality 0.215 0.196 0.00629 0.011* -0.0143 -0.443 0.208 -0.229 
 (0.178)  (0.171)  (0.0640)  (0.230) (0.186) 
TARP -0.153 -0.342 1.212*** 0.987*** 0.411*** 9.257*** -1.366** 0.564 
 (0.604)  (0.167)  (0.0641)  (0.618) (0.605) 
Inflation -7.675 -5.186 5.585 7.594 -3.631* -86.35** -13.26 4.043 
 (7.013)  (7.199)  (1.855)  (9.783) (7.003) 
Term Premium 3.787*** 3.137** -2.996* -3.321** 0.544* 12.86* 6.783*** -3.244** 
 (1.432)  (1.545)  (0.322)  (2.192) (1.430) 
Constant -9.263***  -7.478***  -0.547**  -1.785 8.716*** 
 (1.527)  (0.817)  (0.239)  (1.775) (1.531) 
         
Observations 49058  49058  49058  49058 49058 
R-squared 0.059        
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt, equity or internally generating capital 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.186***  1.366***  45.55***  -0.180 -44.36*** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.430***  0.762***  49.83***  -0.332*** -49.40*** 
Difference in probability  
(B vs A) 
-0.756***  -0.604***  4.275***    
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Table A.3-7a: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Additional Controls  
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity from 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated with a 
Multinomial Logit regression model with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued 
sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Panel A shows the regression 
estimates with the gross loans divided by total assets, Loans-Assets, as an additional control variable. Buffer is the 
actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is 
the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
the period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in 
the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panels B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) 
and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -19.60*** -17.02*** -15.27*** -14.94*** -4.324 
 (3.205)  (2.616)  (4.121) 
Loans-Assets 0.007 0.009 -0.166 -0.165 0.173 
 (0.930)  (0.600)  (1.092) 
Size 0.847*** 0.740*** 0.320*** 0.307*** 0.527*** 
 (0.103)  (0.0544)  (0.113) 
Bank Age -0.0395 -0.031 -0.247*** -0.246*** 0.208 
 (0.127)  (0.0806)  (0.145) 
ROA 30.46 26.59 13.17 12.69 17.29 
 (21.99)  (15.13)  (26.41) 
Tax 0.392 0.331 0.936 0.927 -0.544 
 (0.980)  (0.640)  (1.165) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0911 -0.082 0.171 0.172 -0.262 
 (0.168)  (0.107)  (0.201) 
Tail Risk -11.74*** -10.33*** 0.101 0.265 -11.84*** 
 (3.488)  (2.061)  (4.118) 
Deposits -1.539 -1.367 0.994 1.011 -2.533* 
 (1.065)  (0.742)  (1.353) 
Credit Quality 0.256 0.225 -0.0107 -0.014 0.267 
 (0.182)  (0.177)  (0.236) 
TARP 0.161 0.130 0.800*** 0.794*** -0.639 
 (0.763)  (0.164)  (0.775) 
Inflation -3.139 -2.836 5.474 5.496 -8.613 
 (6.883)  (6.842)  (9.575) 
Term Premium 3.719** 3.319** -3.491** -3.529** 7.210*** 
 (1.483)  (1.449)  (2.175) 
Constant -9.596***  -8.102***  -1.494 
 (1.587)  (0.899)  (1.833) 
      
Observations 48807  48807  48807 
R-squared 0.214     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.146***  1.496***  -0.350** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.469***  0.722***  -0.253** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.677***  -0.773***   
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Table A.3-7b: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Additional Controls  
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity from 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated with a 
Multinomial Logit regression model with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has issued 
sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Panel A shows the regression 
estimates with Non-Performing Loans and Other Real Estate Loans as additional control variables. Non-Performing 
Loans is the  ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, while Other Real Estate Loans is the ratio of other real 
estate loans to total assets. Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is 
the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); 
ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the 
market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the 
lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to 
total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 
otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference 
between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all 
other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt 
or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer 
distribution. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -26.59*** -16.36*** -16.75*** -17.80*** -9.849 
 (5.354)  (2.947)  (6.123) 
Non-Performing Loans -1101 -663.7 -2034 -2184 933.2 
 (5984)  (2431)  (6433) 
Other Real Estate Loans 24.11 15.02 -3.405 -3.918 27.52 
 (27.66)  (11.39)  (30.05) 
Size 0.843*** 0.520*** 0.357*** 0.377*** 0.485*** 
 (0.131)  (0.068)  (0.148) 
Bank Age -0.141 -0.084 -0.360*** -0.387*** 0.219 
 (0.170)  (0.106)  (0.201) 
ROA 39.78 24.47 25.07 26.65 14.70 
 (38.73)  (15.39)  (40.52) 
Tax 1.030 0.638 0.251 0.260 0.780 
 (1.575)  (0.707)  (1.701) 
Tobin’s Q -0.213 -0.132 -0.084 -0.088 -0.129 
 (0.174)  (0.131)  (0.221) 
Tail Risk -9.508* -5.924* 1.526 1.743 -11.03* 
 (5.630)  (2.243)  (6.173) 
Deposits -0.461 -0.302 1.521* 1.646* -1.982 
 (1.341)  (0.785)  (1.588) 
Credit Quality 0.450 0.279 0.0450 0.049 0.400 
 (0.347)  (0.224)  (0.384) 
TARP -0.327 -0.210 0.676*** 0.732*** -1.003 
 (0.857)  (0.174)  (0.863) 
Inflation 3.781 2.246 10.20 10.96 -6.417 
 (7.094)  (7.028)  (9.975) 
Term Premium 5.160** 3.254** -4.672*** -5.092*** 9.832*** 
 (2.606)  (1.704)  (3.228) 
Constant -9.770***  -6.963***  -2.806 
 (1.830)  (0.964)  (2.140) 
      
Observations 36120  36120  36120 
R-squared 0.205     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.146***  1.496***  -0.350** 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.469***  0.722***  -0.253** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.677***  -0.773***   
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Table A.3-8: Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Multinomial Probit Model 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Multinomial Probit regression estimates with the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued sub-debt in any given quarter, 2 if equity was issued, or 0 otherwise (base outcome). Buffer is the actual 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Bank Age is the log 
number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; 
Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  and 1 year treasury 
bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not 
percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower quartile (Low-Buffer) 
and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered 
at the bank level while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -13.65*** -19.10*** -6.727*** -10.93*** -6.924*** 
 (1.895)  (1.305)  (2.241) 
Size 0.490*** 0.690*** 0.168*** 0.263*** 0.321*** 
 (0.059)  (0.029)  (0.063) 
Bank Age -0.027 -0.032 -0.080* -0.140* 0.0534 
 (0.065)  (0.0427)  (0.0712) 
ROA 21.04 30.32 -1.434 -4.095 22.48 
 (14.21)  (8.974)  (16.70) 
Tax -0.056 -0.118 0.505 0.901 -0.562 
 (0.537)  (0.332)  (0.608) 
Tobin’s Q -0.083 -0.124 0.0789 0.146 -0.161* 
 (0.084)  (0.056)  (0.098) 
Tail Risk -7.575*** -10.90*** 0.441 1.341 -8.017*** 
 (1.934)  (1.179)  (2.226) 
Deposits -0.701 -1.051 0.615 1.144* -1.316* 
 (0.686)  (0.383)  (0.776) 
Credit Quality 0.128 0.184 -0.001 -0.010 0.129 
 (0.100)  (0.0974)  (0.125) 
TARP -0.123 -0.219 0.562*** 1.007*** -0.686** 
 (0.306)  (0.103)  (0.314) 
Inflation -4.747 -7.037 2.993 5.661 -7.740 
 (4.300)  (3.837)  (5.543) 
Term Premium 1.812** 2.719** -1.605* -2.982** 3.417*** 
 (0.876)  (0.831)  (1.219) 
Constant -6.102***  -5.169***  -0.933 
 (0.897)  (0.440)  (0.982) 
      
Observations 49058  49058  49058 
R-squared 0.304     
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.205***  1.334***  -0.129 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.426***  0.773***  -0.347*** 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.779***  -0.561***   
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Table A.3-9: Modelling the Probability of Issuing Sub-Debt or Equity - Ordered Probit Model 
This table reports the likelihood of issuing sub-debt or equity for the sample period 1983 to 2015. Panel A shows the 
Ordered Probit regression estimates where, under Equation 1, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a bank has 
issued equity in any given quarter or 2 if sub-debt was issued. The dependent variable under Equation 2 is equal to 1 
if a bank has issued sub-debt in any given quarter or 2 if equity was issued. The base outcome in both cases is 0 
(nothing issued). Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Size is the logarithm 
of total assets; Bank Age is the log number of years a bank appears on Compustat (years since IPO); ROA is the ratio 
of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity 
divided by its book value; Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of 
the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Deposits is the ratio of total deposits to total assets; Credit Quality 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; TARP is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for the period a bank took part in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or 0 otherwise; Inflation is 
the rate of change in the consumer price index; and Term Premium is the difference between the yield on the 10 year  
and 1 year treasury bonds. Size and Bank Age are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in 
ratios/fractions (not percent). Panel B reports the probability of issuing sub-debt or equity by banks at the lower 
quartile (Low-Buffer) and those at the upper quartile (High-Buffer) of the Buffer distribution. The standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-Debt Marginal Effect (%) Equity Marginal Effect (%) Sub-Debt vs Equity 
      
Buffer -7.220*** -16.26*** -6.711*** -16.11*** -0.509 
 (0.893)  (0.887)   
Size 0.214*** 0.481*** 0.191*** 0.458*** 0.023 
 (0.026)  (0.022)   
Bank Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.0141 -0.034 0.012 
 (0.0295)  (0.028)   
ROA 4.199 9.461 3.399 8.162 0.800 
 (5.432)  (5.714)   
Tax 0.343 0.772 0.362 0.868 -0.019 
 (0.246)  (0.222)   
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.008 0.024 0.057 -0.021 
 (0.044)  (0.039)   
Tail Risk -0.688 -1.551 -0.299 -0.717 -0.389 
 (0.717)  (0.769)   
Deposits -0.351 -0.791 -0.166 -0.397 -0.185 
 (0.340)  (0.278)   
Credit Quality 0.107* 0.241* 0.094* 0.226* 0.013 
 (0.056)  (0.054)   
TARP 0.270*** 0.609*** 0.333*** 0.800*** -0.063 
 (0.071)  (0.074)   
Inflation 1.216 2.740 1.682 4.039 -0.466 
 (2.084)  (2.162)   
Term Premium -0.235 -0.529 -0.563 -1.353 0.328 
 (0.424)  (0.445)   
/Cut 1 3.384***  3.386***   
 (0.401)  (0.329)   
/Cut 2 3.718***  3.680***   
 (0.402)  (0.332)   
      
Observations 49058  49058   
R-squared 0.145  0.127   
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panel B: Probability (%) of Low-Buffer and High-Buffer Banks issuing sub-debt or equity 
A) Low-Buffer Banks  1.297***  1.373***  -0.077 
B) High-Buffer Banks 0.546***  0.613***  -0.067 
Difference in probability (B vs A) -0.750***  -0.761***   
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Chapter 4:  The Effect of Debt Priority on the 
Regulatory Role of Subordinated Debt  
4.1 Introduction 
The quest for financial stability has triggered a continuous revision of the list of securities 
included in bank regulatory capital. These instruments have overtime varied in form and 
quantity to reflect the prevailing financial stability concerns (see, BIS, 1988; 2006; 2010). In 
spite of these active regulatory efforts, regulatory bank capital is still challenged as inadequate 
or ill-composed (Bitar et al., 2018; Fullenkamp and Rochon, 2017). In particular, the 
inclusion of subordinated debt (sub-debt) in regulatory capital is considered flawed given its 
inability to support losses on an ongoing basis and its potential to incite risk-taking (Hilscher 
and Raviv, 2014; Schoenmaker, 2015).21  
The consensus, therefore, seems to be that the regulatory capital frameworks are unable 
to curb financial stability risks in the banking sector (see, Thakor, 2014 for a summary of this 
debate), and the government interventions, presence of safety nets and, to some extent, the 
corporate governance of banks are overwhelmingly blamed for these inefficacies. For 
example, interventions that bail out, or create a bail-out expectation, discourage large banks 
from recapitalizing (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). At worst, these 
actions drive large banks to be risky (Afonso et al., 2014; Hagendorff et al., 2018). Similarly, 
ill-priced deposit insurance schemes create a valuable opportunity for banks to remain under-
capitalized and shift risk to the safety net (Keeley, 1989; Lambert et al., 2017), while tighter 
capital regulations are frustrated by owners that compensate for the opportunity cost of 
                                               
21 Among others, sub-debt is recognized in regulatory capital if it is; unsecured, uninsured, long-
term, and subordinate to depositors and general creditors (Federal Reserve System, 1989; 2007; 2013). 
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raising more capital by increasing risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009). In sum, the extant literature 
traces the inability of regulation to accordingly direct the behavior of banks to external 
factors and thereby, absolving the internal frictions within the wider bank capital structure 
from any real role in this context.  
In this study, we show how the broader priority structure of debt affects the effective 
functioning of sub-debt as a regulatory capital element by reviewing the perceptions of 
shareholders to the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities associated with 
senior debt vis-a-vis the regulatory value of sub-debt. The plight of regulatory sub-debt, 
therefore, emanates from the efforts of shareholders to expropriate wealth from 
bondholders (Black, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders mainly redistribute 
wealth from existing bondholders by issuing debt of equivalent or senior status, in the 
process increasing their stock value at the expense of junior debtors (Masulis, 1980; Smith 
and Warner, 1979). Indeed, Tang and Singer (1993) finds that the shareholders of non-
financial firms maximize wealth transfer by issuing non-subordinated as opposed to 
subordinated debt. In this sense, the pervasive incentives brought about by the issuance of 
senior debt has the potential to weaken the regulatory motives for using sub-debt in the 
banking context. 
Using sub-debt to expose the frictions that act against regulatory motivations offers us a 
rare opportunity to reflect on the long-standing dispute on the inclusion of this instrument 
in regulatory capital. That is, the persistent regulatory recognition of sub-debt in the midst 
of its perceived setbacks (see for example, Barrell et al., 2011; Davies, 2015) highlights a level 
of regulatory confidence on the instrument that may just be frustrated by the underlying 
agency costs, of which the priority structure of debt is a candidate.  
To examine the value of risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities to 
shareholders, we compare the reactions of stock to the announcement of senior and sub-
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debt using an event study methodology. We further understand how bank-specific factors 
that induce risk-shifting condition these incentives. In another setting, we explore the 
prevalence of these risk-shifting motives by evaluating subsequent changes in the risk profile 
of banks that issued either security. For this purpose, we use a sample of US listed and 
delisted banks for the period January 1983 to December 2015. This longer period aids a 
thorough understanding of the incompatibilities in the perceptions of regulators and 
investors about the use of sub-debt across time-varying capital frameworks that differently 
treated the instrument in regulatory capital i.e., pre-Basel I to Basel III.22 Meanwhile, the 
beginning of the sample period coincides with the application of the capital requirements to 
all banks, including multinational banks (Keeley, 1988). 
We begin our analysis by examining the distribution of senior and sub-debt offers across 
the years, the characteristics of banks that announce the securities, and the differences 
between the securities announced. The preliminary analysis indicates that senior debt issues 
are more frequent but are concentrated within a few banks as compared to sub-debt. We 
also find that banks announcing senior and sub-debt are different in many respects.   
Nonetheless, the influence of Bank-Size on senior debt issues, coupled with their 
concentrated nature, chimes with suggestions that large and “well known” issuers face lower 
security flotation costs (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; Kwast et al., 1999). The significantly 
better quality of senior debt offers also attest to this claim. Other notable differences are 
with respect to the lower Buffer of banks that announce sub-debt and the longer Maturity of 
these offers, which potentially reflect the importance of regulatory motives in the 
announcement of sub-debt. That is, banks that offer sub-debt recognize the need to improve 
                                               
22 Effective Basel I, capital frameworks recognized a larger portion of sub-debt in regulatory 
capital (see, Federal Reserve System, 1989; 2007). 
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their capital adequacy ratio, especially with long-dated offers that can easily meet the 
regulatory requirements. However, banks that announce senior debt are characterized by 
higher agency costs as reflected by their significantly higher Tail Risk, Tobin’s Q, Free-Cash 
Flow and the average amount raised. Additionally, senior debt offers are prevalent during 
unfavorable times. These periods generally present opportunities for risk-shifting owing to 
subdued creditor-discipline (Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015; Hett and Schmidt, 2017). Overall, 
senior debt offers seem to be explained by factors that define high agency costs and to some 
extent, easier entry to markets, while sub-debt securities appear to fill a regulatory need. 
Next, we examine the extent of value generated by the potential agency costs associated 
with senior debt against the regulatory effects of sub-debt by observing the reaction of 
shareholders to the announcement of either security. Through an event study, covering the 
day of announcement and a day before [-1,0], we show that, despite the regulatory benefit of 
sub-debt, senior debt creates significantly more value for shareholders as compared to sub-
debt. In line with prior evidence from banking studies, bank shareholders do not seem to 
react to sub-debt offers (also see, Laderman, 1994; Wall and Peterson, 1991). We show in 
various tests that these results are not driven by the length of the event window nor sub-
debt issues that would not offer any regulatory benefit.23  
To further clarify our results, we divide the sample into banks that need to raise regulatory 
capital, viz., less-capitalized banks, and observe the shareholder reaction when these banks 
announce the regulatory instrument - sub-debt - or senior debt. We define less-capitalized 
banks as those with a regulatory capital buffer (total capital adequacy ratio less the minimum 
required) below the median of the sample distribution. Against regulatory expectations, 
                                               
23 We identify 102 sub-debt offers that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital 
and/or the bank had exceeded its regulatory Tier 2 quota prior to security announcement. 
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senior debt offers made by less-capitalized banks create significantly more shareholder value 
as compared to sub-debt. An analysis within security types also indicates that senior debt 
offers by less-capitalized banks are significantly more favored than those of well-capitalized 
banks. There is no variation, however, in the reaction of shareholders to sub-debt 
announcements across bank capitalization, implying that sub-debt offers, like equity, have 
similar information content regardless of regulation (Keeley, 1989; Krishnan et al., 2010). 
These results are robust to alternative classifications of bank capitalization i.e., where we 
make comparison of banks in the extreme quartiles of the buffer distribution. The tendency 
of less-capitalized bank’s shareholders to favorably value senior debt instead of capital-
improving elements gives the impression that banks remain under-capitalized in order to 
shift risk to other stakeholders (Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Marcus, 1984). Basically, bank 
shareholders seem to value the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities 
presented by senior debt more than the regulatory motives of sub-debt. In this manner, the 
perverse incentives associated with using senior debt override the regulatory incentives for 
using sub-debt. 
To consolidate the understanding of these shareholder motives, we further examine 
specific channels through which banks with a high risk load can potentially shift it to the 
safety net or other security classes (sub-debt in this case). For this purpose we define risk as 
Tail Risk, the (minus) average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile 
of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns, and our banks are classified as less-
risky if their tail risk falls below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are 
defined as being risky. 
We first show that shareholders of risky banks react significantly more positively to the 
announcement of senior debt than sub-debt - against a reasonable expectation that these 
banks would be better off with a capital element, given its loss-absorption capabilities. In 
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contrast, the market reaction of less-risky banks are not different across the securities. 
Nonetheless, we note that within securities, senior debt offers by risky banks create 
significantly more shareholder value as compared to less-risky ones. We interpret this pattern 
as an indication of the considerable value placed on avenues that aid shareholders to advance 
their risk-shifting motives. This behavior also shows up in risky and large or less-capitalized 
banks, as their shareholders significantly value senior debt over sub-debt offers and over 
senior debt offers of less-risky banks. The fact that this variation is lacking in small or well-
capitalized banks suggest that opportunities for risk-shifting incentives by shareholders 
underlie the use of senior debt in large and less-capitalized banks and these incentives 
outweigh the motivations of regulatory capital frameworks that seek to encourage 
recapitalization and risk-reduction through sub-debt. 
Our results also prevail in a multivariate setting that includes other control variables and 
uses the 2-day cumulative announcement return as the dependent variable. Generally, Tail 
Risk positively explains the announcement returns of senior debt but this is not the case for 
sub-debt offers.  Over the sub-samples, announcement returns are positively associated with 
Tail Risk for senior debt offers of large or less-capitalized banks as highlighted in the 
univariate analysis. Likewise, we do not observe any impact of Tail Risk for senior offers of 
small or well-capitalized banks, nor do we find a significantly positive influence of Tail Risk 
on the sub-debt offers by banks of any size or capitalization level. 
A possible counter-argument to our findings is that the regulatory equity ratio (also known 
as leverage ratio), which prescribes that total assets should be funded by at least 3% of equity 
and its related components potentially restrain the debt structure decisions of banks.24 In this 
                                               
24 However, the minimum equity ratio of 3% only applies to banks that attained a composite 
rating of 1 in the recent onsite inspection, otherwise all other banks should maintain a ratio of 4% 
(see, Federal Reserve System, 1992; 2007). 
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regard, opportunities to use senior debt in ways that maximize the risk-shifting and wealth-
expropriation incentives of shareholders may be more limited than we suppose. However, 
these arguments contradict our results which show that banks announcing senior or sub-
debt maintain an average Equity Ratio over 7% (at least 4% above the requirement for some 
banks) and hence would be less restrained to advance the hazardous interests of shareholders 
through senior debt.  
In addition, banks that announce senior or sub-debt are indistinguishable based on the 
Equity Ratio, which gives us some reasonable expectation that the discrepancies in the 
reaction of shareholders to either security could be traceable to the innate incentives related 
to senior or sub-debt, rather than the dynamics of the equity ratio. Furthermore, the 
multivariate analysis reveals that the Equity Ratio is irrelevant to the stock returns of banks 
that announce senior debt while it is inconclusive for sub-debt announcements. On these 
grounds, the constraints placed by the regulatory equity ratio seem to be trivial to the findings 
that shareholders greatly value the opportunities to shift risk or expropriate wealth from 
other stakeholders through the use of senior debt.  
Our findings could equally be challenged by views that sub-debt specific conflicts, instead 
of the vice incentives from senior debt, are responsible for its own regulatory inefficacy. Such 
arguments would hold if shareholders, particularly of less-risky banks, consider the 
disciplinary attributes of sub-debt as a hindrance to their future risk-taking actions (see for 
example, Nguyen, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). Also, sub-debt could reduce future debt capacity 
thereby limiting shareholders’ ability to exploit the value-enhancing opportunities presented 
by senior debt. Accordingly, shareholders would not value the announcement of sub-debt if 
these disincentives are stronger than the regulatory motives of the instrument. 
However, our indication that the announcement returns for sub-debt are independent of 
the riskiness of a bank goes against the “flight from discipline” arguments. Similarly, the 
91 
relatively high Equity Ratio of banks announcing either security does not suggest that the debt 
capacity of banks would be constrained in ways that could prevent shareholders from 
advancing their future interests with debt. In this regard, the disincentives for using sub-debt 
appear to be generally weak to override the regulatory incentives of the instrument, and as 
such, the attitudes of shareholders towards sub-debt seem to be driven mainly by the wealth-
expropriation and risk-shifting opportunities presented by senior debt.  
To offer some conclusive evidence on these risk-shifting motivations, we demonstrate in 
further tests that, after industry adjustments, senior debt issuers become significantly riskier 
than sub-debt issuers across the 2-year period following issuance. We conclude that the 
inefficacy of sub-debt as a regulatory capital element owes less to its form or design in the 
capital framework, but it is impaired by the priority of debt within the wider bank capital 
structure as shareholders value the moral hazard incentives presented by the use of senior 
debt over the regulatory role of sub-debt. Our findings, therefore, expand the scope of prior 
discussions on the capital structure and risk behavior of banks, which so far do not account 
for the importance of the seniority of capital instruments on the effectiveness (or otherwise) 
of regulatory capital frameworks (see for example, Berger et al., 2008; Dinger and Vallascas, 
2016; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 2010).  
In this regard, we offer the first examination of the implications of incentives associated 
with the broader priority structure of bank capital on the effectiveness of regulatory capital 
frameworks that recognize subordinated securities as capital elements. Prior analysis of the 
choice of sub-debt or senior debt in banking is, generally, limited to the information content 
of these securities. For example, Hancock and Birchler (2004) indicate that the co-existence 
of the securities in the capital structure serves the heterogeneous information needs and 
complexity of investors. In essence, sub-debt and senior debt are information-complements, 
where sub-debt is issued to satisfy the sophisticated and informed investors that are able to 
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bear its additional risk, while the safer senior debt serves the conservative and less informed 
investors. 25 However, such a focus does not bring forth the tensions that exist between these 
security classes to the detriment of regulatory intentions as we do in this current study. 
Another study by Schandlbauer (2014) presents sub-debt and senior debt as alternative 
securities that banks can apply within their capital structure decisions. In their analysis, the 
instruments are mere liability components that do not aid banks to revert to the targets of 
their primary capital ratios. Essentially, the study does not emphasize on the agency costs of 
senior debt. Also, using sub-debt to explain primary capital ratios undermines the regulatory 
importance of sub-debt since the instrument does not contribute to these components of 
regulatory capital. 
Our study directly contributes to the literature on the valuation effects of sub-debt offers 
(Keeley, 1989; Laderman, 1994; Wall and Peterson, 1991). Crucially, these studies pre-date 
Basel I and, therefore, they miss the evolving role of sub-debt in regulatory capital. Other 
than that, these studies are limited by sample size, with sub-debt observations ranging from 
just 6 to 63 offers. More importantly, they do not compare the valuation of incentives 
associated with senior debt to the regulatory value of sub-debt. By the same token, we 
complement studies that observe the valuation effects of other regulatory capital elements 
like equity, regulatory capital adjustments and Tier 2 capital in general (Cornett et al., 1998; 
Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Krishnan et al., 2010; Li et al., 2016; Lubberink and Willett, 
2016; Polonchek et al., 1989). 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature, while 
Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 discusses the econometric model and variables. 
                                               
25 In this case, banks tend to issue sub-debt when they have positive information to reveal to the 
market (Covitz and Harrison, 2004). 
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Section 4.5 presents the empirical results for the short-term valuation effects, while Section 
4.6 discusses the post-issuance risk behavior of senior and sub-debt issuers. Section 4.7 
concludes the analysis. 
4.2 Related Research 
Firms raise capital in many ways but the most common financial decisions are the issuance 
of debt or equity. While the reasons underlying debt and equity issuance decisions are likely 
to be similar (i.e., a need for funding) the information content of these decisions is perceived 
differently by the market due to the information asymmetries between firms and investors 
(Autore and Kovacs, 2010; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1991; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this 
regard, investors have been shown to perceive the issuance of securities as an exploitation of 
their valuation errors and hence they react adversely to these capital structure decisions 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; McLaughlin et al., 1998a; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986).  
For banks, however, the information content of security issuances, mainly equity, is 
debatable as some suggest that regulatory motivations dilute the over-valuation concerns of 
these actions, resulting in less negative wealth effects as compared to non-banks (Li et al., 
2016; Polonchek et al., 1989). Moreover, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) and Cornett et al. 
(1998) argue that these regulatory effects are stronger for under-capitalized banks as their 
need for capital is well understood by the market. However, more recent evidence by 
Krishnan et al. (2010) finds that regulation is not binding, and the value implications of equity 
issues are similar regardless of bank capitalization levels.  
In spite of the diverging opinions on the effect of regulation, these studies commonly 
find that shareholders consider equity issues as value-destructive. In essence, the market and 
regulatory expectations on the issuance of capital elements are incompatible and these 
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disparities inform views that regulation is ineffective and inadequate to restrain financial 
instability (Admati et al., 2013; Hellwig, 2010).  
In this study we test the sources of these inadequacies using a capital instrument whose 
inclusion in regulatory capital is under serious dispute i.e., sub-debt. Contrary to financial 
stability expectations, sub-debt is considered pervasive and lacks capital attributes due to its 
deferred loss-absorbing capacities (Davies, 2015; Schoenmaker, 2015). Nevertheless, like 
equity, the perennial recognition of sub-debt in regulatory capital, despite these setbacks, 
underscores the regulatory confidence in the role of the instrument in financial stability that 
are possibly distorted by frictions in capital markets, particularly the risk-shifting and wealth-
expropriation incentives of shareholders.  
The plausibility of these incentives arises from the tendency of shareholders to shift risk 
and expropriate wealth from outstanding debtholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that, in a capital structure that includes risky debt, shareholders substitute safer assets with 
risky ones to prop up their value, in the process shifting risk and expropriating the wealth of 
existing debtholders. More specifically, the presence of junior debt provides even stronger 
incentives for these moral hazards, given the ability of shareholders to increase their value 
through the issuance of senior debt or debt of equivalent-status as the outstanding one (Black 
and Cox, 1976; Jensen and Smith Jr, 1985). Shareholders effectively devalue outstanding 
junior debt by issuing senior debt or equivalent-status debt (Masulis, 1980). Since the risk 
premium or yield of a bond partially depends on the proportion of debt-to-firm value (see, 
Merton, 1974), leverage-increasing actions raise the yield with a consequent reduction on the 
value of existing bonds, and these value-effects are most severe for unprotected junior claims 
while share value rises (Black and Scholes, 1973). In line with these wealth-expropriation 
incentives, Tang and Singer (1993) finds that the stock reactions to the announcement of 
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non-subordinated debt are positive while subordinated debt offers, which provide limited 
wealth-transfer opportunities, trigger significantly negative stock reactions. 
In essence, the agency costs that arise from the use of senior debt to advance the wealth-
expropriation and risk-shifting incentives of shareholders potentially undermine the 
regulatory benefits of junior debt in bank capital. Under these circumstances, objective 
regulatory intentions that continue to recognize sub-debt in bank capital, and the capital 
frameworks in general, would be rendered ineffective or flawed in upholding financial 
stability, as is the current view (see, for example, Barrell et al., 2011; Fullenkamp and Rochon, 
2017). 
In spite of these well-documented shareholder-debtholder conflicts, the sources of 
regulatory inefficacies are limited to the external interventions such as government rescues 
and safety nets, with little regard to the internally generated tensions in the priority of 
securities within the wider bank capital structure. The tendency of governments to provide 
rescue packages for large banks incite them to be risky (Hagendorff et al., 2018; Taleb and 
Tapiero, 2010), and encourage them to remain under-capitalized as they await bail-out, in the 
process undermining the regulatory effect (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and 
Vallascas, 2016). In the same way, deposit insurance presents a valuable option for banks to 
remain under-capitalized and shift their risk to the safety net (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; 
Lambert et al., 2017; Marcus, 1984). In a study that attributes regulatory distortions to 
corporate governance, Laeven and Levine (2009) finds that powerful owners circumvent the 
effectiveness of tighter capital requirements by increasing risk. Overall, the discussions about 
the inefficacy of regulation do not refer to the potential interferences from incentives 
associated with the seniority of debt in the wider capital structure of a bank. 
Moreover, the extant discussions on bank capital structure so far omit the influence of 
debt type on the post-issuance behavior of banks despite the evidence that security issuance 
96 
decisions shape the long-term performance of firms (see among others, Lee and Loughran, 
1998; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 1997; McLaughlin et al., 1998a). For example, there is an 
established trend for firms issuing equity (initial public offerings or seasoned equity offerings) 
to underperform the benchmarks in the post-issuance period (Cornett et al., 1998; Jain and 
Kini, 1994; Jegadeesh, 2000; McLaughlin et al., 1996). This adverse performance is usually 
traced to managerial and/or investor over-optimism at issuance, which gradually subsides as 
more information becomes available (Gombola and Marciukaityte, 2007; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1995). Investors also underreact to the initial information content of debt but their 
subsequent revaluations results in significant post-issue stock underperformance (Datta et 
al., 2000b; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999). McLaughlin et al. (1998b) and Lewis et al. 
(2001) further show that this poor post-issue performance is not only common in straight 
securities since convertible debt issuers also suffer a similar fate in spite of the theory that 
the hybrid nature of this security offers some incentives for efficient investment decisions. 
Notably, capital structure decisions not only influence post-issue stock or operating 
performance but they also alter the long-term risk profile of issuers. Specifically, equity and 
convertible debt issuers assume more risk in the post-issuance period (Healy and Palepu, 
1990; Lewis et al., 2002). This post-issuance risk trend, alongside the tendency of 
shareholders to shift risk to junior debt through senior debt, could be of immense interest 
to ongoing bank regulators’ attempts to influence the capital structure and risk behavior of 
banks. In essence, understanding how the security choice decisions of banks shape their 
long-term risk profile would inform us of the inherent incentives within the broader bank 
capital structure that contradict the financial stability efforts of regulators.  
Exploring the effect of the underlying risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation incentives 
related to senior debt on the effectiveness of the regulatory role of sub-debt, therefore, 
extends the scope of prior discussions on the capital structure and risk behavior of banks, 
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which so far do not account for the importance of the seniority of capital instruments on the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of regulatory capital frameworks (see for example, Dinger and 
Vallascas, 2016; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 2010; Teixeira et al., 2014). 
4.3 Data 
The sample of banks used in our analysis is drawn from the population of 2145 publicly 
traded and delisted US banks available in Compustat-Capital IQ for the period ranging from 
January 1, 1983 to December 31, 2015. More precisely, we retain from Compustat firms with 
SIC codes from 6020 to 6036. We draw the list of senior and sub-debt offers from Thomson 
One Banker and Bloomberg. In both security datasets we drop issues without crucial 
information such as filing dates, cusip or amount. We proceed by combining the separate 
security datasets and merge the resulting dataset to our filtered population of Compustat-
Banks (using the Cusip identifier), where we subsequently drop issuers without accounting 
data. The screening process up to this stage results in 545 sub-debt and 1100 senior debt 
offers announced by 151 and 56 banks, respectively. 
Our sampling exercise proceeds by dropping joint security announcements and issuances, 
across and within securities, made in the event window.26 This filtering ensures that the 
information content from a particular security announcement is uncontaminated by other 
capital decisions. At this point, we account for the possibility that equity, as an alternative 
capital structure decision, is also likely to distort the information content of our main 
securities’ analysis. We, therefore, exclude senior or sub-debt offers that coincide with equity 
announcements or issuances within the event window. For this purpose, we draw a sample 
of Seasoned Equity Offers (SEOs) from Thomson One Banker over the sample period, 
                                               
26 We use the filling date as the security announcement date.  
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which reduces to 668 equity announcements by 385 banks with accounting information and 
announcement dates.27 Our final filter retains offers that have stock information in the 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and sufficient observations in the event and 
estimation windows, resulting in a final sample of 310 sub-debt and 363 senior debt issues 
by 116 and 40 banks, respectively.28 Table 4-1 shows the distribution of this sample over our 
study period. 
 [Insert Table 4-1] 
The distribution of securities in Table 4-1 highlights some patterns and clustering across 
senior and sub-debt offers. There are more senior debt than sub-debt offers in our sample, 
but more intriguing is that there are few banks offering senior debt than sub-debt as indicated 
by the issuers-to-banks ratio of 0.3 and 0.8, respectively. This pattern, coupled with a 
relatively high senior debt issues-to-banks ratio, suggests that banks that announce senior 
debt are serial issuers, and potentially bear lower issuance costs associated with being known 
to the market (Kwast et al., 1999). The frequency distribution of both securities appears to 
be driven by two major regulatory or legislative interventions across our sample period, viz., 
the announcements of risk-based capital requirements in 1989 and depositor preference laws 
in 1993. For sub-debt, the risk-based capital framework that was effected in 1990 allowed a 
larger fraction of it in regulatory capital than previously (see, Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 
1989), which potentially spurred the use of the instrument between 1989 and the full 
implementation period of 1993. During this period, an unprecedented number of banks 
came to the market and raised more issues than any time in our sample period. Notably, the 
                                               
27 We exclude pure secondary offers as they do not ultimately alter the capital structure of a bank, 
but their proceeds just flow between investors. 
28 The additional Table A.4-1 describes our sampling criteria for the short-term analysis. 
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average amount raised from these issues remained stable around this period, ranging between 
$114 million and $174 million.  
In terms of the number of senior debt offers, they increase from 1994 but temporarily 
drop in 1998. However, this rally is not complemented by a rise in the number of issuers nor 
issuance proceeds, particularly between 1994 and 1997. These disparities are potentially 
driven by the introduction of depositor preference laws in 1993, which established a clear 
superiority of depositors over unsecured claims regardless of seniority.29 Given that bank 
liabilities are generally unsecured (see, Marino and Bennett, 1999), senior debt investors 
could have withheld their funds in anticipation of the prospective losses upon them, hence 
a decline in issuers and amounts raised for the 4-year period post the enactment of the new 
legislation.  
Overall, more proceeds were raised through senior debt, a total of $145 billion, as 
compared to $96 billion from sub-debt but for both securities; the latter half of the sample 
period accounts for most funding as depicted by the distribution of proceeds in Figure 4-1. 
[Insert Figure 4-1] 
4.4 Econometric Model and Variables 
4.4.1 Short-Term Univariate Test 
To assess the value of the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities that act 
against the regulatory motives, we observe the reaction of shareholders to the announcement 
of a regulatory capital element, sub-debt, and towards senior debt, an instrument renowned 
                                               
29 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 pronounce that the claims of depositors have 
preference over claims of uninsured/unsecured creditors during the resolution of a failed FDIC 
insured bank. The salient features and implications of this legislation are discussed, among others, by 
Kaufman (1997) and Marino and Bennett (1999). 
100 
for shifting risk and expropriating the wealth of junior debt holders. We posit that 
shareholders that treasure these risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities will 
disregard the regulatory value of sub-debt and positively react to the announcement of senior 
debt. To reveal these stockholder incentives, we use a standard event-study methodology 
that applies the market return model. Our model parameters are estimated over 100 days, 
starting 20 days after the issuance date as a way to eliminate the upward stock return biases 
that are normally associated with pre-announcement, announcement or issuance periods 
(Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Krishnan et al., 2010). The value-weighted CRSP index return 
is used as the proxy for the market return and we include its lags and leads to account for 
nonsynchronous trading (Scholes and Williams, 1977). More specifically, the abnormal 
return of bank i at event date t (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is given as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡] (2) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on security i on day t; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-
weighted index at time t, along with its lags and leads. The market model parameters (𝛽1−5) 
are estimated over the 100-day [20,120] post-issuance window. Our main event date is the 2-
day period beginning a day before and ending on the announcement day [-1,0]. The length 
of this window accommodates any information leakages prior to the official announcement, 
while also brief enough to filter out other bank events unassociated with the security 
announcement. Nevertheless, we use a 3-day event window [-1,1] as an alternative 
specification to the main test window. The abnormal returns across the event window are 
summed up, and we test for the null hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
is equal to zero using an ordinary regression with robust standard errors. The p-value of the 
constant of this regression is the significance of the CAR. We also run a quantile (median) 
regression, also with robust standard errors, as an alternative test. We compare the average 
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differences across the sub-samples using the mean-difference test while the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test compares the medians. 
For robustness tests, we estimate the abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) for the respective event 
windows using the Fama-French 3-Factor model of the form: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡] (3) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on security i on day t; 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the risk-free rate of return and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
is the return on the market index on day t. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the excess return of small over big firms 
and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of high- over low-growth firms, on day t. The market model 
parameters (𝛽1−3) are estimated over the same 100-day [20,120] post-issuance period. We 
extract the factor loadings for the model from the Kenneth French Data Library (Fama-
French 3 Factors). 
Having established the value perceptions of stockholders, and the imminent conflicts 
between regulatory and shareholder interests, our analysis explores conditions under which 
the wealth-expropriation and risk-shifting incentives of shareholders are aggravated. The 
noted tendency of shareholders to shift risk and expropriate the wealth of junior debtholders 
through the use of debt of a higher priority or equivalent status suggest that shareholders of 
riskier banks would be more receptive to senior debt as it offers them an opportunity to 
offload their risky positions. In the process, these incentives may overshadow the regulatory 
effort of improving financial stability through lower-priority elements such as sub-debt. To 
measure bank risk, we use Tail Risk, defined by Acerbi and Tasche (2002) as the (minus) 
average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. We identify risky banks as those whose Tail Risk, in the 
quarter prior to the security announcement, is greater or equal to the median of the sample 
distribution.  
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Given the vulnerability of already risky banks, we proceed to test for conducive bank-
specific conditions that prime shareholders to defy the regulatory forces to recapitalize but 
expect to shift their risk position to the tax payers or safety nets. In particular, the 
expectations for a bail-out provides large banks with little incentive for recapitalizing (Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016) and incites them to be risky (Afonso et al., 
2014; Hagendorff et al., 2018). Additionally, deposit insurance presents an opportunity for 
poorly capitalized banks to shift risk to the safety net (Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Lambert 
et al., 2017). For these banks, recapitalization devalues the deposit insurance guarantee, hence 
shareholders enhance their wealth through higher risk-taking in a bid to expropriate the 
safety net (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley, 1989). In this sense, the risk-shifting motives 
that are already prevalent in risky banks would be more pronounced when banks are also 
“risky and large” or “risky and less-capitalized”. As such, shareholders of these banks are 
more likely to react negatively to the announcement of capital-improving elements, i.e., sub-
debt, that would reduce the value of their implicit government guarantee and deposit 
insurance guarantee. On the other hand, shareholders of “risky and large” or “risky and less-
capitalized” banks could positively react to the announcement of senior instruments that do 
not threaten the value of their guarantees, but continue to offer opportunities for risk-
shifting and wealth-expropriation.  
We identify large banks as those with assets greater or equal to the median of the sample 
distribution, or otherwise are defined as being small. In terms of capitalization, we use the 
distribution of the buffer to classify banks as less- or well-capitalized. We measure the buffer 
as the difference between a bank’s regulatory capital adequacy ratio and the minimum 
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required.30 Banks with a ratio below the median of the sample distribution are considered 
less-capitalized. Similar to tail risk, these classifications are measured a quarter before security 
announcement. Overall, this analysis attempts to highlight channels through which the 
opportunities for risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation that come along with the use of 
senior debt affects the regulatory effectiveness of sub-debt.  
4.4.2 Short-Term Multivariate Test 
To consolidate the foregoing univariate analysis, we proceed by modelling the relationship 
between the stock returns and the risk of banks announcing senior or sub-debt while 
controlling for other factors that could condition shareholder-reaction to these offers. For 
this analysis, we run a multivariate regression with the CAR as the dependent variable and 
include Tail Risk as our main independent variable of interest. If shareholders possess strong 
incentives to exploit the moral hazard opportunities presented by senior debt, then Tail Risk 
should positively explain the CAR for senior debt announcements, and especially for large 
or less-capitalized banks. We highlight this relationship through an ordinary least squares 
specification, with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, of the form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (4) 
Where, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the average cumulative abnormal return over the event window [-1,0] for 
bank i; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 is the Tail Risk as previously defined and measured and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term, 
which is assumed to be normally distributed with a constant variance, 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎). 𝑋𝑖 is a 
                                               
30 We use the capital ratios available in Compustat to compute the regulatory buffer. In case of 
missing ratios, i.e. before 1993, we compute the capital adequacy ratio as the total regulatory capital 
divided by total assets. For this purpose, we determine the regulatory capital elements in line with the 
Federal Reserve Bulletins and Krishnan et al. (2010). In addition, the unavailability of risk-weighted 
assets in the Basel I transition period (1990 to 1992) forces us to calculate the capital ratios during 
this period using the prior capital framework (regulatory capital divided by total assets). This affects 
only 69 issues (10% of total offers) and are, therefore, likely to have a negligible impact on our results. 
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vector of control variables that are also likely to condition shareholders’ reaction to the 
announcement of debt. Most importantly, we include a number of indicators to control for 
time-varying macro-economic and banking conditions.31 
The controls include the extent of bank capitalization as measured by the (Buffer). The 
impact of bank capitalization on shareholders’ reaction to security announcements depends 
on their motivations. Investors that seek to expropriate and shift risk are less likely to 
recapitalize (Marcus, 1984), hence they are more likely to react negatively to capital 
instruments but favor pure leverage-increasing offers i.e., senior debt. Alternatively, investors 
keen on preserving the bank’s franchise value will most likely favor regulatory securities that 
attenuate bank risk and react adversely to leverage-increasing securities. We also include the 
logarithm of bank assets (Bank-Size) as a control. The larger number of analysts following 
large firms ensures that information production and dissemination for these firms is higher 
(Atiase, 1985; Chae, 2005). Essentially, these firms face lower information asymmetry costs 
as the information content of their issues is well understood, resulting in a less negative 
reaction to their securities announcements (see, Li et al., 2016).  
We next control for logarithm of the amount issued (Issue-Size). Relatively large issues 
would increase the cash available under the control of management and hence exacerbate 
the agency costs of debt (Jensen, 1986). Also, a larger than anticipated issuance may signal 
lower expected cash flows (Miller and Rock, 1985). Shareholders are, therefore, more likely 
to react adversely to relatively large amount of new financing (Johnson, 1995). Furthermore, 
we control for the expected loss and recoverability rates of bonds as implied in their credit 
ratings (Debt Quality). Highly-rated debt securities are associated with positive 
                                               
31 Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to minimize outlier effects. 
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announcement returns due to their relatively low expected loss rates or high recoverability 
rates (Howton et al., 1998). We define high quality securities as those with an S&P rating of 
BBB- or better (investment grade), or otherwise they are classified as low quality. In addition, 
we control for the maturity structure of debt via the logarithm of the years to maturity 
(Maturity). Flannery (1986) argues that, under information asymmetry, firms are able to 
signal their quality through the maturity structure of debt. Firms that are able to endure the 
uncertainty of reissuing debt at short intervals are ably showing-off their credibility to 
uninformed investors. On the contrary, bad quality firms reduce the uncertainties with regard 
to their refinancing rates by issuing long-term debt. An effective signal from the maturity 
structure of debt should, therefore, lead to an inverse relation between debt maturity and 
announcement returns (also see, Chen and Stock, 2018; Datta et al., 2000a).  
We also control for the availability of investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q), which we 
measure as the market value of equity divided by its book value. Given the tendency of 
shareholders to underinvest when investments partially benefit debtholders, firms with high 
growth opportunities will be constrained by the presence of debt in their capital structure 
(Myers, 1977). In this sense, shareholders should react adversely to debt announcements by 
growth firms (Howton et al., 1998). Similarly, leverage encourages firms to undertake 
suboptimal investment decisions. As the amount of debt in a firm’s balance sheet rises, along 
with bankruptcy risk, shareholders will derive more value from debtholders by increasing the 
volatility of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With these asset-substitution incentives, 
shareholders would react positively to debt announcements by highly leveraged institutions 
(Howton et al., 1998). We measure the extent of this indebtedness as the fraction of primary 
or Tier 1 capital to total assets (Equity Ratio), where a lower ratio denotes excessive 
leverage.  
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The availability of cash under the control of managers (Free-Cash Flow) and the effect 
of the tax shield (Tax) associated with debt are also likely to condition shareholder reactions. 
When the cash available exceeds the value of profitable investment opportunities, self-
servicing managers are more likely to engage in sub-optimal investment activities at the 
expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Effectively, shareholders would react adversely to 
debt announcements by firms that have a high level of existing cash (Howton et al., 1998). 
We measure Free-Cash Flow as operating cash divided by total assets. On the other hand, 
the tax-deductibility of interest payments offers a valuable tax shield to investors (De Mooij 
and Keen, 2016; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Schandlbauer, 2017). The announcement of 
debt, regardless of priority, is therefore likely to be associated with positive stock returns. 
Our Tax variable is measured as the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings.  
Lastly, we control for the time-varying conditions in the economy and banking sector, in 
particular. We account for the effect of the broader economic conditions on the supply and 
demand of capital securities by including an economic cycle indicator (Recession). The 
variable takes the value of 1 for recessions as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or otherwise 0. Among others, Choe et al. (1993) and Dutordoir and Van 
de Gucht (2007) show that shareholder reactions to security issuance are conditional on the 
state of the economy. In particular, shareholders are more receptive to debt announcements 
made during economic upswings (Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2007).  
For the banking industry specific conditions, we include the aggregate level of systemic 
risk - Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), Banking Crisis periods (Crisis) and the Dodd-
Frank Era (Dodd-Frank) as time-control variables. We measure MES as the (minus) 
average equity loss when market returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of daily stock returns (see, Acharya et al., 2017). This variable captures an 
institution’s contribution to overall systemic risk and higher values suggest a larger 
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contribution. In line with the broader macroeconomic conditions, shareholders are more 
likely to react adversely to debt announcements during periods of high systemic risk. 
Similarly, shareholders could be less receptive to debt announcements during a crisis, as is 
the case with equity announcements made at these times (see, Li et al., 2016). We define 
Crisis in line with Liu and Ngo (2014), where banking crisis periods include the Savings and 
Loan crisis (1986Q1 to 1992Q4) and the global financial crisis (2007Q3 to 2009Q4). The 
variable takes the value of 1 for these crisis periods, or otherwise 0. We further include a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for all periods from the effective implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act in July 2010 (Dodd-Frank), or otherwise 0. The period captures the increasing 
scrutiny of regulators on banks, which reduced information asymmetries and resultantly 
lowered adverse selection costs for security issuances (see, Li et al., 2016). Effectively, stock 
returns are more likely to be positive to debt announcements made in the Dodd-Frank era.  
4.4.3 Long-Term Multivariate Test 
The findings that capital structure decisions tend to alter the long-term risk behavior of 
issuers (see, Healy and Palepu, 1990; Lewis et al., 2002) suggest that the security choice 
decision plays a significant role in the post-issuance risk profile of an institution. For debt 
priority in particular, the risk-shifting incentives related to the use of senior debt imply that 
institutions that issue senior debt would be riskier in the post-issue period. In similar ways, 
the intentions to shift risk would show up if banks that were already risky, but went ahead 
with the issuance, become riskier after the issuance of senior debt. On the other hand, banks 
that subsequently issue sub-debt are expected to be risk-averse partly due to the cushion that 
the instrument provides as a regulatory capital component and/or its presumptive 
disciplinary ability (Nguyen, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014).  
This final test, therefore, seeks to establish if there is some association between bank 
security choice and bank risk post-issuance. In more precise terms, we test if the issuance of 
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senior debt causes banks to be risky in the long-run and whether such security choice exhibits 
some risk-shifting motivations that potentially undermine the intentions of regulatory capital 
requirements and financial stability goals at large. For this test, we require issuers to have at 
least 4 quarters of pre-issuance data and 8 quarters of post-issuance data of the risk indicator. 
Essentially, we drop issues made in 1983 and after 2013 to accommodate this sample 
requirement. We further drop cross-security issues made during the test period in order to 
have a precise impact of the security issuance decision on risk performance, Tail Risk in this 
case. In similar terms as the short-term analysis, we account for possible distortions of equity 
issuance on the performance of banks by excluding senior and sub-debt issues that coincide 
with equity issues within the test period. This screening process results in a sample of 211 
sub-debt and 383 senior debt issues, respectively made by 106 and 98 banks.32  
Conducting this analysis also requires that we account for the pre-issuance risk by 
matching security issuers against their peers. For our purpose, we identify the peers as the 
sub-sample of either security issuer in the post-issuance period. For example, a dataset of 
senior issuers in the test period (1st quarter to the 8th quarter after issuance) is used as a 
control group or peers for the 211 sub-debt issuers. Reciprocally, a dataset of sub-debt issuers 
in the test period is used as a control group for the 383 senior debt issuers in this analysis. 
We then proceed as per the recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1996) and match banks 
based on their pre-issuance size and operating performance. In this case, we classify security 
issuers into quartiles based on the distribution of assets and tail risk in the quarter before 
issuance, where assets and tail risk are as previously defined. We, thereafter, match sub-debt 
                                               
32 A logical expectation is that observations in the short-term analysis would exceed long-term 
ones, which is not the case with our senior debt offers. This anomaly is due to a short-term data 
constraint that requires offers to have a filing date, and the majority of senior debt offers do not meet 
this condition. For long-term analysis, however, the condition is irrelevant as we deal with actual 
issuances instead of announcements. Table A.4-2 presents the sampling criteria for the long-term 
analysis. 
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and senior debt issuers within the same quartile. In principle, this matching process is in line 
with decile-matching by Li et al. (2016), but our wider matching range generates a larger 
sample size for reasonable comparison and inference. Nevertheless, we still present the 
results of the tighter match (decile- and quintile-matching) to ensure robustness of our 
findings.  
Our quartile-matching process generates matched samples of 106 and 187 sub-debt and 
senior debt issues, respectively.33 Following the successful matching, we generate the 1-year 
pre-issuance median tail risk for either security issuers and use it to adjust the post-issuance 
tail risk of issuers. Basically, we obtain the adjusted tail risk of a sub-debt issuer by subtracting 
the median tail risk of a matching senior debt issuer, in the year prior to issuance of sub-
debt, from the median tail risk of a sub-debt issuer. Reciprocally, the adjusted median risk 
for a senior debt issuer subtracts the prior-year median tail risk of a matching sub-debt issuer. 
These adjustments eliminate the pre-issuance performance bias that could spill into the post-
issuance period (see, Powell and Stark, 2005).  
With these adjusted measures, we test for the null hypothesis that adjusted post-issuance 
risk is equal to zero using an ordinary regression with standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The p-value of the constant of this regression is the significance of the 
adjusted-risk. A quantile regression, also with robust standard errors, provides us with 
alternative median test. We assess the average differences across the sub-samples using the 
mean-difference test while the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test compares the 
medians.  
                                               
33 We obtain 87 sub-debt and 175 senior debt issues through the quintile-matching while decile 
process gives just 54 and 112 sub-debt and senior debt issues, respectively. 
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We further run a multivariate analysis to account for other factors that could influence 
the post-issuance risk. Under this setting, we run a linear regression model where, the 
adjusted post-issuance median tail risk is regressed on the adjusted 1-year pre-issuance tail 
risk and some control variables. In this way, the average post-issuance performance left 
unexplained would be attributable to the respective issuance of senior or sub-debt and would 
be captured by the intercept (also see, Ghosh, 2001; Powell and Stark, 2005). The model is 
of the form:  
𝐴𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝐴𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (5) 
Where 𝐴𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the adjusted post-issuance median tail risk and 𝐴𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑒 is the 
adjusted 1-year pre-issuance median tail risk. The model is run with robust standard errors, 
and the error term, 𝜀𝑖 , is assumed to be normally distributed with a constant variance, 
𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎). 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables that are also likely to have an impact on post-
issuance tail risk. Among these, we control for (Bank-Size), as previously defined. The 
inclusion of this variable is based on arguments that the implicit and explicit government 
guarantee of large institutions makes them unusually risky (Bhagat et al., 2015; Taleb and 
Tapiero, 2010). Next, we control for a bank’s profitability through the Return on Assets 
(ROA), measured as pre-tax income divided by total assets. The ability of banks to build 
capital reserves through earnings enables them to withstand shocks. Profitable banks would, 
therefore, be relatively stable and less risky.   
Given the credit risk inherent in banks’ lending business, we control for the loan portfolio 
as the fraction of total loans to total assets (Loans-Assets). Other things equal, a large 
portfolio of loans denotes a higher level of risk, particularly credit risk, due to the higher risk-
weight accorded to lending activities (BIS, 1988; 2006; 2010). Notwithstanding that, the risk-
sensitivity of regulatory capital dictates banks hold capital commensurate with their level of 
risk. We, therefore, control for a bank’s ability to match its risk profile via capital reserves by 
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including Buffer - as previously defined. It is then conceivable that risky banks would 
maintain high regulatory capital buffers. However, the effect of the buffer on bank risk is 
ambiguous given that poorly-capitalized banks may become riskier as shareholders attempt 
to shift the impending costs of failure to the safety net (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Similarly, 
institutions with a low level of equity in their capital structure, thus highly levered, are more 
likely to get riskier in an attempt to shift risk to other stakeholders and the safety net. We 
capture the extent of bank indebtedness through the Equity Ratio - as already defined in 
the preceding sub-section. 
In addition, we control for the charter value of a bank via Tobin’s Q, where low values 
indicate a less valuable charter and more opportunities for risk-shifting (Goyal, 2005). As the 
charter value diminishes, value-maximizing shareholders engage in risky bets to increase the 
value of the deposit insurance option (Keeley, 1990; Marcus, 1984). Furthermore, we control 
for the issuer’s credit quality (Credit Quality) by including a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
banks with a S&P rating of BBB- or better (investment grade), or 0 otherwise. Highly-rated 
banks have relatively lower default risk, hence they are likely to have lower tail risk. 
Similar to short term analysis we account for changes in macroeconomic and banking 
sector conditions by including the variables, Recession and Marginal Expected Shortfall 
(MES). The variables are as previously defined and capture the time-varying effects of the 
economic cycle and bank-wide systemic risk on individual bank risk. Economic contractions 
and periods of high-systemic risk are more likely to drive up bank risk.  
4.5 The Short-Term Valuation Effects of Senior and Sub-Debt 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4-2 summarizes the characteristics of banks that announce senior and sub-debt and 
the differences in the offers announced. 
112 
[Insert Table 4-2] 
The characteristics of banks that announce senior or sub-debt and the offer-
characteristics are different in most respects. Most notably, banks that announce senior debt 
are larger and the offers are of a higher-credit quality than sub-debt. The significance of these 
indicators, alongside the concentration of the offers within a few “well-known” players (see 
Table 4-1), suggest that banks that announce senior debt enjoy relatively easier and cheaper 
access to the debt markets (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; Colla et al., 2013; Kwast et al., 
1999). In other aspects, banks that announce sub-debt are relatively lowly capitalized (based 
on their Buffer levels) but the offers have a longer Maturity as compared to senior debt. This 
pattern could be indicative that sub-debt offers are announced with underlying regulatory 
considerations. That is, banks with low capital buffers derive a potential regulatory benefit 
in using sub-debt, especially if the instrument is more likely to meet the regulatory 
requirements i.e. long-dated instruments.34 This presumption is further strengthened by the 
fact that the majority of sub-debt offers (67%) are compliant with the minimum maturity 
and the security/guarantee requirements for inclusion of sub-debt in regulatory capital and 
the banks still have the regulatory capacity to issue Tier 2 elements.  
Senior debt offers seem to be driven by situations of high agency costs. For example, 
banks that announce senior debt have a relatively higher Tail Risk, in line with suggestions 
of asset-substitution in firms that have debt in their capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In addition, senior debt offers are prevalent in banks that have high investment 
opportunities, Tobin’s Q, thus prone to suboptimal investment decisions brought by leverage 
                                               
34 To be eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital, sub-debt should, among others, have a 
minimum original maturity of 5 years (7 years before Basel I), be subordinate to depositors and 
general creditors, unsecured, unguaranteed, uninsured, and should be within the required Tier 2 
threshold (see, Federal Reserve System, 1985a; 1989; 2007; 2013).  
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(Barclay and Smith, 1995; Myers, 1977). Also, senior debt offers raise relatively higher 
proceeds and are common in banks that have larger Free-Cash Flow, which exacerbate the 
self-servicing interests of managers (Jensen, 1986).  
Apart from these bank-specific indicators, the dominance of senior debt in Recession and 
high systemic risk periods (MES) suggest some systematic decision to time adverse 
conditions for senior debt announcements. These periods usually present opportunities for 
risk-shifting due to subdued creditor-discipline (Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015; Hett and 
Schmidt, 2017; Karas et al., 2013). While a similar tendency may apply to sub-debt offers 
that dominate banking crisis periods (Crisis), we cannot rule out that sub-debt offers around 
this time potentially underlie the pronounced role of capital in periods of systemic distress 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Therefore, the timing effect of sub-debt offers is a bit more 
ambiguous than the pattern exhibited by senior debt announcements. 
With respect to other variables, tax considerations appear to be important for senior debt 
while, unsurprisingly, sub-debt offers are common in a period that witnessed an 
unprecedented level of scrutiny of regulatory capital levels - the Dodd-Frank era. Generally, 
senior debt offers seem to be explained by elements of high agency costs and, to some extent, 
opportunities for easier access to debt markets while sub-debt offers appear to fill a 
regulatory need.  
4.5.2 Univariate Analysis 
We test the reaction of shareholders to senior and sub-debt offers in the following 
univariate analysis. The tests evaluate if there are some systematic differences in stock 
reactions to the securities and whether these valuation differences are driven by risk-shifting 
and wealth-expropriation opportunities presented by the use of senior debt. 
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4.5.2.1 The Announcement Effects of Senior and Sub-Debt  
Table 4-3 summarizes the announcement period abnormal stock returns for senior and 
sub-debt offers over two main event windows, [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The results in the first 3 
columns are estimated through the market model while the latter 3 columns present estimates 
based on the 3-factor model. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity in both 
cases. 
[Insert Table 4-3] 
The results in Table 4-3 indicate that shareholders react in a significantly positive manner 
to announcements of senior debt and the reactions are significantly different in compassion 
to sub-debt offers. More precisely, reactions to sub-debt offers are generally muted in line 
with the prior literature (see, Keeley, 1989; Laderman, 1994; Wall and Peterson, 1991). The 
consistency across different return-model estimations suggest that our results are robust to 
model specification. Also, the length of the event window does not drive these results.35 We 
also show that the variations in the reaction between senior and sub-debt are not overly 
influenced by sub-debt that is not eligible for regulatory purposes, which have a pure 
leverage-effect. Table A.4-4 reports the results that exclude offers that do not meet the 
minimum criteria for inclusion in regulatory capital and those from banks that have already 
exceeded their Tier 2 regulatory capacity. 36 The results indicate that shareholders are still 
unreactive to sub-debt announcements while senior debt offers continue to earn a 
significantly positive shareholder value.  
                                               
35 In the results reported as additional tables, Table A.4-3 shows that shareholder valuation effects 
of senior debt announcements still significantly outclass those of sub-debt in windows of up to 7 
days [-3,3].  
36 We identify 34 sub-debt offers that do not meet the maturity and security criteria, 62 are made 
by banks that have already exhausted their Tier 2 regulatory threshold, and 6 are jointly disqualified 
and over the Tier 2 threshold.  
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In principle, our results are aligned to findings from non-financial firms, which show that 
shareholders positively value the announcement of non-subordinated offers that accord 
them an opportunity to advance their risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation motives (Tang 
and Singer, 1993). These moral hazards could be interfering with the regulatory signal 
resulting in a muted response to the announcement of bank regulatory capital elements, sub-
debt in this case. Resultantly, the issuance of regulatory capital elements may be perceived to 
hold little regulatory information content (Keeley, 1989; Krishnan et al., 2010) or the whole 
capital framework may be deemed ineffective in directing bank behavior, particularly with 
the inclusion of sub-debt in regulatory capital (Barrell et al., 2011; Davies, 2015; 
Schoenmaker, 2015).  
Bearing in mind the potential distractions on the regulatory value of sub-debt by senior 
debt, we proceed to test the shareholders’ reactions to differently capitalized banks 
announcing these securities.  
4.5.2.2 Do Shareholders Value the Regulatory Benefit of Sub-Debt 
Under a clear regulatory signal, banks that need to raise their regulatory capital would be 
attractive to shareholders if they announce a capital-improving element, otherwise the 
opportunities for moral hazard incentives related to senior debt would prove more valuable 
to the detriment of regulatory intentions. In fact, under-capitalized banks that do not find 
the prospect of recapitalization appealing could be seeing an opportunity to shift risk to the 
ultimate bearers of bank losses upon failure, mainly sub-debt, or the deposit insurance 
(Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Marcus, 1984). For this test we divide the sample into less- or 
well-capitalized banks based on their buffer distribution a quarter before announcement, 
where banks with a buffer below the median of the sample distribution are deemed less-
capitalized, otherwise they are classified as well-capitalized. Table 4-4 presents the results of 
shareholder reactions to differently capitalized banks and shows that shareholders of less-
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capitalized banks react in a significantly positive manner to the announcement of a non-
regulatory element, senior debt, but are unreactive to the announcement of a capital-
improving element, sub-debt. 
[Insert Table 4-4] 
The results further indicate that the reactions are only significantly different between 
senior and sub-debt announcements of less-capitalized banks, while the difference for well-
capitalized banks is inconclusive, or at best weakly favors senior debt (column 6). More 
strikingly, within security analysis indicates that shareholders react in a more significantly 
positive way to senior debt offers by less-capitalized banks than senior offers of well-
capitalized banks (column 8) but are indifferent to sub-debt offers across bank capitalization 
levels (column 7). Likewise, these results are unaffected by sub-debt offers that would not 
count towards regulatory capital, since an analysis that excludes them yields similar findings 
(see, additional Table A.4-5). We also eliminate the possibility that these results are driven by 
our bank-capitalization cut-off point by choosing a different categorizing level. In this case 
we categorize banks with buffers within the lower quartile of the sample distribution as 
capital-constrained and those within the upper quartile as unconstrained. We show the stock 
reactions to these banks’ offers in Table 4-5. 
[Insert Table 4-5] 
The results in Table 4-5 are consistent with those of less-capitalized banks and offer more 
conclusive evidence that senior debt offers create significant share value for banks that are 
closer to the regulatory threshold than sub-debt. These offers are also significantly more 
positive than those made by unconstrained banks (column 8). In contrast, share valuations 
from sub-debt offers do not depend on the level of bank capitalization (column 7) and the 
reactions between senior and sub-debt of unconstrained banks are not different (column 5). 
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Clearly, there is a systematic tendency of shareholders of banks with low buffers to shun 
capital securities. Essentially, shareholder and regulatory expectations are incompatible in as 
far as the benefit of sub-debt on the stability of banks is concerned. Specifically, shareholders 
appear to not value the regulatory gain from the announcement and potential issuance of 
sub-debt in ways similar to equity (Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; Krishnan et al., 2010). In 
our case, it appears that this anomaly stems from the use of senior debt, as shareholders seem 
to treasure the risk-shifting and wealth expropriation opportunities presented by the 
instrument ahead of the regulatory welfare of sub-debt. In this context, our next analysis 
tests for the presence of these pervasive incentives within the broader capital structure of 
banks. 
4.5.2.3 Shareholder’s Risk-Shifting Incentives  
Based on arguments that shareholders improve their wealth by increasing risk, we 
establish if the issuance of leverage-increasing instruments such as senior debt is of valuable 
interest to shareholders. This analysis, therefore, tests suggestions by among others, Masulis 
(1980), that the use of senior debt is perceived in a positive light by institutions that are risky. 
Arguments that expectations for bailouts become more valuable as banks grow larger (see, 
for example, Berger and Bouwman, 2013), also direct us to evaluate the reactions of 
shareholders to security announcements by large banks. To circumvent the problem of 
simultaneity with the issuance decision, as in earlier categorizations, we classify risky and 
large banks based on the respective distribution of the tail risk and assets a quarter prior to 
announcement of the offers.  
4.5.2.4 Security-Announcements and Bank Risk 
Table 4-6 reports the announcement period abnormal stock returns for senior and sub-
debt offers made by risky and less-risky banks. Less-risky banks are those with a tail risk 
below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are classified as risky.  
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[Insert Table 4-6] 
Table 4-6 indicates that shareholders react in a significantly positive way to the 
announcement of senior debt offers by risky banks. This reaction is significantly different to 
sub-debt announcements by risky banks or senior debt announcements by less-risky banks. 
A potential alternative argument for the preference of senior over sub-debt by risky banks 
lies with ideas that senior debt is cheaper for firms under or close to distress (see, Attaoui 
and Poncet, 2013; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012). However, if the type of security is the 
underlying driver of the cost differential, then senior debt should be cheaper across the 
board, and shareholders would still value this cost-advantage regardless of risk levels. 
Strikingly, our results do not show this consistency, but shareholders are indifferent about 
their wealth effects when less-risky banks announce either senior or sub-debt (column 6). 
The failure by shareholders to positively value the announcement of a regulatory capital-
instrument that could abate their risk position is even more surprising. This behavioral 
pattern suggest that shareholders see the use of senior debt as a value-enhancing opportunity 
in line with their risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation motives (Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Jensen and Smith Jr, 1985; Masulis, 1980). 
4.5.2.5 Security-Announcements and Bank-Size 
To understand the value of risk-shifting opportunities arising from the expectation of 
being bailed-out, we show shareholder reactions to the announcement of senior and sub-
debt by small and large banks in Table 4-7.  
[Insert Table 4-7] 
Table 4-7 shows that shareholders of large banks significantly value the announcement 
of senior debt more than sub-debt. Strikingly, these valuation differences are not evident, or 
are at best weak, in regards to small banks (column 6). In addition, shareholders are 
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indifferent to the announcement of sub-debt by large or small banks (column 7), but the 
announcement of senior debt by large banks, to some degree, creates significant shareholder 
value than senior debt announced by small banks (column 8). Based on these results, we 
infer that the persistent share value generated by securities that have no regulatory benefit, 
i.e. senior debt, by large-bank shareholders perhaps explain the tendency of these banks to 
be undercapitalized (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). Moreover, 
these results, alongside those of the prior sub-section, suggest that shareholder’s reaction to 
the announcement of bank securities, particularly senior debt, are driven by bank risk and 
size. Therefore, we proceed to test how the interactions of risk and size conditions the 
reaction of stock to security announcements, and whether these factors underlie motivations 
for less-capitalized banks’ shareholders to favor senior but non-regulatory instruments at the 
expense of subordinated regulatory capital elements. 
4.5.2.6 Risk and Bank-Size  
Hryckiewicz (2014) argues that public bail-outs destabilize the banking system in general 
but the risk effects are most pronounced in large banks that bet on their chances of being 
bailed-out (Afonso et al., 2014; Hagendorff et al., 2018). These effects are usually enabled by 
the reduction in creditor-discipline, which is conditioned upon the expectations of large 
banks to be bailed out (Acharya et al., 2016). In essence, large and risky banks could offer 
shareholders a conducive environment to shift risk or expropriate the wealth of other 
stakeholders, and the use of senior debt, as a tool that further enhances these incentives, 
would prove valuable to shareholders of such banks. We show the reactions of shareholders 
to senior and sub-debt announcements made by these banks in Table 4-8. 
[Insert Table 4-8] 
The results in Table 4-8 indicate that shareholders react in significantly positive way to 
the announcement of senior debt by large and risky banks as compared to sub-debt offers 
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by the same kind of banks. These reactions are in stark contrast to offers made by less-risky 
and large banks, where shareholders react in a significantly negative way to their senior offers. 
The wealth losses from these senior offers are in some cases (window [-1,1]) significantly less 
than those from sub-debt announcements. Meanwhile, senior debt offers by risky and large 
banks attract significantly more positive reactions than senior debt offers of their less-risky 
counterparts (column 8), while sub-debt offers are not different across the risk categories 
(column 7).  
We further show in additional Table A.4-6 that these results are not driven by the 
purported cost-advantages of senior debt given that shareholders are unreactive to either 
security offers by risky and small banks. If anything, shareholders are happier with senior 
debt offers by less-risky and small banks as compared to sub-debt, in contrast to their 
reactions when banks are risky and large. Furthermore, shareholders’ reactions to senior 
offers by risky and small banks relative to less-risky and small banks is significantly different 
and negative, as compared to the positive differential noted for large banks. To this point, it 
is clear that senior debt creates more shareholder value for risky and large banks while the 
shareholder-value perceptions of sub-debt are irreconcilable with the regulatory expectations 
of the instrument. 
4.5.2.7 Risk and Bank-Capitalization 
Arguably, the bail-out expectation attached to large banks incites them to remain under-
capitalized (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Dinger and Vallascas, 2016). These prospects may 
obscure the regulatory value of capital instruments, resulting in the preceding muted 
shareholder reaction to sub-debt announcements. On these grounds, we conduct a more 
direct test on the reaction of shareholders to senior or sub-debt offers by banks that need to 
raise their regulatory capital (they are less-capitalized) across varying levels of bank risk. We 
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show these results in Table 4-9 and find that shareholders of less-capitalized and risky banks 
attach no value to the announcement of a capital-improving element, viz., sub-debt. 
[Insert Table 4-9] 
The results in Table 4-9 further indicate that senior debt offers add significant value to 
shareholders when banks are less-capitalized and risky. These valuation effects are 
significantly different from sub-debt offers made by similar banks (column 3), or senior debt 
offers made by less-risky banks (column 8). Shareholders rather see the announcement of 
senior debt by less-risky banks as value-destructive in some instances (column 5). To offer a 
complete picture on this behavior, we test if this preference for senior debt exists in risky 
banks that, however, have little need for capital - namely, well-capitalized banks. The results 
in the additional Table A.4-7 suggest that, unlike less-capitalized banks, shareholders of well-
capitalized banks do not value the announcement of senior or sub-debt irrespective of bank 
risk. 
These results, and those before, offer some indication that regulatory capital elements 
are discretionary regardless of bank capital as found by Krishnan et al. (2010). However, the 
foregoing evidence of a consistently positive reaction to the announcement of senior debt, 
even by vulnerable banks, suggest that this instrument causes banks to deviate from the 
regulatory expectations of recapitalizing with sub-debt. In fact, the level of shareholder value 
generated by this non-regulatory element, especially for risky and less-capitalized banks, links 
well with suggestions that banks get riskier and remain under-capitalized to maximize their 
deposit insurance guarantee (Lambert et al., 2017; Marcus, 1984). More specifically, the 
attraction of senior debt offers to shareholders of banks that are already weak, by risk or 
capital levels, perfectly fits arguments that the instrument presents valuable opportunities for 
expropriating the wealth of and shifting risk to subordinated debt holders (Masulis, 1980; 
Tang and Singer, 1993). In the following analysis, we evaluate if this behavior persists under 
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a multivariate setting that controls for factors that could also condition shareholder reactions 
to debt offerings. 
4.5.3 Multivariate Analysis  
Under this section, we establish if risk level (Tail Risk) explains the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of senior and sub-debt offers through an ordinary least squares specification. 
For this test, we estimate the models separately for each sub-sample and compare the 
statistical significance of the differences in the coefficients across groups. In this manner, the 
coefficients and standard errors would be consistent across the group of senior and sub-debt 
announcements (see, Hoetker, 2007). We find this procedure appropriate for our analyses 
instead of capturing the differences between the two groups through the differential intercept 
coefficient (coefficient of the security dummy). As its major limitation, the dummy 
(senior/sub-debt) would assume that the differential effect of the type of security on 
announcement returns is constant across all other covariates (see, Gujarati and Porter, 2009, 
p.289). In this case, a higher CAR for one security over another would imply that this is the 
case regardless of the bank and security-specific characteristics. This assumption is clearly 
untenable in our sample where the groups of senior debt and sub-debt announcements are 
distinct in all observable variables but the equity ratio. Also, using a single equation for both 
groups of security announcements assumes that the unobserved variation between these 
groups would be the same and this is a far-fetched supposition given the already notable 
variation in the observable covariates. Effectively, the security dummy would force the 
unobserved variation, captured by the single error term, to be the same across both groups 
resulting in misleading conclusions (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Hoetker, 2007).  
In light of the above caveats, a compassion between the groups would be informative 
and even more meaningful given the roughly similar size of the group of senior and sub-debt 
announcements. To proceed, we use the CAR for the event window [-1,0] for each group of 
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senior and sub-debt announcers as the dependent variable. For robustness purposes, similar 
analyses are conducted using the CAR of the alternative window [-1,1] as the dependent 
variable. We run these specifications, with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, 
across similar scenarios or sub-samples as in the univariate analysis, thus by bank-size and 
capitalization levels.  
4.5.3.1 Tail Risk and Abnormal Returns 
Table 4-10 reports the results of the linear regression model that estimates the 
relationship between the abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk. The first 3 columns estimate 
the relationship with the CAR for the event window [-1,0] and the latter columns are with 
respect to the alternative window of [-1,1]. The estimates for sub-debt offers are reported in 
columns (1) and (4) while columns (2) and (5) report those for senior debt. We also show 
the difference of coefficients between senior and sub-debt in columns (3) and (6).   
[Insert Table 4-10] 
The main result in Table 4-10 is that Tail Risk significantly explains the stock returns of 
banks that announce senior debt but not for those announcing sub-debt. The difference in 
the impact of risk between the two offerings is significant (column 3) and the results hold 
across both event windows. These results, therefore, confirm the univariate results that risky 
banks attract a significantly positive reaction when announcing senior debt and this is not 
the case for sub-debt.  
We find that other factors also condition shareholders’ reactions to security 
announcements, and are, to some extent, in line with the univariate tests. For example, senior 
debt announcements are value-enhancing for banks that have a larger Free-Cash Flow, while 
sub-debt offers made during the Dodd-Frank era earn a positive reaction from shareholders. 
Although the influence of the Crisis on announcement returns of sub-debt is insignificant, 
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the variable has a significantly different impact between senior and sub-debt offers. A 
contrary result to the univariate tests is with regard to the influence of Tobin’s Q on both 
offers. Banks with higher investment opportunities are in this case associated with a 
significantly higher shareholder value when offering sub-debt rather than senior debt. 
Otherwise, the overwhelming consistency with respect to the majority of the significant 
variables suggest that agency costs underlie the announcement of senior debt as shown in 
the univariate tests. We further illustrate the presence of these agency costs by examining the 
influence of the main independent variable, Tail Risk, on the announcement of securities 
across sub-samples of banks.  
4.5.3.2 Tail Risk and Bank-Size  
Based on earlier arguments that bail-out expectations incite risk-taking in large banks, we 
test for the influence of risk on the share value of large banks that announce senior or sub-
debt. We present the results of this relationship in Table 4-11 where we allocate banks to 
size categories as in the prior univariate analysis and report the results for large banks, and 
the difference in the coefficients between the securities, in the first 3 columns while the 
results for small banks are in columns (4) to (6). We compare the impact of Tail Risk across 
bank-sizes for sub-debt and senior debt offers in columns (7) and (8), respectively.  
[Insert Table 4-11] 
We find that risky banks that announce senior debt earn significantly positive stock 
returns when they are large. The influence of Tail Risk on these offers is significantly different 
from sub-debt, which is insignificant. Interestingly, Tail Risk has no impact the share value 
of either security when banks are small. Most notable is the fact that risky banks that 
announce senior debt earn a significantly more positive stock return when they are large than 
when they are small (column 8). We further confirm these results using the alternative [-1,1] 
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CAR as the dependent variable in the additional Table A.4-8, where senior debt offers made 
by risky and large banks continue to earn greater wealth for shareholders. 
So far, the results are consistent with the risk-shifting opportunities available for large 
banks in general (for example, Afonso et al., 2014; Hagendorff et al., 2018), but specifically 
they show that these motivations also vary with the type of security used. In particular, 
shareholders of risky and large banks appear to derive greater value in the risk-shifting 
opportunities presented by using senior debt, against a reasonable expectation that these 
banks would rather value the use of a regulatory element that would attenuate their risk 
concerns. We interpret this unexpected behavior as an indication that shareholders see the 
use of senior debt as an opportunity to enhance their wealth by expropriating junior debtors 
(Jensen and Smith Jr, 1985), and banks specifically avoid using capital instruments that will 
dilute the value of their deposit insurance (Marcus, 1984). We elaborate on these claims in 
the following analysis.  
4.5.3.3 Tail Risk and Bank-Capitalization  
Under this analysis, we assess the validity of earlier claims that banks remain under-
capitalized and get riskier in an effort to maximize the value of the insurance cover that will 
be triggered by the imminent bankruptcy. In other ways, these actions also shift risk to sub-
debt holders given their subordinated position upon bankruptcy. Essentially, we test if 
shareholders place little regulatory value on the announcement of sub-debt as a capital 
instrument, even for banks that need to improve their regulatory capital. By the same test, 
we aim to reveal the share valuation of weak banks (risky and less-capitalized) upon 
announcement of a security that offers no regulatory cushion - senior debt. Our tests should 
finally reveal if the opportunities for risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation that are common 
with the use of senior debt act against the financial stability objectives of including junior 
debt in regulatory capital, and the effectiveness of regulatory capital frameworks in general. 
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We present the results of the relationship between Tail Risk and abnormal stock returns 
of differently capitalized banks in Table 4-12. We make a similar categorization to the one 
used in the univariate analysis, where less-capitalized banks are those with a buffer below the 
median of the sample distribution in the quarter prior to the announcements, otherwise they 
are defined as being well-capitalized. Columns (1) to (3) report the estimates for the less-
capitalized banks, and those for well-capitalized banks follow in columns (4) to (5), with the 
comparisons across bank capitalizations for sub-debt and senior debt being shown in 
columns (7) and (8), respectively.  
[Insert Table 4-12] 
The results in Table 4-12 show that risky banks that announce senior debt earn 
significantly positive wealth for shareholders when they are less-capitalized (column 2) and 
these valuation effects are significantly different when compared to sub-debt offers (column 
3). The results are surprising given that the shareholders of banks that need to raise their 
capital levels would be expected to share views similar to regulators on the importance of 
sub-debt in this regard. However, the share valuation of well-capitalized banks does not 
depend on bank risk for either senior or sub-debt offers (columns 4 to 6). Across bank 
capitalization levels, we also do not see any significant association between Tail Risk and 
stock returns for sub-debt offers (column 7). For senior debt, however, we find risky banks 
add significantly positive value to shareholders only when they are less-capitalized (column 
8). These results are robust to the use of the CAR for the alternative event window, as shown 
under additional Table A.4-9.  
In summary, our assessment points to a clear tendency of banks to remain under-
capitalized by preferring to announce non-regulatory capital elements. Specifically, sub-debt 
remains value-irrelevant to shareholders even for banks that would derive a greater regulatory 
benefit from its issuance. This evidence conclusively points to acts of delayed recapitalization 
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by banks in an attempt to exploit the opportunities to shift risk and expropriate other 
stakeholders. Most importantly, our findings support arguments that shareholders see the 
use senior debt as an opportunity to advance their interests of expropriating and shifting risk 
to the junior debt holders, in this case sub-debt. The validity of these arguments follows from 
the fact that senior debt securities do not count towards the regulatory capital of a bank, and 
as such do not contribute towards the safety and soundness of an institution. Rather, the use 
of senior debt is a leverage-increasing action that raises the risk premium of issuers with a 
consequent reduction on the value of existing bonds (Black and Cox, 1976; Black and 
Scholes, 1973) and these value-effects are most severe to the residual unprotected junior 
claimants, i.e. sub-debt, while positive to shareholders’ wealth (Masulis, 1980; Smith and 
Warner, 1979; Tang and Singer, 1993).  
Arguably, the financial decisions of banks in the US are bound by the minimum regulatory 
equity requirement, hence banks acting in the interests of shareholders may not freely 
restructure their liability components in a ways that explore the risk-shifting or wealth-
expropriation opportunities associated with senior debt. Essentially, the 3% equity ratio (see, 
Federal Reserve System, 1992; 2007; 2013) is a binding constraint that potentially restrain the 
debt structure decisions of banks.  
Nonetheless, this argument would contradict our summary statistics results (Table 4-2), 
which indicate that banks announcing senior or sub-debt have an average Equity Ratio greater 
than 7%, hence do not seem to be constrained in a way that would substantially limit their 
ability to exploit the opportunities to shift risk or expropriate the wealth of other 
stakeholders through senior debt. Furthermore, banks that announce senior debt are 
indistinguishable from those that announce sub-debt based on the Equity Ratio, which gives 
us some reasonable expectation that the discrepancies in the reaction of shareholders to 
either security could be traceable to the underlying incentives associated with senior or sub-
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debt, rather than the dynamics of the equity ratio. In addition, the results of the multivariate 
analysis (Table 4-10) reveal that the Equity Ratio is irrelevant to the stock returns of banks 
that announce senior debt while inconclusive for sub-debt announcements. On this basis, 
the constraints placed by the regulatory equity ratio seem to be trivial to the findings that 
banks significantly price the opportunity to shift risk or expropriate wealth from other 
stakeholders through the use of senior debt. 
It is equally conceivable that regulatory inefficiencies could be driven by conflicts specific 
to sub-debt rather than the moral hazard incentives underlying senior debt. For example, 
shareholders could view the disciplinary ability of sub-debt as a constraint to their risk-taking 
activities (see among others, Belkhir, 2013; Evanoff et al., 2011). Specifically, the displeasure 
to sub-debt announcement would be greater for less-risky banks that still have room to 
explore their risk-taking potential. Also, the issuance of sub-debt would reduce future debt 
capacity thereby limiting shareholder’s ability to take advantage of value-enhancing 
opportunities presented by senior debt. In this case, the shareholder value perceptions with 
regard to sub-debt would be determined by the strength of these disincentives vis-a-vis the 
regulatory motives of the instrument. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, our earlier results indicate that the reaction of 
shareholders to the announcement of sub-debt is independent of the riskiness of a bank 
(Tables 4-6 and 4-10), which suggests that shareholders do not regard the disincentives 
arising from the disciplinary effect of sub-debt in their value perceptions. Also, the relatively 
high Equity Ratio of banks announcing either security does not suggest that banks would be 
constrained to structure their debt in ways that would advance their future interests. 
Effectively, the disincentives for using sub-debt appear to be generally weak to dilute the 
regulatory incentives of the instrument, and as such, the wealth-expropriation and risk-
shifting opportunities associated with senior debt seem to be the underlying drivers of 
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shareholders’ perceptions towards sub-debt. We argue that these opportunities limit the 
regulatory role of sub-debt in bank capital and distort well-intended regulatory intentions 
that continue to recognize the instrument as an important candidate in the financial stability 
of banks. For this reason, the regulatory and shareholder expectations with respect to sub-
debt will remain divergent as they are with other components of regulatory capital, namely 
equity, regulatory capital adjustments and Tier 2 capital in general.37 
Overall, the dominancy of agency costs bred by the priority of debt within the broader 
bank capital structure seem to explain findings about the ineffectiveness of capital 
frameworks in directing bank behavior (Admati, 2016; Krishnan et al., 2010), especially when 
these frameworks include sub-debt (Barrell et al., 2011; Davies, 2015; Schoenmaker, 2015).  
After successfully establishing the effects of security choices on shareholders’ wealth and 
how these choices are moderated by risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities, 
we proceed to examine the impact of the security issuance decision on the long-term risk 
behavior of a banks.  
4.6 The Long-Term Risk Behavior of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
The evidence that security choice decisions tend to alter the long-term risk profile of 
non-financial institutions (see, Healy and Palepu, 1990; Lewis et al., 2002) raises grave 
concerns about the use of financial instruments in banking. Given that regulatory efforts are 
mainly concerned with maintaining financial stability through capital-issuance (Federal 
Reserve System, 2013; 2017), the effect of the issuance decisions on the risk behavior of 
banks therefore becomes crucial more especially if there are shareholder-incentives within 
                                               
37 See among others, Cornett et al. (1998); Laderman (1994); Lubberink and Willett (2016); Wall 
and Peterson (1991) for adverse shareholder valuation effects of other regulatory capital elements. 
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the wider capital structure that potentially interfere with these financial stability goals. As 
such, the findings that shareholders value the announcement of non-regulatory securities 
that offer opportunities for risk-shifting viz., senior debt, informs us to further review how 
the issuance of senior or sub-debt profiles the risk behavior of banks in the long-run.  
4.6.1 Univariate Analysis 
The tests under this section, therefore, seek to highlight whether the use of senior debt 
in banking supports the risk-shifting incentives of shareholders. The presence of these 
motives will show if banks that use senior debt become riskier post-issuance. Specifically, 
this behavior would be most pronounced in banks that are already risky, based on their pre-
issuance tail risk, but still go ahead with senior debt issuance in an attempt to off-load their 
risky positions to the unsecured subordinate debt holders and the safety nets.  
4.6.1.1 Post-Issuance Risk of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
Table 4-13 reports results of the adjusted median risk of senior and sub-debt issuers over 
several post-issuance periods. The median tail risk in the post-issuance periods is adjusted by 
the 1-year pre-issuance median of the matching bank. The first 3 columns show the results 
of senior and sub-debt issuers based on quartile matching and the associated differences 
between the issuers. Columns (4) to (6) are quintile-matched issuers while the last 3 columns 
are with respect to decile-matching. 
[Insert Table 4-13] 
By any form of matching, and in all periods, senior debt issuers get significantly riskier 
than sub-debt issuers post-issuance. For sub-debt, the risk behavior of issuers does not 
change in the main matching sample. However, there are some elements of post-issuance 
risk reduction from the instrument under the quintile- and decile-matched samples. These 
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findings confer with the short-term analysis that the use of senior debt presents risk-shifting 
opportunities for banks/shareholders. 
Perhaps using the median over the post-issuance period unduly disadvantages senior 
debt given their populated offers. On this possibility, we adjust the issuer’s tail risk at the end 
of the quarter by the 1-year pre-issuance median of the matching bank. For example, we 
adjust the tail risk at the 8th quarter post-issuance by the 1-year pre-issuance median of the 
matching bank. The results of this adjustment are reported under Table A.4-10 as an 
additional table, where senior debt issuers still emerge riskier than sub-debt issuers in the 
following quarters after issuance. The results are also consistent across the methods of 
matching. Generally, the risk-shifting incentives associated with senior debt appear to 
overweigh the regulatory and presumptive disciplinary benefit of sub-debt. 
Given our preceding evidence that senior debt harbors risk-shifting motives, we argue 
that these incentives will be valuable for banks that have a legacy of being risky and would, 
therefore, consider the use of senior debt as an opportunity to shed their risk. We evaluate 
this behavior by comparing the risk behavior of banks that are risky in the quarter prior to 
issuance as compared to the less risky, where less-risky banks have a tail risk below the 
median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are defined as being risky. Table 4-14 
presents the results of this comparison. 
[Insert Table 4-14] 
Table 4-14 shows that risky banks that subsequently issue senior debt get significantly 
riskier post-issuance. The adjusted post-issuance median risk for these banks is significantly 
higher than for sub-debt at all post-issuance times. Notably, the post-issuance risk behavior 
of banks that issue senior debt amid their risky position is also significantly different from 
the less-risky issuers (column 8). However, the post-issuance risk behavior of banks that are 
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less-risky prior issuance is independent of the security issued and does not generally change 
(columns 4 to 6). The behavior of sub-debt issuers also does not depend on their pre-issuance 
risk position. This evidence so far suggests that senior debt acts as a conduit through which 
banks can shift risk. We put this evidence through further tests that control for the influence 
of other factors on the post-issuance risk profile of banks in the succeeding analysis.   
4.6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Our analysis at this point attempts to isolate the impact of security choice on the post-
issuance risk behavior of banks by controlling for the median adjusted risk a year prior to 
issuance and other possible explanations of bank risk. The analysis runs a linear regression 
with the adjusted post-issuance risk as the dependent variable. Any unexplained post-
issuance risk would be captured by the intercept and attributable to a particular security 
issuance decision. 
4.6.2.1 Post-Issuance Risk of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
Table 4-15 reports the regression results on the adjusted median tail risk of senior and 
sub-debt issuers across various post-issuance periods.  
[Insert Table 4-15] 
According to Table 4-15, a number of control variables appear to influence the post-
issuance risk profile of senior and sub-debt issuers. However, these effects are either 
inconsistent, weak or non-persistent thereby offering inconclusive explanations on the risk 
behavior of banks following security issuance. On the other hand, there is some consistency 
in the sign and significance of the Intercept of the regression model. The Intercept is only 
significantly positive for senior debt issuers across the majority of post-issuance periods and 
it is significantly different from that of sub-debt issuers in most cases. This pattern generally 
support the long-term univariate results, in that, the issuance of senior debt increases a bank’s 
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post-issuance risk while using sub-debt has no impact on the risk behavior of banks. The 
irrelevance of sub-debt on the post-issuance risk behavior of banks could be an indication 
that the instrument lacks a preventative influence as suggested by Krishnan et al. (2005), but 
it may also be the case that the strength of the risk-shifting opportunities that come along 
with using senior debt eclipses this effect, as it had with the regulatory effect of sub-debt. 
Our final analysis examines the post-issuance risk behavior of banks that have a legacy 
of being risky in a multivariate setting. The categorization of risky and less-risky banks is as 
in the univariate analysis. We show the results of the regression on the adjusted median post-
issuance tail risk of risky banks that issue senior or sub-debt in Table 4-16.  
[Insert Table 4-16] 
The results in Table 4-16 indicate that risky banks that proceed to issue senior debt 
observe a significantly positive median tail risk (as shown by the Intercept) in the post-issuance 
period as compared to those that issue sub-debt. The post-issuance risk of sub-debt issuers 
remains insignificant, except over the 2-year period (column 16). In a series of further tests 
that we present as additional tables, Table A.4-11, we find that the post-issuance risk of less-
risky senior debt issuers is not consistently significant, and their risk behavior is generally not 
different from sub-debt issuers as is the case with their risky counterparts.  
A slight caveat, however, is that the issuance of sub-debt appears to increase the risk of 
less-risky banks over the 2-year period after issuance (Table A.4-11, column 16). This latter 
result contradicts theories on the disciplinary effect of sub-debt. Perhaps it indicates that 
sub-debt holders relax their disciplining restraint on banks with less risk and these banks 
ultimately get riskier as their risk-taking goes unchecked. When we follow up this claim with 
intra-security analysis, we notice some significant risk-reductions across most post-issuance 
periods (including over the 2-year period) on risky banks that issue sub-debt as compared to 
134 
less-risky ones (Table A.4-12). To some degree, this latter finding suggests that sub-debt 
exhibits some degree of preventative influence, especially when the market already 
understands the risk position of the issuer. In this regard, the disciplinary actions of sub-debt 
are important to risky banks.  
With respect to senior debt, risky banks that issue the instrument tend to be significantly 
riskier in the post-issuance period, particularly the longer term periods, as compared to less-
risky ones (Table A.4-13). We interpret this as a deliberate effort by banks to use senior debt 
when they are already vulnerable in an attempt to shift their risk positions to other 
stakeholders.  
In sum this analysis demonstrates that the use of senior debt presents risk-shifting 
opportunities that potentially undermine both the regulatory role and the disciplinary effect 
of sub-debt.  
4.7 Conclusions  
Regulators continue to place confidence in sub-debt as an important aspect of financial 
stability, as envisioned in the regulatory capital frameworks. These regulatory actions have, 
however, attracted a lot of resistance from the market with views that sub-debt is deficient 
as a form of regulatory capital, hence the capital frameworks that continue to recognize it 
are flawed and ineffective in controlling bank behavior and risk.  
In this study, we show that the purported regulatory inefficacy of sub-debt as a regulatory 
element is brought about by incentives within the priority structure of bank capital that drive 
bank shareholders to place greater value on the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation 
opportunities related to the use of senior debt. We carry out numerous tests to show that the 
announcement of senior debt is more valuable to shareholders even on occasions where the 
regulatory benefit of sub-debt would be superior. In particular, our event-study analyses 
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reveals that shareholders of less-capitalized or risky banks derive more wealth from senior 
debt that does little to attenuate the capital or risk concerns of a bank instead of a regulatory 
capital element. We also notice that senior debt offers create significant share value for banks 
that are risky and large. Based on these risk-shifting motives, our analysis of the post-issuance 
risk indicates that senior debt issuers become riskier than sub-debt issuers in the post-
issuance period, especially when they went ahead with the issuance in spite of their risky pre-
issuance status.  
Overall, our findings are in line with arguments that shareholders consider the use of 
senior debt as an opportunity to advance their interests of expropriating and shifting risk to 
junior debt holders. Effectively, these incentives limit the regulatory role of sub-debt in bank 
capital and distort well-intended regulatory efforts that continue to recognize the instrument 
as a capital element. In this regard, the perceived regulatory deficiencies of sub-debt, and the 
frameworks that recognize it, owes little to its form and design but are traceable to the agency 
costs arising from the priority structure of elements in the wider capital structure of a bank. 
Our analysis, therefore, add to the broader debates on the efficiency (or otherwise) of 
regulatory capital frameworks and underscores the need to account for the general conflicts 
on interests in the wider capital structure, which dilute the efficacy of these frameworks. 
136 
Tables and Figures - Chapter 4 
Table 4-1: Distribution of Senior and Sub-Debt Offers from 1983 to 2015 
This table summarizes our sample of banks that have announced senior and sub-debt on an annual basis, the relative 





























1983 3 3 1.0 3 1.0 140.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1984 7 7 1.0 8 1.1 183.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1985 6 6 1.0 6 1.0 150.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1986 3 3 1.0 3 1.0 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1987 12 10 0.8 16 1.3 313.6 2 0.2 2 0.2 62.5 
1988 5 5 1.0 7 1.4 243.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
1989 13 11 0.8 16 1.2 171.9 3 0.2 6 0.5 129.2 
1990 10 6 0.6 16 1.6 113.6 4 0.4 6 0.6 119.2 
1991 13 11 0.8 20 1.5 146.3 2 0.2 2 0.2 275.0 
1992 14 13 0.9 24 1.7 173.7 1 0.1 1 0.1 150.0 
1993 19 15 0.8 31 1.6 171.8 4 0.2 5 0.3 105.0 
1994 11 8 0.7 10 0.9 146.3 3 0.3 11 1.0 62.2 
1995 12 8 0.7 11 0.9 135.2 4 0.3 28 2.3 74.3 
1996 12 8 0.7 9 0.8 257.8 4 0.3 30 2.5 64.9 
1997 10 6 0.6 10 1.0 192.3 4 0.4 10 1.0 73.0 
1998 13 9 0.7 9 0.7 299.2 4 0.3 5 0.4 170.0 
1999 8 4 0.5 4 0.5 256.3 4 0.5 37 4.6 290.8 
2000 10 3 0.3 3 0.3 283.3 8 0.8 40 4.0 181.5 
2001 8 5 0.6 6 0.8 1091.7 5 0.6 40 5.0 163.4 
2002 5 5 1.0 5 1.0 641.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
2003 13 10 0.8 13 1.0 312.1 3 0.2 10 0.8 265.0 
2004 6 3 0.5 4 0.7 193.8 3 0.5 22 3.7 950.4 
2005 8 6 0.8 9 1.1 1062.6 4 0.5 18 2.3 785.4 
2006 7 4 0.6 11 1.6 772.9 3 0.4 28 4.0 971.3 
2007 9 9 1.0 9 1.0 242.8 1 0.1 8 0.9 1263.8 
2008 3 2 0.7 2 0.7 105.0 1 0.3 2 0.7 12.6 
2009 4 2 0.5 2 0.5 16.1 2 0.5 17 4.3 345.9 
2010 4 1 0.3 1 0.3 37.5 3 0.8 16 4.0 809.7 
2011 3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 3 1.0 11 3.7 628.0 
2012 5 1 0.2 1 0.2 75.0 4 0.8 8 1.6 1262.5 
2013 7 7 1.0 9 1.3 914.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
2014 17 17 1.0 19 1.1 561.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
2015 12 12 1.0 13 1.1 251.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
Total 292 220 0.8 310 1.1 - 79 0.3 363 1.2 - 
Average Amount Raised ($mil) 308.8     398.2 
Total Amount Raised ($mil) 95 713.9     144 561.2 
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Table 4-2: Analysis of Banks that Announced Senior or Sub-Debt 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for senior and sub-debt offers and the associated mean difference. 
Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Bank-Size 
is the logarithm of total assets; Amount is the Dollar amount raised; Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s 
Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total 
assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall, the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-
Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 
(inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size and Maturity are in logarithmic terms while Amount is in millions of Dollars, 
otherwise all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The notations ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables 
Sub-Debt  Senior Debt  Mean Difference 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. Sub-Debt vs Senior Debt 
Tail Risk 310 0.031 0.027 0.016 363 0.041 0.033 0.031 -0.011*** 
Buffer 310 0.036 0.036 0.023 363 0.044 0.038 0.018 -0.008*** 
Bank-Size 310 10.25 10.38 1.478 363 11.25 11.73 0.930 -0.999*** 
Amount 310 308.8 150.0 509.7 363 398.2 100.0 623.1 -89.49** 
Debt Quality 310 0.742 1.000 0.438 363 0.934 1.000 0.249 -0.192*** 
Maturity 310 3.047 2.319 1.581 363 1.306 1.115 0.855 1.740*** 
Tobin’s Q 310 1.373 1.213 0.633 363 2.050 1.982 0.876 -0.678*** 
Equity Ratio 310 0.073 0.074 0.017 363 0.072 0.071 0.018 0.001 
Free-Cash Flow 308 0.003 0.003 0.003 363 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.001*** 
Tax 310 0.300 0.307 0.075 363 0.329 0.329 0.056 -0.028*** 
Recession 310 0.071 0.000 0.257 363 0.124 0.000 0.330 -0.053** 
MES 310 0.013 0.012 0.013 363 0.026 0.017 0.021 -0.012*** 
Crisis 310 0.352 0.000 0.478 363 0.099 0.000 0.299 0.252*** 
Dodd-Frank 310 0.135 0.000 0.343 363 0.072 0.000 0.258 0.064*** 
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Table 4-3: Abnormal Stock Returns for Senior and Sub-Debt Offers 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers for the 
event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The mean and median coefficients are estimated 
with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market Model 3-Factor Model 
Sub-Debt  Senior Debt Diff (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt  Senior Debt Diff (4 vs 5) 
        
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.16 0.50*** -0.65*** -0.09 0.35*** -0.44*** 
 Median -0.15 0.65*** -0.80*** -0.10 0.38*** -0.48*** 
        
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.28* 0.44** -0.72*** -0.14 0.31** -0.45** 
 Median -0.15 0.42*** -0.57*** -0.11 0.16 -0.27* 
        
Observations  310 363  310 363  
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Table 4-4: Abnormal Stock Returns by Bank Capitalization (Less-Capitalized vs Well-Capitalized) 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of Less- 
and Well-Capitalized banks over for the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The sample period runs from 1983 to 2015. 
Banks are Less-Capitalized if their buffer falls below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are 
classified as being Well-Capitalized, where buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum 
required. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Less-Capitalized Banks Diff Well-Capitalized Banks  Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4 vs 5) (1 vs 4) (2 vs 5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.15 0.91*** -1.06*** -0.16 0.24 -0.40 0.01 0.68** 
 Median -0.25 1.26*** -1.51*** -0.06 0.31* -0.37 -0.19 0.95*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.31 0.41 -0.72* -0.22 0.46** -0.68** -0.09 -0.05 
 Median -0.26 0.53** -0.89*** -0.12 0.33** -0.35* -0.14 0.20 
          
Observations  192 140  118 223    
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Table 4-5: Abnormal Stock Returns by Bank Capitalization (Capital-Constrained Vs Unconstrained) 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of 
Capital-Constrained and Unconstrained banks over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The sample period runs from 
1983 to 2015. Banks are Capital-Constrained if their buffer falls below the 25th percentile of the sample distribution 
and they are classified as being Unconstrained if their buffer is at or above the 75th percentile of the sample 
distribution, where buffer is the actual capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required. The mean and median 
coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Capital-Constrained  Banks Diff Unconstrained  Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4 vs 5) (1 vs 4) (2 vs 5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.15 1.84*** -1.99*** -0.21 -0.55*** 0.33 0.06 2.38*** 
 Median -0.25 1.26* -1.51*** -0.11 -0.18 0.07 -0.14 1.44*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.42 1.30*** -1.72** -0.37 -0.23 -0.14 -0.05 1.53*** 
 Median -0.34 1.42** -1.76*** -0.15 -0.16 0.01 -0.19 1.58*** 
          
Observations  133 33  68 101    
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Table 4-6: Abnormal Stock Returns by Bank Risk 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of Less-
Risky and Risky banks over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The sample period runs from 1983 to 2015. Banks 
are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are classified as 
being Risky, where Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the 
quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard 
errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) (1vs4) (2vs5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.18 0.98*** -1.16*** -0.14 -0.20 0.06 -0.04 1.18*** 
 Median -0.17 1.22*** -1.39*** -0.15 0.15 -0.30 -0.02 1.07*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.45 1.32*** -1.77*** -0.16 -0.83*** 0.67** -0.29 2.14*** 
 Median -0.26 0.63*** -0.89*** -0.08 0.09 -0.17 -0.18 0.54*** 
          
Observations  125 215  185 148    
  
142 
Table 4-7: Abnormal Stock Returns by Bank Size 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of Small 
and Large banks over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The sample period runs from 1983 to 2015. Banks are 
Small if the logarithm of their assets falls below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they are classified 
as being Large. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Large Banks Diff Small Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) (1vs4) (2vs5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.28 0.78*** -1.06*** -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.18 0.79*** 
 Median -0.10 1.04*** -1.14*** -0.17 0.20 -0.37 0.06 0.84*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.52** 0.46* -0.98** -0.15 0.41* -0.56* -0.37 0.05 
 Median -0.08 0.51*** -0.59*** -0.26 0.30** -0.56* 0.16 0.21 
          
Observations  107 232  203 131    
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Table 4-8: Abnormal Stock Returns of Large Banks by Risk Levels 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of Large 
banks across risk levels. The CARs are estimated calculated over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] for the sample 
period 1983 to 2015. Banks are Large if the logarithm of their assets is at or above the median of the sample 
distribution. Less-Risky banks are those with Tail Risk below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they 
are classified as being Risky, where Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th 
percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with 
robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) (1vs4) (2vs5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.28 1.59*** -1.87*** -0.28 -0.67* 0.39 0.00 2.26*** 
 Median -0.10 1.67*** -1.77*** -0.15 -0.75* 0.60 0.05 2.42*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.56 1.99*** -2.54*** -0.50* -2.28*** 1.78*** -0.06 4.27*** 
 Median 0.05 1.29*** -1.24*** -0.17 -1.22** 1.05*** 0.22 2.53*** 
          
Observations  37 149  70 83    
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Table 4-9: Abnormal Stock Returns of Less-Capitalized Banks by Risk Levels 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, for senior and sub-debt offers of Less-
Capitalized banks across risk levels. The CARs are calculated over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] for the sample 
period 1983 to 2015. Banks are Less-Capitalized if their buffer falls below the median of the sample distribution, 
where buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required. Less-Risky banks are those 
with Tail Risk below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they are classified as being Risky, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the 
notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) (1vs4) (2vs5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.25 1.91*** -2.16*** -0.07 -0.50 0.43 -0.18 2.41*** 
 Median -0.19 1.96*** -2.15*** -0.40* -0.50 0.10 0.21 2.46*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.48 2.37*** -2.85*** -0.17 -2.36*** 2.19*** -0.31 4.73*** 
 Median -0.21 1.71*** -1.92** -0.30 -0.61 0.31*** 0.09 2.32*** 
          
Observations  88 82  104 58    
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Table 4-10: Relationship between Abnormal Stock Returns and Tail Risk 
This table reports the relationship between abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk for senior and sub-debt 
announcements over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated using a linear regression model with 
the cumulative abnormal returns over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] as the dependent variable. Tail Risk is the 
average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock 
returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Bank-Size is the logarithm 
of total assets while Issue-Size is the logarithm of the amount raised; Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s 
Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total 
assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall, the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-
Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 
(inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size, Issue-Size and Maturity are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous 
covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity, 
while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return [-1,0] Cumulative Abnormal Return [-1,1] 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(4 vs 5) 
       
Tail Risk -0.072 0.438** -0.510** -0.359 0.996*** -1.355*** 
 (0.171) (0.186)  (0.224) (0.251)  
Buffer -0.080 -0.318*** 0.238* -0.023 -0.096 0.073 
 (0.094) (0.089)  (0.106) (0.137)  
Bank-Size -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.003* 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  
Issue-Size -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  
Debt Quality 0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.004 0.034* -0.029 
 (0.005) (0.013)  (0.005) (0.018)  
Maturity -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  
Tobin’s Q 0.008*** -0.010*** 0.019*** 0.011*** -0.019*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004)  
Equity Ratio  -0.124 0.025 -0.149 -0.257** 0.102 -0.359* 
 (0.097) (0.118)  (0.116) (0.153)  
Free-Cash Flow -0.219 2.736*** -2.955*** -0.579 2.262** -2.841** 
 (0.626) (0.674)  (0.889) (0.921)  
Tax 0.030 -0.066 0.096** 0.051* -0.048 0.099 
 (0.022) (0.042)  (0.030) (0.056)  
Recession 0.001 0.008 -0.007 0.004 0.011 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.008)  
MES 0.250 -0.106 0.356 0.096 -0.868*** 0.964*** 
 (0.168) (0.154)  (0.213) (0.237)  
Crisis 0.002 -0.019** 0.021** 0.011** -0.031*** 0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.011)  
Dodd-Frank 0.010** -0.010 0.021** 0.010* -0.031*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.011)  
Constant 0.004 -0.010  0.018 -0.012  
 (0.018) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.035)  
       
Observations 308 363  308 363  
R-squared 0.081 0.164  0.099 0.193  
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Table 4-11: Relationship between Abnormal Stock Returns and Tail Risk - Based on Bank Size 
This table reports the relationship between abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk for senior and sub-debt 
announcements of Large and Small banks over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated using a 
linear regression model with the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [-1,0] as the dependent variable. 
Banks are Small if the logarithm of their assets fall below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they are 
defined as being Large. Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of 
the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the 
minimum required; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total assets while Issue-Size is the logarithm of the amount raised; 
Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods 
as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected 
shortfall, the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as 
identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 (inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size, Issue-Size and 
Maturity are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The 
standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
Regression 
Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Large Banks Small Banks Large Vs Small Banks 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(4vs5) Diff(1vs4) Diff(2vs5) 
         
Tail Risk 0.054 1.634*** -1.581*** -0.129 0.047 -0.176 0.183 1.587*** 
 (0.222) (0.210)   (0.207) (0.224)       
Buffer -0.099 -0.265* -1.580 -0.073 -0.322*** 0.249* -0.026 0.057 
 (0.176) (0.151)  (0.108) (0.109)    
Bank-Size 0.016* 0.033*** 0.166 -0.001 0.005** -0.006* 0.017* 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.002)    
Issue-Size -0.001 0.004*** -0.017** -0.001 0.004* -0.005 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)    
Debt Quality 0.028*** 0.023*** -0.005 0.001 -0.014* 0.015* 0.027*** 0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007)    
Maturity 0.003* -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.004** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)    
Tobin’s Q 0.014*** -0.010** 0.004*** 0.008** 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005)    
Equity Ratio  0.077 0.026 0.024 -0.129 -0.048 -0.081 0.206 0.074 
 (0.134) (0.140)  (0.139) (0.149)    
Free-Cash Flow 0.242 1.612*** 0.051 -1.785* 0.560 -2.345* 2.027* 1.052 
 (0.746) (0.514)  (0.975) (0.984)    
Tax -0.083** -0.271*** -1.370*** 0.063** -0.003 0.066 -0.146*** -0.268*** 
 (0.036) (0.057)  (0.027) (0.045)    
Recession 0.019*** 0.019** 0.188 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 0.023** 0.017 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.011)    
MES 0.067 -0.942*** 0.000*** 0.329 -0.232 0.561** -0.262 -0.710** 
 (0.253) (0.264)  (0.217) (0.185)    
Crisis -0.003 -0.036** 1.009* 0.001 -0.011* 0.012 -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.007) (0.017)  (0.005) (0.006)    
Dodd-Frank 0.008 -0.072*** 0.033*** 0.005 0.020 -0.015 0.003 -0.092*** 
 (0.008) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.015)    
Constant -0.215* -0.346*** 0.080 0.001 -0.044    
 (0.108) (0.112)  (0.024) (0.032)    
         
Observations 107 232  201 131    
R-squared 0.388 0.540  0.100 0.358    
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Table 4-12: Relationship between Abnormal Stock Returns and Tail Risk - Based on Bank 
Capitalization 
This table reports the relationship between abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk for senior and sub-debt 
announcements of Less- and Well-Capitalized banks over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated 
using a linear regression model with the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [-1,0] as the dependent 
variable. Banks are Less-Capitalized if their buffer falls below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they 
are defined as being Well-Capitalized. Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th 
percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio 
less the minimum required; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total assets while Issue-Size is the logarithm of the amount 
raised; Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods 
as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected 
shortfall, the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as 
identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 (inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size, Issue-Size and 
Maturity are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The 
standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Regression 
Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Less-Capitalized Banks  Well-Capitalized Banks  Less- Vs Well-Capitalized 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(4vs5) Diff(1vs4) Diff(2vs5) 
         
Tail Risk -0.130 1.642*** -1.772*** -0.113 0.427 -0.540 -0.017 1.215*** 
 (0.202) (0.274)  (0.259) (0.325)    
Buffer -0.146 -0.331 0.185 0.066 -0.374 0.440* -0.212 0.043 
 (0.170) (0.652)  (0.101) (0.233)    
Bank-Size 0.001 0.022*** -0.021*** -0.005** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.006** 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003)    
Issue-Size -0.003 0.009*** -0.012*** 0.002 -0.005** 0.007** -0.005 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)    
Debt Quality 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.015 -0.004 -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.006) (0.015)  (0.007) (0.021)    
Maturity -0.000 -0.004* 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.007* 0.003 -0.008** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)    
Tobin’s Q 0.008* -0.005 0.013** 0.009** -0.021*** 0.030*** -0.001 0.016* 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.008)    
Equity Ratio  -0.020 0.064 -0.084 -0.276* 0.093 -0.369* 0.256 -0.029 
 (0.134) (0.288)  (0.145) (0.155)    
Free-Cash Flow 0.334 -5.779*** 6.113*** -1.656 4.476*** -6.132*** 1.990 -10.255*** 
 (0.701) (1.286)  (1.940) (1.388)    
Tax 0.039 -0.290*** 0.329*** 0.029 0.010 0.019 0.010 -0.300*** 
 (0.027) (0.060)  (0.038) (0.044)    
Recession 0.002 -0.043*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.008)    
MES 0.153 -0.418 0.571 0.407* -0.440 0.847** -0.254 0.022 
 (0.235) (0.362)  (0.241) (0.312)    
Crisis -0.002 -0.012 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.005 -0.013 -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.018)    
Dodd-Frank -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.014*** -0.010 0.024** -0.016* 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.009)    
Constant -0.009 -0.186**  0.037 -0.094**    
 (0.022) (0.077)  (0.034) (0.046)    
         
Observations 190 140  118 223    
R-squared 0.089 0.649  0.186 0.305    
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Table 4-13: Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
This table presents the adjusted median Tail Risk, in percent, of senior and sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 
years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is 
calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to issuance of sub-debt from 
the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, the adjusted median Tail Risk 
for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers. Tail Risk is measured as the average 
equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns. 
The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Post Issuance Period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
















           
1st Quarter Mean -0.26 0.63*** -0.89*** -0.20 0.61*** -0.81*** -0.04 0.62*** -0.66** 
 Median -0.25 0.25** -0.50*** -0.28 0.27** -0.55*** -0.15 0.24 -0.39** 
 N 102 177  83 166  51 105  
           
2nd Quarter Mean 0.00 0.54*** -0.54** -0.11 0.51*** -0.62*** -0.04 0.50*** -0.54** 
 Median -0.08 0.15 -0.23** -0.26 0.16 -0.42** -0.07 0.22 -0.29** 
 N 102 180  83 168  51 107  
           
3rd Quarter Mean -0.10 0.53*** -0.63*** -0.36** 0.50*** -0.86*** -0.29* 0.47*** -0.76*** 
 Median -0.14 0.13 -0.27*** -0.30* 0.09 -0.39*** -0.25 0.13 -0.38*** 
 N 102 181  83 169  51 107  
           
1st Year Mean -0.10 0.59*** -0.69*** -0.37** 0.54*** -0.91*** -0.30* 0.57*** -0.87*** 
 Median -0.10 0.12 -0.22*** -0.28* 0.08 -0.36*** -0.25 0.14 -0.39*** 
 N 102 181  83 169  51 107  
           
2nd Year Mean 0.01 1.02*** -1.01** -0.09 0.87*** -0.96** 0.09 0.73*** -0.64 
 Median -0.25 0.22 -0.47*** -0.22 0.12 -0.34** -0.28 0.35** -0.63* 
 N 97 153  79 145  47 89  
           
Over 2 Years Mean -0.14 0.45*** -0.59** -0.21* 0.39*** -0.60*** -0.23* 0.24** -0.47*** 
 Median -0.11 0.15* -0.26*** -0.19 0.21*** -0.40*** -0.30** 0.21** -0.51*** 
 N 102 181  82 166  50 104  
  
149 
Table 4-14: Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers by Bank Risk 
This table presents the adjusted median Tail Risk, in percent, of Risky and Less-Risky senior and sub-debt issuers for 
the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance. The sample period runs from 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail Risk of 
sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to issuance 
of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, the adjusted 
median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers. Tail Risk is measured 
as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily 
stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they 
are defined as being Risky. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the 
notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Post Issuance Period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt  Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt  Senior Debt  (4vs5) (1vs4) (2vs5) 
          
1st Quarter Mean -0.55 1.07*** -1.62*** 0.00 0.15 -0.15 -0.55 0.92*** 
 Median -0.53 0.54*** -1.07*** 0.00 -0.09 0.09 -0.53** 0.63*** 
 N 47 92  55 85    
          
2nd Quarter Mean -0.12 0.93*** -1.05** 0.10 0.13 -0.03 -0.22 0.80*** 
 Median -0.19 0.66*** -0.85*** -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.68*** 
 N 47 93  55 87    
          
3rd Quarter Mean -0.25 0.91*** -1.16** 0.03 0.12 -0.09 -0.28 0.79*** 
 Median -0.23 0.50** -0.73*** -0.07 -0.09 0.02 -0.16 0.59*** 
 N 47 93  55 88    
          
1st Year Mean -0.29 0.94*** -1.23*** 0.07 0.21* -0.14 -0.36 0.73** 
 Median -0.12 0.64*** -0.76*** -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.68** 
 N 47 93  55 88    
          
2nd Year Mean -0.60 1.00** -1.60* 0.55** 1.04*** -0.49 -1.15** -0.04 
 Median -0.59** -0.03 -0.56*** 0.49* 0.46** 0.03 -1.08*** -0.49 
 N 45 74  52 79    
          
Over 2 Years  Mean -0.14 0.84*** -0.98* -0.14 0.03 -0.17 0.00 0.81*** 
 Median 0.15 0.41*** -0.26* -0.27** 0.01 -0.28** 0.42 0.40*** 
 N 47 93  55 88    
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Table 4-15: Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-
Debt Issuers 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of senior and sub-debt 
issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail Risk 
of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to issuance 
of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, the adjusted 
median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where Tail Risk is 
measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the 
logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans 
to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the 
market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1st Quarter Diff 2nd Quarter Diff 3rd Quarter Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (7vs8) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.668*** 0.289 0.379 0.819*** 0.274 0.545 0.784*** 0.361 0.423 
 (0.235) (0.384)  (0.165) (0.354)  (0.185) (0.394)  
Bank-Size 0.002 -0.002 0.004* 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  
ROA -0.863 -0.660 -0.203 -4.510*** -0.449 -4.061** -5.447* -0.546 -4.901 
 (0.628) (0.988)  (1.401) (0.889)  (3.168) (0.932)  
Loans-Assets -0.012 -0.028** 0.015 -0.002 -0.027** 0.025* 0.009 -0.028** 0.037** 
 (0.010) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.014)  
Buffer -0.002 -0.178* 0.176 -0.058 -0.188** 0.130 -0.020 -0.159* 0.139 
 (0.065) (0.104)  (0.058) (0.088)  (0.074) (0.095)  
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.004* -0.001 0.008*** 0.004* 0.004 0.008* 0.005** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio 0.066 0.058 0.008 0.195* 0.103 0.092 0.172 0.083 0.089 
 (0.126) (0.098)  (0.110) (0.104)  (0.177) (0.121)  
Credit Quality -0.001 -0.008 0.007 0.004 -0.010 0.014 0.003 -0.010 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.009)  (0.004) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.009)  
Recession 0.014 0.001 0.013 0.002 -0.006 0.008 -0.005 -0.012** 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  
MES -0.014 0.045 -0.059 -0.106 0.035 -0.141 -0.087 0.023 -0.110 
 (0.144) (0.149)  (0.117) (0.118)  (0.131) (0.100)  
Constant -0.017 0.051*** -0.069** -0.018 0.042*** -0.060** -0.028 0.037** -0.066** 
 (0.023) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.016)  (0.031) (0.016)  
          
Observations 101 173  101 176  101 177  
R-squared 0.264 0.087  0.514 0.097  0.470 0.102  
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Table 4-15 (Continued): Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of 
Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of senior and sub-debt 
issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail Risk 
of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to issuance 
of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, the adjusted 
median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where Tail Risk is 
measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of its daily stock returns. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the 
logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans 
to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the 
market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1st Year Diff 2nd Year Diff Over 2 Years Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (10vs11) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (13vs14) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (16vs17) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.817*** 0.428 0.389 0.986*** 0.338 0.648 1.049*** 0.784** 0.265 
 (0.138) (0.437)  (0.166) (0.475)  (0.299) (0.326)  
Bank-Size 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  
ROA -4.577 -0.830 -3.747 -5.950 0.884 -6.834* -5.413 -0.795 -4.618 
 (2.864) (0.930)  (3.929) (0.979)  (3.324) (0.723)  
Loans-Assets 0.004 -0.039** 0.043** 0.005 -0.038 0.042 0.015 -0.002 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.017)  (0.016) (0.025)  (0.013) (0.010)  
Buffer -0.051 -0.174 0.123 -0.051 -0.129 0.078 0.037 -0.062 0.099 
 (0.075) (0.107)  (0.103) (0.126)  (0.071) (0.075)  
Tobin’s Q 0.009** 0.005** 0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.012* 0.012** 0.001 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio 0.128 0.101 0.027 0.085 0.041 0.044 0.172 0.077 0.095 
 (0.164) (0.113)  (0.209) (0.169)  (0.188) (0.072)  
Credit Quality 0.004 -0.012 0.016 0.012* -0.015 0.028* 0.010** -0.017** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.014)  (0.005) (0.008)  
Recession -0.003 -0.014** 0.010 -0.008 -0.010* 0.001 -0.015 -0.008** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.004)  
MES -0.065 0.026 -0.091 -0.301** -0.231 -0.070 -0.060 -0.156 0.096 
 (0.119) (0.118)  (0.133) (0.155)  (0.090) (0.106)  
Constant -0.016 0.042** -0.058* -0.004 0.039* -0.043 -0.038 0.013 -0.052 
 (0.028) (0.017)  (0.038) (0.022)  (0.035) (0.012)  
          
Observations 101 177  96 149  101 177  
R-squared 0.471 0.123  0.420 0.088  0.474 0.243  
  
152 
Table 4-16: Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-
Debt Issuers of Risky Banks 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky senior and sub-
debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail 
Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to 
the issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, 
the adjusted median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where 
Tail Risk is measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. Banks are defined as being Risky if their Tail Risk is at or above the median of 
the sample distribution. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the logarithm 
of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the market value 
of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Credit Quality is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Recession is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 
0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 
5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic terms while all other 
continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










          
Pre-Risk 0.790*** -0.121 0.911* 0.957*** -0.035 0.992** 0.883*** 0.148 0.735 
 (0.188) (0.492)  (0.108) (0.487)  (0.110) (0.587)  
Bank-Size 0.004 -0.003 0.007* 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.005* -0.003 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  
ROA -2.176** -0.738 -1.438 -6.806*** -0.595 -6.211*** -8.887** -0.835 -8.052** 
 (0.813) (1.084)  (0.988) (0.977)  (3.404) (1.031)  
Loans-Assets -0.074 -0.057* -0.017 -0.041 -0.058** 0.017 -0.001 -0.065** 0.064* 
 (0.054) (0.031)  (0.026) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.030)  
Buffer -0.079 -0.256 0.177 -0.154* -0.295 0.141 -0.062 -0.347* 0.285 
 (0.154) (0.191)  (0.090) (0.178)  (0.073) (0.206)  
Tobin’s Q 0.009** 0.005 0.004 0.015*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.007** 0.012* 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.003)  
Equity Ratio 0.117 0.141 -0.024 0.283** 0.204 0.079 0.330 0.216 0.114 
 (0.215) (0.124)  (0.128) (0.140)  (0.218) (0.167)  
Credit Quality 0.003 -0.010 0.013 0.007 -0.014 0.021 0.003 -0.016 0.019 
 (0.005) (0.015)  (0.005) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.015)  
Recession 0.038*** -0.000 0.038*** 0.019*** -0.007 0.026*** 0.004 -0.012* 0.016* 
 (0.009) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006)  
MES -0.192 -0.082 -0.110 -0.293 -0.070 -0.223 -0.306 -0.073 -0.233 
 (0.402) (0.223)  (0.235) (0.177)  (0.198) (0.152)  
Constant -0.008 0.077* -0.085* -0.021 0.067* -0.089** -0.066 0.077* -0.143*** 
 (0.036) (0.043)  (0.028) (0.037)  (0.043) (0.039)  
          
Observations 46 88  46 89  46 89  




Table 4-16 (Continued): Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of 
Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers of Risky Banks 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky senior and sub-
debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median Tail 
Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to 
the issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, 
the adjusted median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where 
Tail Risk is measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. Banks are defined as being Risky if their Tail Risk is at or above the median of 
the sample distribution. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the logarithm 
of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the market value 
of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Credit Quality is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Recession is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 
0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 
5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic terms while all other 
continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1st Year Diff 2nd Year Diff Over 2 Years Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior 
Debt 
(10vs11) Sub-Debt Senior 
Debt 
(13vs14) Sub-Debt Senior 
Debt 
(16vs17) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.920*** 0.412 0.508 1.053*** 0.820 0.233 1.110*** 0.994** 0.116 
 (0.097) (0.640)  (0.145) (0.630)  (0.255) (0.497)  
Bank-Size 0.003 -0.004 0.007** 0.003 -0.005* 0.008** 0.006* -0.001 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002)  
ROA -7.787** -1.144 -6.643** -9.925** 0.202 -10.13** -8.052** -0.517 -7.535** 
 (3.098) (0.983)  (4.520) (0.767)  (3.616) (0.846)  
Loans-Assets -0.007 -0.095** 0.088** 0.001 -0.065 0.066 0.015 -0.015 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.038)  (0.027) (0.041)  (0.031) (0.025)  
Buffer -0.077 -0.499** 0.422* -0.029 -0.616** 0.587** 0.097 -0.216 0.313* 
 (0.080) (0.234)  (0.085) (0.249)  (0.084) (0.177)  
Tobin’s Q 0.019*** 0.009** 0.010* 0.020** 0.005 0.015* 0.018** 0.002 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.003)  
Equity Ratio 0.270 0.270* 0.000 0.331 0.241* 0.090 0.291 0.059 0.232 
 (0.203) (0.156)  (0.257) (0.139)  (0.274) (0.115)  
Credit Quality 0.004 -0.019 0.023 0.009 -0.032 0.041* 0.005 -0.023* 0.028* 
 (0.007) (0.017)  (0.008) (0.023)  (0.008) (0.014)  
Recession 0.007 -0.013* 0.020** 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.033*** -0.007 -0.026*** 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.011) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.005)  
MES -0.260 -0.042 -0.218 -0.335 -0.040 -0.295 0.200 -0.213 0.413 
 (0.180) (0.167)  (0.257) (0.245)  (0.265) (0.158)  
Constant -0.047 0.105** -0.152*** -0.058 0.119** -0.177*** -0.102* 0.051 -0.153*** 
 (0.040) (0.043)  (0.052) (0.048)  (0.054) (0.035)  
          
Observations 46 89  44 70  46 89  




Figure 4-1: Average Proceeds from Senior and Sub-Debt Offers  




























































































































Additional Tables - Chapter 4 
Table A.4-1: Description of the Sample - Short Term Analysis 
This table describes the sampling criteria for the short-term analysis of sub-debt and senior debt announcements 
over the sample period 1983 to 2015. 
Sampling Criteria 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt 
Issues Issuers Issues Issuers 
Senior debt issues by banks N/A N/A 33386 2274 
Sub-debt issues by all financial institutions 4604 1725 N/A N/A 
Retain straight senior debt i.e. non-hybrid issues, exclude; swaps, deposits, bank notes, 
commercial paper, mortgage bonds, loans or leases etc.38 
N/A N/A 6151 686 
Retain issues by banks in Compustat-Capital IQ 773 231 2347 163 
Retain issues with file (announcement) dates 591 181 1178 64 
Retain issues with accounting data 545 151 1100 56 
Drop contemporaneous announcements within the maximum event window [-1,1] 365 142 398 43 
Drop announcements coinciding with issuance within the [-1,1] event window 360 140 396 43 
Retain issues with stock information in CRSP 342 130 380 41 
Retain events with sufficient observations in the [-1,1] event window 337 127 380 41 
Retain events with sufficient observations in the estimation window [20,120] 310 116 363 40 
Final Sample 310 116 363 40 
  
                                               
38 More precisely, the screening retains; Adjustable Rate Bonds, Extendible Floating Rate Bonds, 
Bonds, Debentures, Debt, Debt Financing, Global Bonds, Fixed / Straight Bond, Fixed/Floating 
Rate Bonds, Senior Debt, Floating Rate Bonds, Floating Rate Debentures, Senior Bonds, Floating 
Rate Guaranteed Bonds, Floating Rate Senior Bonds, Floating Rate Unsecured Bonds, Guaranteed 
Bonds, Unsecured Bond, Guaranteed Global Bonds, Senior Debentures, Step-Up Bonds, Zero 
Coupon Bonds, Adjustable Rate Notes, Discount Notes, Capped Floating Rate Notes, 
Fixed/Floating Rate Medium Term Notes, Fixed/Floating Rate Notes, Floating Rate Guaranteed 
Medium Term Notes, Floating Rate Notes, Floating Rate Senior Notes, General Term Notes, Global 
Floating Rate Notes, Global Medium-Term Notes, Global Notes, Guaranteed Global Notes, 
Guaranteed Medium-Term Notes, Guaranteed Notes, Guaranteed Senior Notes, Guaranteed Senior 
Unsecured Notes, Medium-Term Notes, Medium-Term Floating Rate Notes, Medium-Term Senior 
Notes, Notes, Secured Notes, Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Senior Notes, Senior Medium 
Term Notes, Senior Secured Notes, Senior Unsecured Notes, Step-Down Floating Rate Notes, Step-
Up Callable Notes, Step-Up Notes, Step-Up Floating Rate Notes, Step-Up Medium Term Notes, 
Term Notes, Variable Rate Notes, Yield Curve Notes, Zero Coupon Notes, Zero Coupon Medium 
Term Notes, Amortizing Floating Rate Notes, Amortizing Notes, Auction Rate Notes, Extendible 




Table A.4-2: Description of the Sample - Long Term Analysis 
This table describes the sampling criteria for the long-term analysis of sub-debt and senior debt issuances over the 
sample period 1983 to 2015. 
Sampling Criteria 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt 
Issues Issuers Issues Issuers 
Senior debt issues by banks N/A N/A 33386 2274 
Sub-debt issues by all financial institutions 4604 1725 N/A N/A 
Retain straight Senior debt i.e. non-hybrid issues, exclude; swaps, deposits, bank notes, 
commercial paper, mortgage bonds, loans or leases etc. 
N/A N/A 6151 686 
Retain 1 same-security issue per quarter  3000 1725 2576 686 
Drop cross-security issues within a quarter 2682 1691 2250 669 
Retain Compustat-Bank issues  434 210 679 152 
Drop cross-security issues within 2 years 317 188 505 138 
Drop securities without data in the pre- and post-period analysis i.e. pre-1984 and post 
2013 
265 151 444 123 
Retain issues with accounting data 211 106 383 98 




Table A.4-3: Abnormal Stock Returns for Senior and Sub-Debt Offers - Longer Event Windows 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, of senior and sub-debt offers for the 
respective event window over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with 
robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) 
Market Model - Longer Event Windows 
Sub-Debt  Senior Debt Diff (1 vs 2) 
     
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.12 0.51*** -0.63*** 
 Median -0.13 0.67*** -0.80*** 
     
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.24 0.45** -0.69*** 
 Median -0.15 0.42*** -0.57*** 
     
CAR [-2, 2] Mean -0.40* 1.09*** -1.48*** 
 Median -0.10 0.52*** -0.62*** 
     
CAR [-3, 3] Mean -0.19 1.38*** -1.58*** 
 Median -0.10 0.62** -0.72*** 
     
Observations39  298 361  
  
                                               
39 For this test, the sample was screened for contemporaneous announcements within the 
maximum event window [-3,3], resulting in lower observations than in the main test. 
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Table A.4-4: Abnormal Stock Returns for Eligible Sub-Debt and Senior Debt Offers 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, of eligible sub-debt and senior debt for 
the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] over the sample period 1983 to 2015. Eligible sub-debt offers are those that meet 
the minimum criteria for inclusion as regulatory capital and/or the issuer is still within the regulatory Tier 2 quota. 
The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sub-Debt  Senior Debt Diff (1 vs 2) 
     
CAR [-1, 0] Mean 0.06 0.50*** -0.44** 
 Median 0.07 0.65*** -0.58** 
     
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.06 0.44** -0.50* 
 Median -0.05 0.42*** -0.97** 
     





Table A.4-5: Abnormal Stock Returns by Bank Capitalization - Only Eligible Sub-Debt Offers 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, of eligible sub-debt and senior debt 
offers for Less- and Well-Capitalized banks over for the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1]. The sample period runs 
from 1983 to 2015. Eligible sub-debt offers are those that meet the minimum criteria for inclusion as regulatory 
capital and/or the issuer is still within the regulatory Tier 2 quota. Banks are Less-Capitalized if their buffer falls 
below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are classified as being Well-Capitalized, where buffer is 
the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required. The mean and median coefficients are 
estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Less-Capitalized Banks Diff Well-Capitalized Banks  Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4 vs 5) (1 vs 4) (2 vs 5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean 0.08 0.91*** -0.83** 0.00 0.24 -0.24 0.08 0.68** 
 Median 0.07 1.26*** -1.19*** 0.36 0.31* 0.05 -0.29 0.95*** 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean 0.01 0.41 -0.40 -0.20 0.46** -0.66* 0.21 -0.05 
 Median -0.15 0.53** -0.68** 0.13 0.33** -0.20 -0.28 0.20 
          





Table A.4-6: Abnormal Stock Returns of Small Banks by Risk Levels 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, of senior and sub-debt offers of Small 
banks across risk levels. The CARs are calculated over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] for the sample period 1983 
to 2015. Banks are Small if the logarithm of their assets falls below the median of the sample distribution. Less-Risky 
banks are those with Tail Risk below the median of the sample distribution, otherwise they are classified as being 
Risky, where Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, 
while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4 vs 5) (1 vs 4) (2 vs 5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.14 -0.41 0.27 -0.05 0.40** -0.445 -0.09 -0.81* 
 Median -0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.16 0.22 -0.38* -0.01 -0.24 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.40 -0.20 -0.20 0.05 1.03*** -0.98** -0.45 -1.23*** 
 Median -0.34 -0.16 -0.14 0.16 0.80*** -0.64*** -0.50 -0.96*** 
          




Table A.4-7: Abnormal Stock Returns of Well-Capitalized Banks by Risk Levels 
This table presents the cumulative announcement returns (CAR), in percent, of senior and sub-debt offers of Well-
Capitalized banks across risk levels. The CARs are calculated over the event windows [-1,0] and [-1,1] for the sample 
period 1983 to 2015. Banks are Well-Capitalized if their buffer is at or above the median of the sample distribution, 
where buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required. Less-Risky banks are those 
with Tail Risk below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they are classified as being Risky, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors, while the 
notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Announcement Window 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risky Banks Diff Less-Risky Banks Diff Diff Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1 vs 2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4 vs 5) (1 vs 4) (2 vs 5) 
          
CAR [-1, 0] Mean -0.02 0.40 -0.42 -0.23 -0.01 -0.22 0.21 0.41 
 Median -0.17 0.82*** -0.99 0.09 0.20 -0.11 -0.26 0.62 
          
CAR [-1, 1] Mean -0.38 0.67** -1.04 -0.15 0.16 -0.31 -0.23 0.51 
 Median -0.32 0.24 -0.56 -0.76 0.47** -1.23 0.44 -0.23 
          




Table A.4-8: Relationship between Abnormal Stock Returns and Tail Risk - Based on Bank Size 
This table reports the relationship between abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk of senior and sub-debt 
announcements for Large and Small banks over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated using a 
linear regression model with the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [-1,1] as the dependent variable. 
Banks are Small if the logarithm of their assets fall below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they are 
classified as being Large. Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of 
the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the 
minimum required; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total assets while Issue-Size is the logarithm of the amount raised; 
Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods 
as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected 
shortfall, the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as 
identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 (inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size, Issue-Size and 
Maturity are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The 
standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Large Banks Small Banks Large Vs Small Banks 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt Diff(4vs5) Diff(1vs4) Diff(2vs5) 
         
Tail Risk -0.406 3.148*** -3.554*** -0.305 0.230 0.535 0.101 2.918*** 
 (0.316) (0.266)   (0.234) (0.379)       
Buffer -0.048 0.508*** -0.556** -0.063 -0.068 0.005 0.015 0.576*** 
 (0.250) (0.157)  (0.124) (0.159)    
Bank-Size 0.016 0.008 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.018 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.014)  (0.003) (0.004)    
Issue-Size -0.000 0.007*** -0.007** -0.001 0.007** -0.008** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003)    
Debt Quality 0.024** 0.033*** -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.023** 0.034** 
 (0.009) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.013)    
Maturity 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.003)    
Tobin’s Q 0.019*** -0.008* 0.027*** 0.008** 0.002 0.006 0.011 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.007)    
Equity Ratio  0.114 -0.043 0.157 -0.222 -0.353 0.131 0.336 0.310 
 (0.166) (0.165)  (0.156) (0.226)    
Free-Cash Flow -0.383 2.110** -2.493 -1.951* -0.882 -1.069 1.568 2.992** 
 (1.598) (0.876)  (1.116) (0.996)    
Tax -0.043 -0.362*** 0.319*** 0.076** 0.044 0.032 -0.119** -0.406*** 
 (0.050) (0.064)  (0.035) (0.076)    
Recession 0.022** 0.068*** -0.046*** -0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.022 0.078*** 
 (0.008) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.020)    
MES -0.013 -2.888*** 2.875*** 0.183 -0.499 0.682 -0.196 -2.389*** 
 (0.294) (0.359)  (0.222) (0.378)    
Crisis 0.001 -0.089*** 0.090*** 0.010* -0.008 0.018* -0.009 -0.081*** 
 (0.009) (0.019)  (0.006) (0.010)    
Dodd-Frank 0.006 -0.114*** 0.120*** 0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.002 -0.130*** 
 (0.012) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.017)    
Constant -0.220 -0.093  0.020 -0.005    
 (0.174) (0.162)  (0.025) (0.055)    
         
Observations 107 232  201 131    
R-squared 0.399 0.641  0.089 0.277    
163 
 
Table A.4-9: Relationship between Abnormal Stock Returns and Tail Risk - Based on Bank 
Capitalization 
This table reports the relationship between abnormal stock returns and Tail Risk of senior and sub-debt 
announcements for Less- and Well-Capitalized banks over the sample period 1983 to 2015. The results are estimated 
using a linear regression model with the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [-1,1] as the dependent 
variable. Banks are Less-Capitalized if their buffer falls below the median of the sample distribution otherwise they 
are classified as being Well-Capitalized. Tail Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th 
percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio 
less the minimum required; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total assets while Issue-Size is the logarithm of the amount 
raised; Debt Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for debt issues with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Maturity is the logarithm of years to maturity; Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity divided by its book value; 
Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Free-Cash Flow is the ratio of operating cash to total 
assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes to pre-tax earnings; Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods 
as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected 
shortfall, the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution 
of daily stock returns; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for periods falling within banking crisis periods as 
identified by Liu and Ngo (2014), or 0 otherwise; Dodd-Frank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods after 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 (inclusive), or 0 otherwise. Bank-Size, Issue-Size and 
Maturity are in logarithmic terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The 
standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Regression 
Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Less-Capitalized Banks  Well-Capitalized Banks  Less- Vs Well-Capitalized 
Sub-Debt Senior 
Debt 
Diff(1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior 
Debt 
Diff(4vs5) Diff(1vs4) Diff(2vs5) 
         
Tail Risk -0.390 2.608*** -2.998*** -0.515* 0.395 -0.910* 0.125 2.213*** 
 (0.279) (0.403)  (0.296) (0.458)    
Buffer -0.119 -1.034 0.915 0.079 -0.134 0.213 -0.198 -0.900 
 (0.193) (0.966)  (0.106) (0.350)    
Bank-Size -0.000 0.007 -0.007 -0.008*** 0.011*** -0.019*** 0.008** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.003)    
Issue-Size -0.003 0.012*** -0.015*** 0.006** -0.006* 0.012*** -0.009** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)    
Debt Quality 0.002 0.021 -0.019 0.015 0.020 -0.005 -0.013 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.018)  (0.009) (0.030)    
Maturity 0.000 -0.007** 0.007** -0.006** 0.003 -0.009** 0.006** -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)    
Tobin’s Q 0.016*** -0.015** 0.031*** 0.003 -0.017* 0.020* 0.013* 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.010)    
Equity Ratio  -0.206 0.562 -0.768 -0.364** -0.049 -0.315 0.158 0.611 
 (0.168) (0.466)  (0.146) (0.211)    
Free-Cash Flow -0.111 -3.708* 3.597* -3.516 2.741 -6.257** 3.405 -6.449*** 
 (0.898) (1.881)  (2.352) (1.800)    
Tax 0.061* -0.233** 0.294*** 0.022 -0.000 0.022 0.039 -0.233** 
 (0.036) (0.089)  (0.040) (0.061)    
Recession 0.009 -0.074*** 0.083*** 0.002 -0.011 0.013 0.007 -0.063*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.013)    
MES -0.214 -2.169*** 1.955*** 0.383 -0.512 0.895* -0.597 -1.657*** 
 (0.310) (0.404)  (0.260) (0.470)    
Crisis 0.009 -0.046* 0.055** 0.036 0.022 0.014 -0.027 -0.068** 
 (0.005) (0.027)  (0.022) (0.023)    
Dodd-Frank 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.004 -0.020* 0.024* 0.002 0.020* 
 (0.009) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.012)    
Constant -0.001 -0.053  0.091*** -0.072    
 (0.026) (0.113)  (0.032) (0.072)    
         
Observations 190 140  118 223    




Table A.4-10: Adjusted Post-issuance Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers 
This table presents the adjusted Tail Risk, in percent, of senior and sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-
issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting 
the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior to issuance of sub-debt from the Tail Risk of sub-debt 
issuers at the end of the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, the adjusted Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior 
year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers. Tail Risk is measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are 
in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of its daily stock returns. The mean and median coefficients 
are estimated with robust standard errors, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Post Issuance 
Period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
















           
Quarter 1 Mean -0.26 0.63*** -0.89*** -0.20 0.61*** -0.81*** -0.04 0.62*** -0.66** 
 Median -0.25 0.25** -0.50*** -0.28 0.27** -0.55*** -0.15 0.24 -0.39** 
 N 102 177  83 166  51 105  
           
Quarter 2 Mean 0.25 0.50*** -0.25 0.01 0.47*** -0.46 -0.03 0.44*** -0.47 
 Median -0.17 0.11 -0.28 -0.23 -0.05 -0.18* -0.17 0.06 -0.23* 
 N 101 173  82 163  50 103  
           
Quarter 3 Mean 0.01 0.84*** -0.83** -0.36** 0.87*** -1.23*** -0.28 0.68*** -0.96*** 
 Median -0.08 0.16 -0.24** -0.34* 0.16 -0.50*** -0.43** 0.21 -0.64*** 
 N 99 168  79 158  49 98  
           
Quarter 4 Mean 0.16 1.02*** -0.86** -0.17 0.92*** -1.09*** -0.20 1.16*** -1.36*** 
 Median -0.18 0.07 -0.25** -0.37* 0.05 -0.42** -0.30 0.15 -0.45*** 
 N 97 157  79 148  48 92  
           
Quarter 8 Mean 0.01 1.21*** -1.20*** 0.14 1.00*** -0.86* 0.28 1.08*** -0.80 
 Median -0.20 0.57*** -0.77*** -0.28 0.33* -0.61** -0.19 0.48** -0.67** 




Table A.4-11: Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior and Sub-
Debt Issuers of Less-Risky Banks 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of less-risky senior and 
sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median 
Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior 
to issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, 
the adjusted median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where 
Tail Risk is measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk is below the median of the sample 
distribution. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total 
assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans to total assets; 
Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the market value of 
equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Credit Quality is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Recession is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 
0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 
5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic terms while all other 
continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1st Quarter Diff 2nd Quarter Diff 3rd Quarter Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (1vs2) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (4vs5) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (7vs8) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.845*** 0.802*** 0.043 0.374 0.644*** -0.270 0.467 0.453*** 0.014 
 (0.239) (0.212)  (0.248) (0.152)  (0.281) (0.150)  
Bank-Size -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.002* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  
ROA -0.600 -0.494 -0.106 -0.735 -0.322 -0.413 0.504 0.322 0.182 
 (1.361) (0.636)  (1.412) (0.587)  (1.168) (0.720)  
Loans-Assets -0.001 0.009 -0.010 -0.001 0.012 -0.013 -0.002 0.014 -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.011)  
Buffer 0.081 -0.035 0.116 -0.040 -0.032 -0.008 -0.082 0.050 -0.132 
 (0.076) (0.086)  (0.073) (0.061)  (0.068) (0.062)  
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio -0.033 -0.285* 0.252 -0.029 -0.267** 0.238 -0.105 -0.347** 0.242 
 (0.112) (0.160)  (0.095) (0.127)  (0.099) (0.132)  
Credit Quality -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003)  
Recession -0.009** -0.006* -0.003 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.013*** -0.017*** 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  
MES 0.085 0.079 0.006 0.103 0.059 0.044 0.109 0.190* -0.081 
 (0.077) (0.099)  (0.076) (0.093)  (0.089) (0.100)  
Constant 0.009 0.036** -0.027 0.018 0.028** -0.010 0.025 0.029** -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.017)  (0.016) (0.013)  (0.018) (0.013)  
          
Observations 55 85  55 87  55 88  




Table A.4-11 (Continued): Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of 
Senior and Sub-Debt Issuers of Less-Risky Banks 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of less-risky senior and 
sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median 
Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior 
to issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods. Reciprocally, 
the adjusted median Tail Risk for senior debt subtracts the prior year median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers, where 
Tail Risk is measured as the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly 
distribution of its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk is below the median of the sample 
distribution. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size is the logarithm of total 
assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total loans to total assets; 
Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is the market value of 
equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; Credit Quality is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; Recession is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or 
0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market returns are in the lower 
5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic terms while all other 
continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1st Year Diff 2nd Year Diff Over 2 Years Diff 
Sub-Debt Senior Debt (10vs11) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (13vs14) Sub-Debt Senior Debt (16vs17) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.337 0.470** -0.133 0.294 1.100*** -0.806 0.398 0.462*** -0.064 
 (0.303) (0.198)  (0.639) (0.399)  (0.382) (0.170)  
Bank-Size -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.004** -0.006** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  
ROA 0.893 0.010 0.883 0.889 1.391 -0.502 0.686 -0.621 1.307 
 (1.242) (0.867)  (1.719) (2.321)  (1.005) (0.587)  
Loans-Assets 0.001 0.008 -0.007 0.008 -0.028 0.036 -0.011 0.002 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.048)  (0.009) (0.007)  
Buffer -0.111 0.089 -0.200** -0.246* 0.095 -0.341* -0.137* 0.040 -0.177** 
 (0.076) (0.068)  (0.135) (0.148)  (0.072) (0.051)  
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio -0.140 -0.301** 0.161 -0.306 0.014 -0.320 -0.102 0.049 -0.151 
 (0.106) (0.143)  (0.225) (0.460)  (0.104) (0.083)  
Credit Quality 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.012 -0.003 0.015* 0.008* -0.008** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004)  
Recession -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.000 -0.021*** -0.016** -0.005 -0.001 -0.004* 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.002)  
MES 0.120 0.201* -0.081 -0.130 -0.058 -0.072 -0.025 0.002 -0.027 
 (0.096) (0.118)  (0.144) (0.216)  (0.081) (0.069)  
Constant 0.023 0.024* -0.001 0.045 -0.010 0.055 0.043** 0.001 0.042** 
 (0.019) (0.013)  (0.040) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.010)  
          
Observations 55 88  52 79  55 88  




Table A.4-12: Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Sub-Debt 
Issuers by Risk Levels 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky and less-risky 
sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median 
Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior 
to issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution 
otherwise are defined as being Risky. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size 
is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total 
loans to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is 
the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1st Quarter Diff 2nd Quarter Diff 3rd Quarter Diff 
Risky Less-Risky (1vs2) Risky Less-Risky (4vs5) Risky Less-Risky (7vs8) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.790*** 0.845*** -0.055 0.957*** 0.374 0.583** 0.883*** 0.467 0.416 
 (0.188) (0.239)  (0.108) (0.248)  (0.110) (0.281)  
Bank-Size 0.004 -0.001 0.005* 0.003 -0.001 0.004* 0.005* -0.002 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  
ROA -2.176** -0.600 -1.576 -6.806*** -0.735 -6.071*** -8.887** 0.504 -9.391*** 
 (0.813) (1.361)  (0.988) (1.412)  (3.404) (1.168)  
Loans-Assets -0.074 -0.001 -0.073 -0.041 -0.001 -0.040 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.054) (0.010)  (0.026) (0.010)  (0.022) (0.010)  
Buffer -0.079 0.081 -0.160 -0.154* -0.040 -0.114 -0.062 -0.082 0.020 
 (0.154) (0.076)  (0.090) (0.073)  (0.073) (0.068)  
Tobin’s Q 0.009** 0.004 0.005 0.015*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.001 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.004)  
Equity Ratio 0.117 -0.033 0.150 0.283** -0.029 0.312** 0.330 -0.105 0.435** 
 (0.215) (0.112)  (0.128) (0.095)  (0.218) (0.099)  
Credit Quality 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004)  
Recession 0.038*** -0.009** 0.047*** 0.019*** -0.014*** 0.033*** 0.004 -0.013*** 0.017** 
 (0.009) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.003)  
MES -0.192 0.085 -0.277 -0.293 0.103 -0.396* -0.306 0.109 -0.415** 
 (0.402) (0.077)  (0.235) (0.076)  (0.198) (0.089)  
Constant -0.008 0.009 -0.017 -0.021 0.018 -0.039 -0.066 0.025 -0.091** 
 (0.036) (0.018)  (0.028) (0.016)  (0.043) (0.018)  
          
Observations 46 55  46 55  46 55  




Table A.4-12 (Continued): Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of 
Sub-Debt Issuers by Risk Levels 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky and less-risky 
sub-debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted median 
Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers in the year prior 
to issuance of sub-debt from the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers over the post-issuance periods, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution 
otherwise are defined as being Risky. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-Size 
is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of total 
loans to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q is 
the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1st Year Diff 2nd Year Diff Over 2 Years Diff 
Risky Less-Risky (10vs11) Risky Less-Risky (13vs14) Risky Less-Risky (16vs17) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.920*** 0.337 0.583** 1.053*** 0.294 0.759 1.110*** 0.398 0.712* 
 (0.097) (0.303)  (0.145) (0.639)  (0.255) (0.382)  
Bank-Size 0.003 -0.001 0.004* 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.006* -0.004*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.001)  
ROA -7.787** 0.893 -8.680*** -9.925** 0.889 -10.81** -8.052** 0.686 -8.738*** 
 (3.098) (1.242)  (4.520) (1.719)  (3.616) (1.005)  
Loans-Assets -0.007 0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.008 -0.007 0.015 -0.011 0.026 
 (0.020) (0.011)  (0.027) (0.016)  (0.031) (0.009)  
Buffer -0.077 -0.111 0.034 -0.029 -0.246* 0.217 0.097 -0.137* 0.234** 
 (0.080) (0.076)  (0.085) (0.135)  (0.084) (0.072)  
Tobin’s Q 0.019*** -0.001 0.020*** 0.020** 0.000 0.020** 0.018** 0.004 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.004)  
Equity Ratio 0.270 -0.140 0.410** 0.331 -0.306 0.637** 0.291 -0.102 0.393 
 (0.203) (0.106)  (0.257) (0.225)  (0.274) (0.104)  
Credit Quality 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.012 -0.003 0.005 0.008* -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.004)  
Recession 0.007 -0.010*** 0.017** 0.006 -0.021*** 0.027*** -0.033*** -0.001 -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.002)  
MES -0.260 0.120 -0.380** -0.335 -0.130 -0.205 0.200 -0.025 0.225 
 (0.180) (0.096)  (0.257) (0.144)  (0.265) (0.081)  
Constant -0.047 0.023 -0.069* -0.058 0.045 -0.102* -0.102* 0.043** -0.145*** 
 (0.040) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.040)  (0.054) (0.017)  
          
Observations 46 55  44 52  46 55  





Table A.4-13: Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of Senior Debt 
Issuers by Risk Levels 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky and less-risky 
senior debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted 
median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers in the 
year prior to issuance from the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers over the post-issuance periods, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution 
otherwise they are defined as being Risky. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-
Size is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of 
total loans to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q 
is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1st Quarter Diff 2nd Quarter Diff 3rd Quarter Diff 
Risky Less-Risky (1vs2) Risky Less-Risky (4vs5) Risky Less-Risky (7vs8) 
          
Pre-Risk -0.121 0.802*** -0.923* -0.035 0.644*** -0.679 0.148 0.453*** -0.305 
 (0.492) (0.212)  (0.487) (0.152)  (0.587) (0.150)  
Bank-Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  
ROA -0.738 -0.494 -0.244 -0.595 -0.322 -0.273 -0.835 0.322 -1.157 
 (1.084) (0.636)  (0.977) (0.587)  (1.031) (0.720)  
Loans-Assets -0.057* 0.009 -0.066** -0.058** 0.012 -0.070** -0.065** 0.014 -0.079*** 
 (0.031) (0.016)  (0.029) (0.012)  (0.030) (0.011)  
Buffer -0.256 -0.035 -0.221 -0.295 -0.032 -0.263 -0.347* 0.050 -0.397** 
 (0.191) (0.086)  (0.178) (0.061)  (0.206) (0.062)  
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.007** -0.001 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio 0.141 -0.285* 0.426** 0.204 -0.267** 0.471*** 0.216 -0.347** 0.563*** 
 (0.124) (0.160)  (0.140) (0.127)  (0.167) (0.132)  
Credit Quality -0.010 0.003 -0.013 -0.014 0.003 -0.017 -0.016 0.004 -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.005)  (0.014) (0.004)  (0.015) (0.003)  
Recession -0.000 -0.006* 0.006 -0.007 -0.012*** 0.005 -0.012* -0.017*** 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.003)  
MES -0.082 0.079 -0.161 -0.070 0.059 -0.129 -0.073 0.190* -0.263 
 (0.223) (0.099)  (0.177) (0.093)  (0.152) (0.100)  
Constant 0.077* 0.036** 0.041 0.067* 0.028** 0.039 0.077* 0.029** 0.048 
 (0.043) (0.017)  (0.037) (0.013)  (0.039) (0.013)  
          
Observations 88 85  89 87  89 88  




Table A.4-13 (Continued): Regression Results on the Adjusted Post-issuance Median Tail Risk of 
Senior Debt Issuers by Risk Levels 
This table presents the estimated linear regression results on the adjusted median Tail Risk of risky and less-risky 
senior debt issuers for the 8-quarters (2 years) post-issuance over the sample period 1984 to 2013. The adjusted 
median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers is calculated by subtracting the median Tail Risk of sub-debt issuers in the 
year prior to issuance from the median Tail Risk of senior debt issuers over the post-issuance periods, where Tail 
Risk is the average equity loss when a bank’s returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of 
its daily stock returns. Banks are Less-Risky if their Tail Risk falls below the median of the sample distribution 
otherwise they are defined as being Risky. Pre-Risk is the adjusted median Tail Risk in the year prior issuance; Bank-
Size is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the ratio of pre-tax earnings to total assets; Loans-Assets is the ratio of 
total loans to total assets; Buffer is the actual regulatory capital adequacy ratio less the minimum required; Tobin’s Q 
is the market value of equity divided by its book value; Equity Ratio is primary or Tier 1 capital divided by total assets; 
Credit Quality is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issuers with a S&P rating of BBB- or better, or 0 otherwise; 
Recession is a dummy variable equal to 1 for recessionary periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), or 0 otherwise; MES is marginal expected shortfall - the average equity loss when the market 
returns are in the lower 5th percentile of the quarterly distribution of daily stock returns. Bank-Size is in logarithmic 
terms while all other continuous covariates are in ratios/fractions (not percent). The standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, while the notations ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Regression Analysis 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1st Year Diff 2nd Year Diff Over 2 Years Diff 
Risky Less-Risky (10vs11) Risky Less-Risky (13vs14) Risky Less-Risky (16vs17) 
          
Pre-Risk 0.412 0.470** -0.058 0.820 1.100*** -0.280 0.994** 0.462*** 0.532 
 (0.640) (0.198)  (0.630) (0.399)  (0.497) (0.170)  
Bank-Size -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005* 0.004** -0.009*** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  
ROA -1.144 0.010 -1.154 0.202 1.391 -1.189 -0.517 -0.621 0.104 
 (0.983) (0.867)  (0.767) (2.321)  (0.846) (0.587)  
Loans-Assets -0.095** 0.008 -0.103*** -0.065 -0.028 -0.037 -0.015 0.002 -0.017 
 (0.038) (0.013)  (0.041) (0.048)  (0.025) (0.007)  
Buffer -0.499** 0.089 -0.588** -0.616** 0.095 -0.711*** -0.216 0.040 -0.256 
 (0.234) (0.068)  (0.249) (0.148)  (0.177) (0.051)  
Tobin’s Q 0.009** -0.001 0.010** 0.005 -0.009 0.014** 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.002)  
Equity Ratio 0.270* -0.301** 0.571*** 0.241* 0.014 0.227 0.059 0.049 0.010 
 (0.156) (0.143)  (0.139) (0.460)  (0.115) (0.083)  
Credit Quality -0.019 0.002 -0.021 -0.032 -0.003 -0.029 -0.023* -0.008** -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.003)  (0.023) (0.005)  (0.014) (0.004)  
Recession -0.013* -0.010*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.016** 0.016* -0.007 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.002)  
MES -0.042 0.201* -0.243 -0.040 -0.058 0.018 -0.213 0.002 -0.215 
 (0.167) (0.118)  (0.245) (0.216)  (0.158) (0.069)  
Constant 0.105** 0.024* 0.081* 0.119** -0.010 0.129** 0.051 0.001 0.050 
 (0.043) (0.013)  (0.048) (0.026)  (0.035) (0.010)  
          
Observations 89 88  70 79  89 88  




Chapter 5:  Summary and Implications 
5.1 Background of the Thesis 
The extent of economic disruptions brought by the instability of the banking sector 
necessitate proactive regulatory mechanisms that seek to prevent a repeated occurrence of 
distress episodes. Regulatory capital frameworks are one of the key preventive measures 
available in this regard. However, these frameworks that have overtime been used as a 
yardstick for banking safety and soundness proved inadequate to contain the might of the 
global financial crisis. 
On these grounds, the regulators embarked on the enormous task of overhauling the 
capital frameworks to improve the quality and quantity of elements that would safeguard 
bank soundness. As a result, a greater emphasis is placed on high quality capital elements as 
true loss-absorbing securities, thereby relegating the importance of sub-debt in regulatory 
capital. Notwithstanding that, the quantity of sub-debt in regulatory capital remains 
nontrivial, yet there is little evidence as to whether banks use the instrument to primarily 
improve their overall capital adequacy levels. Moreover, we know little about perceptions of 
shareholders with regard to the use of sub-debt for these regulatory purposes. 
In some ways, the continuous inclusion of sub-debt within regulatory capital should be 
effective in influencing banks to recapitalize. Crucially, these efforts should not camouflage 
vices that threaten the objectives of financial stability. More importantly, these goals should 
be equally embraced by other bank stakeholders such that there is no interference to the 
regulatory effectiveness of capital elements, specifically sub-debt.  
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This thesis brings perspective to these issues by analysing the use of sub-debt across a 
longer period that cuts across all regulatory capital regimes in the US. Through this analysis, 
the thesis contributes to the wider debate on the effectiveness of regulation on the capital 
structure decisions of banks. It also informs ongoing debates on the relevance of sub-debt 
as an element of regulatory capital.  
The task of isolating the regulatory relevance of sub-debt begins with chapter 2 reviewing 
other roles of the instrument in the wider capital structure of banks. Apart from its intended 
regulatory function, sub-debt is prominent for its disciplinary, informational and tax 
purposes. Given the residual nature of their claims, sub-debt holders are sensitive to bank 
risk hence considered to be effective players in curbing the risk-taking actions of banks. 
Banks also use sub-debt as a conduit for transmitting positive information to the market, 
while the tax-deductibility of the interest on the instrument earns them a tax benefit. 
Effectively, these auxiliary roles alongside the application of the instrument by non-financial 
firms that are not subject to capital requirements makes the regulatory role of sub-debt less 
obvious. The two empirical chapters of this thesis hence attempt to clear this ambiguity. 
Specifically, chapter 3 examines the role of regulation on the issuance of sub-debt. The 
chapter applies the regulatory capital buffer as an indicator of the regulatory binding 
constraint and contrasts these effects with the variables that explain the debt priority 
structure in general. The chapter proceeds to evaluate if the regulatory privilege of issuing 
sub-debt conceals any undesirable intentions contradictory to financial stability.  
Chapter 4 further expands the regulatory scope of sub-debt by considering the value 
perceptions of shareholders with respect to its issuance. The primary purpose of the chapter 
is to test for shareholder incentives within the wider capital structure, which could weaken 
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the effective application of sub-debt as a regulatory capital element that banks, particularly 
vulnerable ones, can access to improve their capital position. These incentives are traceable 
to the seniority of debt within the broader bank capital structure that presents opportunities 
for risk-shifting and redistribution of wealth from subordinated claims. The value of these 
opportunities to shareholders is reviewed by testing the stock reactions to the announcement 
of senior debt, a non-regulatory element, and sub-debt. Furthermore, the chapter establishes 
whether the security choice decisions of banks are deliberately made to support the risk-
shifting motives of shareholders by examining the post-issuance risk profile of banks. More 
specifically, the study evaluates whether the choice of senior debt exacerbates the risk-taking 
behavior of banks, particularly those that have a legacy of being risky. 
5.2 Summary of Findings 
The empirical chapters revealed some important findings on the effectiveness of 
regulation behind the use of sub-debt in banking and some disturbances to the regulatory 
effectiveness of the instrument.  
5.2.1 Does Regulation Drive Banks to Issue Subordinated Debt? 
Chapter 3 offers insights on the primary drivers of sub-debt issuance over the regulatory 
capital regimes covering the period from 1983 to 2015. The main finding of the study is that 
the issuance of sub-debt seems to be driven by regulatory motives that allow the instrument 
to serve as capital. In this manner, banks that are most in need of capital, thus are less-
capitalized, see an opportunity to improve their regulatory capital through sub-debt. These 




Arguably, the list of capital elements in this regard is not exhaustive given that banks can 
also access TPS and perpetual preferred stock to restore their capital position. Nevertheless, 
our analysis considers sub-debt and equity as key regulatory components that have stood 
the test of capital frameworks, and their coexistence within capital even predates the era of 
formal capital requirements (Ehlen, 1983). These securities, therefore, offer a rich dataset to 
reflect upon the effectiveness of regulation across capital requirements that differently 
treated their participation in regulatory capital. However, instruments like TPS were available 
for a limited timeframe within regulatory capital, hence would narrow the scope of 
discussions on the relevance of capital requirements on security issuance. Similarly, perpetual 
preferred shares would also inadequately capture the regulatory effect due to their scarcity 
in regulatory capital (see, Boyson et al., 2016).  
Essentially, the issuance of equity or sub-debt represent a common action towards 
improving capital adequacy ratios over the long-term. In this instance, the securities could 
be seen as substitutes in the drive to meet regulatory capital requirements, hence their 
issuance could be distinct and unrelated choices even when excluding alternative securities 
for reasons advanced above. In fact, the study further establishes that the regulatory motive 
of sub-debt is not affected by the ability of banks to build their capital base through internal 
means viz., by cutting dividends or reducing assets. On these grounds, we found it 
reasonable to rely on the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) for 
the analysis in this chapter.  
Notwithstanding that, the present results have been exposed to extensive tests to 
eliminate alternative explanations and the chapter continues to show that the decision to 
allow banks to use sub-debt for regulatory purposes does not present opportunities for risk 
shifting. Rather, banks that are prone to risk-shifting have a lower chance of issuing sub-
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debt. These findings suggest market discipline in debt quantities is effective in rationing 
funding to risky banks. The results also reveal that large banks also face these disciplinary 
measures - against the view that these banks are spared from discipline due to government 
guarantees associated with them.  
5.2.2 The Effect of Debt Priority on the Regulatory Role of Subordinated 
Debt 
Chapter 4 explains the tensions within the priority structure of bank capital that dilute 
the effective use of sub-debt for regulatory purposes. The chapter is based on arguments 
that disregard the regulatory role of sub-debt without paying much attention to factors that 
obscure its participation in this respect, particularly the seniority of securities within the 
wider bank capital structure. The main finding of the chapter is that shareholders seem to 
place greater value on the risk-shifting and wealth-expropriation opportunities associated 
with senior debt, which weakens their perceptions about the regulatory value of sub-debt. 
Specifically, shareholders of banks that would most likely benefit from the issuance of sub-
debt do not value the issuance of this capital improving element. To the contrary, the chapter 
shows that these banks, which are usually risky or less capitalized, create significant 
shareholder value when they issue senior debt.  
In further tests, the chapter finds that the use of senior debt by risky or less-capitalized 
banks generate significant wealth for shareholders, as such, the opportunities to shift risk 
and redistribute wealth from other stakeholders seem to be mainly valuable for vulnerable 
banks. Pursuant to these risk-shifting opportunities, the use of senior debt aggravates the 
risk-taking behavior of banks in the long-run. In this case, banks that have a legacy of being 
risky or less capitalized become riskier after issuing senior debt. These effects do not show 
up following the issuance of sub-debt.  
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A key challenge to the analysis in this chapter was the screening of senior debt securities. 
Unlike sub-debt that can be designed along regulatory requirements, senior debt is varied 
and banks can apply it in many forms. The task of choosing uniform bank senior debt issues 
is, therefore, a rarity and the existing limited studies offer little guidance in this regard. For 
example, Hancock and Birchler (2004) does not explicitly state their criteria for sampling 
senior debt, while Schandlbauer (2014), for unexplained reasons, drops short-term debt 
securities. Therefore, deciding on the kind of senior debt for the purpose of this chapter 
was an intuitive decision. The chapter proceeded by keeping straight senior debt securities 
i.e. non-hybrid issues, excluding complex deals such as swaps, mortgage bonds, and 
dropping deposit-like or loan-like securities.  
Nevertheless, the dataset for senior debt issues remains large, hence further possible 
filters are unlikely to significantly alter the sample size for this analysis, thereby providing 
reasonable comfort to the findings of this chapter. On that basis, the chapter concludes that 
the moral hazard opportunities that come along with the seniority of debt within the broader 
capital structure of a bank interferes with the regulatory function of sub-debt. Therefore, 
the observed inefficacy of sub-debt in regulatory capital is not necessarily due to its design, 
but owes to the conflicting shareholder incentives within the priority structure of the wider 
bank capital. 
5.3 Policy Implications and Future Areas for Research  
The findings of this thesis have important implications on the use of sub-debt by banks. 
However, the regulatory importance of sub-debt itself is threatened by numerous regulatory 
surcharges and buffers that require equity capital. For example, the countercyclical and 
conservation buffers would at least increase the minimum capital adequacy requirement to 
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13%. Under this scenario, sub-debt and other Tier 2 elements would contribute about 15% 
to the total capital. At these levels, it is then for future debate to establish whether the 
instrument has any tangible economic purpose, despite the evidence that regulation drives 
its issuance.  
In addition, the Total Loss Absorbing Capital requirements (TLAC) would require large 
banks to issue unsecured/unguaranteed debt with a minimum maturity of at least 12 months 
(Federal Reserve System, 2017). However, the credit enhancement and payment acceleration 
clauses on this debt makes it ineligible for regulatory capital, yet it shares some common 
attributes with sub-debt. With these inconsistencies, coupled with the diminishing 
proportion of sub-debt in regulatory capital, it seems inconceivable to expect large banks to 
still favor sub-debt. This is a concern given that sub-debt is historically utilized by these 
banks. These issues, therefore, need to be further discussed with a view to informing the 
future of sub-debt in regulatory capital. In general, future research needs to provide more 
evidence on the regulatory importance of sub-debt, otherwise the overemphasis on market 
discipline could ultimately compromise its attributes of capital.  
Lastly, the tendency of shareholders to systematically value the risk-shifting and wealth-
expropriation opportunities presented by senior debt over the regulatory benefits of sub-
debt suggest that regulators should engage bank shareholders in the regulation process. 
Moreover, the prevalence of this opportunistic behavior implores future research to directly 
test if shareholders “ultimately realize” their motives to expropriate the wealth and shift risk 
to subordinated debtholders. That is, subsequent studies could explore how sub-debt yields 
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